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Abstract 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the understanding of the key economic and 
company specific components of credit spreads in the investment and non-investment 
grade US bond market for different maturing bond indices. It calls for the full 
integration of different market andfirm specific variables into a unique framework, in 
order to predict credit spread changes. Key determinants of default risk are employed 
to determine credit migration risk. 
Particularly, this thesis provides evidence as to the relation between different 
macroeconomic factors and credit spread changes in all different maturities and 
rating categories, it supports the use of the consumer confidence index, as the most 
important variable explaining changes in credit spreads in investment and high yield 
companies, but most importantly it provides support for the strong informational 
content of high yield spreads as predictors of output growth, based on Option 
Adjusted Spreads. It favours the inclusion of implied volatilities in explaining credit 
spread changes, while it criticises the incorporation of historical ones. Throughout 
the thesis, it becomes evident that BBB-rated bonds exhibit highly volatile patterns 
and are very difficult to model. 
Financial ratios adjusted to reflect depreciation and amortisation expenses, which 
are usually very high for non-investment grade companies, prove to be very important 
in explaining changes of high yield spreads. However, firm specific risk, accounts 
onlyfor a smallfraction of the variation in the investment grade category. UltirnatelY, 
it is shown that by using solely market (equity and macro variables) andfirm specific 
variables, i. e. some of the key determinants of default risk and the price of credit risky 
debt in most Merton-type models, we can accurately forecast credit spread changes at 
least one year ahead, particularly based on results provided from the investment 
grade sample. Moreover, credit spreadforecasts, based on our set of OAS, tend to be 
overestimated rather than underestimated, as opposed to results provided by previous 
studies. This makesforecasts more conservative and therefore more appealingfor risk 
management purposes. 
In particular, this thesis is focused on the main drivers of credit spread movements in 
the US corporate bond market. There arefour issues mainly considered. 
II 
The first part of the thesis examines a question that is a point of centralfocus in the 
fixed income literature, i. e. the relation between credit spread changes and the 
macroeconomic cycle. This chapter is inspired by the relatively little work that has 
been done on the empirical relationship between credit spread changes and the 
macroeconomy, since most of the literature on this issue focuses on macroeconomic 
variables and the modelling of default risk. We investigate how this relation evolves, 
not only with respect to short, medium and long term maturities but also for 
investment and non-investment rated companies, by testing the direction of causation 
among economic variables and credit spreads and by employing different sets of data 
and estimation techniques to explore the relation. We find that irrespective of the 
statistical method used or the time period tested that the most important variable in 
explaining the variation of credit spread changes is the US Consumer Confidence 
Index. We affirm the negative relation between the consumer confidence index, money 
supply and changes in credit spreads but notfor the variables of GDP and industrial 
production. The negative relation between the term structure and credit spreads is 
also asserted for investment grade bonds of all maturities, consistent with the 
structural model's theory, while wefind this relation to be positivefor non-investment 
grade companies. Results from the OLS regressions suggest that macroeconomic 
variables alone, can explain at best a 17% of the variation in medium and long term 
maturing indices, and a 20.5% in short term indices. Findings from cross sectional 
regressions suggest that macroeconomic factors alone can explain 27.9% of the 
variation in credit spreads for investment grade bonds and a 44.4% for high yield 
ones. When testing the direction of causation, wefind thatfor long and medium term 
maturity investment grade indices we reject the null hypothesis that macroeconomic 
variables don't granger cause changes in credit spreads, but not for short term 
maturities and the high yield sector. Indeed, results provided on that respectfrom the 
high yield category, provide evidence that non-investment grade spreads may be a 
good proxyfor predictinglestimating overallfinancial conditions. 
Secondly, the relation between credit spreads and equities together with their implied 
and historical volatilities is examined. This chapter constitutes an effort tofill the gap 
in the existing literature, which has focused mainly on bond returns or yield changes, 
while very limited work has been done in modelling credit spread changes. 
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Empirical evidence points out to thefact that debt markets not only in the US but also 
in Europe and elsewhere seem to be greatly affected by the movements in the equity 
markets. If that is the case we should expect changes in equity prices to affect changes 
in credit spreads. This assumption is tested on a cross sectional and time series basis, 
for quarterly and monthly frequencies and by using company specific equity prices 
against the respective credit spreads, but also by including equity and volatility 
indices. We find that there is a negative relation between credit spread and equity 
changes, irrespective of maturity or rating category. Results provided by univariate 
regressions, based on changes in equity prices alone, explain haýr of the variation of 
B-rated corporate spreads. Results affirm the positive relation between implied 
volatilities and their high explanatory power on credit spread changes while findings 
derived from historical volatilities although statistically significant don't even 
marginally support the hypothesis of explaining the variation in credit spreads. In 
particular, results from pooled regressions suggest that when implied volatilities are 
substitutedfor the historical ones, adjusted R2 sfell to 6% and 28%for the investment 
and non-investment grade samples respectively (from 25% and 50.3% for investment 
and non-investment grade companies, when implied volatilities are considered). 
Resultsfrom OLS regressions, suggest that equity variables explain at best a 44%for 
short term maturing indices, and 35% and 37% for medium and long term maturing 
2 indices as reflected by the adjusted R S. We also strongly reject the null hypothesis 
that implied volatilities don't granger cause changes in credit spreads but only with 
regards to short and medium term maturities. 
The next chapter of the thesis focuses on how changes in a company's financials, as 
those are presented by ratios, actually infiuence changes in credit spreads. The 
reason for including this chapter is due to the fact that although traditional ratio 
analysis has been widely investigated, it has mainly been tested within the context of 
default risk, while very limited literature exists on the use of traditional credit risk 
analysis in determining credit spread changes. Cross sectional analysis is employed 
in this chapter to test the hypothesis that credit spread changes are influenced by 
changes in accounting factors, both in investment and high yield categories. On a 
multivariate basis, wefind that 63.5% of the variation in high yield credit spreads is 
explained by the changes in financial ratios, as reflected by the adjusted R2, 
compared to an adjusted R2 of 19.2% for investment grade companies. Consistently, 
13 
in the randomly selected group of companies, we find that traditional ratios can 
explain one third of the variation in credit spreads in the high yield sector, although 
less than 10% in the investment grade sample. A reason for the higher explanatory 
power in the high yield sector entails the use of ratios adjusted, to reflect depreciation 
and amortisation expenses, which hasn't been considered before. The most 
statistically and economically significant coefficient was obtained from the current 
market capitalisation, which was used as a proxyfor thefirm's size. 
The last part of the thesis, constitutes an effort to combine all the above factors 
(macroeconomic, equity and financials), in order to forecast credit spread changes 
one and two years ahead. We show that on a multiple regression context, results 
provided are consistent with previous chapters and indeed highly significant in 
explaining credit spread variation, irrespective of the time period tested. For the total 
sample we get an adjusted R2 of 95% or 52% as part of the weighted and unweighted 
statistics respectively. A robust model is identified for forecasting credit spread 
changes one year ahead, with the employment of the dynamic solution method. The 
accuracy of the model doesn't fall below 85% within the first year, while we choose 
as the most vigorous methodfor estimating coefficients the GLS method adjustedfor 
heteroscedasticity, since it consistently provides more conservative forecasts. 
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1.0. Introduction 
I. I. Motivation for this study 
Over the past twenty years a significant number of important changes have been made 
in the credit risk and credit management area. The reasons for these developments are 
basically considered to be: 
a. Rise in Credit Risk. Most bankruptcy statistics show a significant increase in the 
number of bankruptcies', some of which are attributed to the increased 
competition. The same forces that are driving market growth are also affecting the 
credit quality of issuers. Additionally, financial engineering is creating new types 
of securities which are often complicated. As a result, more resources should be 
committed to credit risk analysis, not only in order to weight the relative risk of 
default, but also and most importantlV to monitor and forecast chanzes in credit 
risk over time. The role of credit analysis is increasingly becoming time sensitive, 
since the value of a debt security must be continuously evaluated according to the 
current market value, and quickly adjusted for any changes in the credit quality 
that may have a direct impact on secondary market prices. 
b. Rating agencies responses. Following the 1998 Asian crisis and the general rise in 
credit spread levels, it became apparent, that credit ratings are not always 
consistent with the issuer's credit quality. There have been a number of defaulted 
issuers, whose ratings at the time were not suggesting an immediate default. This 
effectively poses numerous concerns about the timing and credit sensitivity to 
which credit agencies respond to credit quality issues. 
C. More competitive margins. Interest margins and spreads tend in some periods to 
become very thin despite a decline in the average credit quality of loans and/or 
bonds. This is the result of increased competition. In terms of the competitive 
interest margins, this is the outcome of the increased supply of loans and the 
increasing number of smaller banks which are providing their services at a 
1 According to Moody's study of default rates of corporate bond issuers from 1985-2004, annual 
corporate default rates peaked in 2002 in Europe and in 2001 in the US while they have declined quite 
sharply during 2003 and 2004. In particular, in US, the number of defaulted issuers, according to 
Moody's definition of default, reached 155 in 2001 which represents a 42% increase from 2000 and a 
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discount, while on the credit spread front; this is the result of an increasing 
number of new issue of bonds of particular rating categories and of specific 
maturities. 
d. Privatisation. Continuing privatisation of state-owned companies together with 
their need to fund their capital requirements in the public markets, effectively 
increases the number of potential issuers. This means that there is increased 
appetite for debt instruments, which in some instances have to be tailor made in 
order to meet the customer's needs. This increased demand for debt products in 
some instances is met by an increase in their supply, hence, there is credit spread 
equilibrium, while in other instances the increased demand may not always be 
accompanied by an increase in supply, and therefore we might end up with a 
tightening of credit spreads and vice versa. 
e. Expansion of investment funds. It has been an increasing trend for ageing 
individuals (especially in Europe) to invest in the market through a pension fund 
or a life insurance company. Once an integrated market is established the investor 
will have a wider selection of investment opportunities from which to choose, and 
effectively most of the investment decision making process will pass on to the 
institutional investors. In other words, there is a move observed for people to 
move from a defined benefit scheme to defined contribution schemes. 
f Growth of off-balance sheet instruments. The increase of off balance sheet 
instruments came along with the increased demand for tailor made products to 
meet customer's specific needs and requirements. These instruments may be part 
of structured finance loans or structured bonds, and since part of them usually is 
off balance sheet, credit risk can't be properly managed or measured. This 
intrinsically increase credit risk and that was one of the main reasons for the 
introduction of risk based capital requirements by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in 1993. Under the BIS system, banks have to hold a capital 
requirement based on the marked to market current value of each OTC derivative 
contract. 
638% increase from 1997. The respective statistics of European defaults show a 433% annual increase 
in 2001 and an 1600% increase from 1997. 
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g. Basel 11 framework. This imposes that all banks should develop more 
sophisticated credit risk management systems and strategies, in order to measure 
and efficiently manage credit risk and consequently has provided the strongest 
incentive for banks to develop new credit risk models. Up until 1992, all loans had 
been subject to the same 8% capital adequacy ratio, irrespective of the size of 
loan, its maturity and credit quality. This accord has been reviewed several times 
until it reached its present format, whose aim is to improve the way regulatory 
capital requirements reflect underlying risks. This framework introduces, three 
approaches, the standardised approach, the foundation internal ratings approach 
and the advanced internal ratings based approach for the calculation of risk 
weights. The ultimate goal is to reduce risk weights for high quality corporate 
credits, and to introduce a higher than 100% risk weight for lower quality 
exposures. Given that credit rating agencies are not always adjusting credit ratings 
on a timely basis, there is a stronger incentive for banks to develop internal credit 
risk systems to closely monitor and evaluate credit risk. For every bank, world 
wide the ultimate goal and objective is to follow the foundation or advanced 
internal ratings based approach for the calculation of credit risk weights. In that 
way, the chances that banks will be in position to calculate more accurate and 
potentially lower risk weights for their exposures, are higher. Another reason for 
the development of internal credit risk models, is that the Basel II framework, 
assigns more conservative (higher) risk weights for not rated corporates, hence 
there is increased appetite for banks to assign their own internal ratings which 
may provide them the opportunity to assume a better risk weight for their capital 
requirements. It should be mentioned though, that the costs to banks for 
developing and calibrating an internal credit risk model may be much higher than 
the capital reduction they will potentially incur, but those implications won't be 
further explored here since they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As a result of the above mentioned developments academics and practitioners have 
responded by researching in depth the issue of credit risk management and by 
developing more sophisticated credit risk models. In particular, new models 
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developed incorporate market and credit risk, quantify risk on a portfolio basis and are 
proved to help more active management of credit portfolios. 2 
1.1.1. Objectives and Contributions of this Thesis 
Considering all the above developments, it is rather surprising that most of the 
empirical work in credit risk literature has focused on modelling default risk, while 
limited work has been done in estimating transitions in credit ratings as those are 
reflected in credit spread changes. Therefore, the main objective and idea behind this 
thesis, is to find the determinants of credit spread changes (only migration risk is 
considered throughout this thesis) as well as to explore the structural relation among 
credit spread changes, (which by default are used as proxy for credit ratings) together 
with a set of explanatory variables that incorporate both market and credit risk namely 
equity market information, US macroeconomic infon-nation and US firm specific 
company infon-nation. The aim is to construct a multi-factor credit risk model for 
estimating/predicting credit spread changes. 
Additionally, this thesis constitutes an effort to combine variables used in the recently 
developed credit risk models and traditional credit risk analysis, into one model that 
can forecast changes in credit spreads. Models developed recently, based on the 
structural approach, suggest that this approach doesn't provide accurate forecasts. 
Also the literature on modelling credit spread changes has been rather thin, since most 
of the research work has focused on yield changes 3. For example, hedge funds often 
take high leveraged positions in corporate bonds, while hedging the interest rate risk 
by shorting treasuries. Effectively, their portfolios are more sensitive to credit spread 
changes rather than yield changes. 
This thesis is particularly relevant and motivated by credit risk analysis from the bond 
investment side. A corporate bond investor is particularly interested in selecting the 
corporate bond that will yield the better return, other things equal. However, within 
the context of this thesis, we are not interested at the initial price that the bond is 
issued, but rather in the movements 
- 
changes in spreads, realised to that particular 
' For a detailed description of the new models and approaches developed, refer to section 2.2.1- 2.3. 3 See Kwan (1996) 
18 
bond, once it is issued. A bond investor has two options when a bond is comes to the 
market: 
a. Buy the bond, if he/she thinks that the issue price is fair, compared to other bonds 
of the same rating category and maturity, is confident about that bond's outlook 
and the bond's specifications meet his/her portfolio requirements, or 
b. Not buy the bond. 
This thesis, focuses on estimating /predicting the outlook of that bond once an 
investor has decided to add it to his/her portfolio of bonds and other assets. An 
investor's decision to buy a bond shouldn't only be driven by the price it comes to the 
market, but also and more importantly by the expected change in the price of that 
bond until maturity. Effectively, this means that the financial performance and market 
outlook should be carefully considered and be part of the decision making process. In 
other words, it is very important to consider closely internal and external factors that 
can influence the performance of a bond. This means that the idea and objective of 
this thesis is core to any investment decision. 
Of course, this idea isn't first incepted here. Academic literature, has provided a 
number of papers dealing with credit risk and default, macroeconomic cycle and 
defaults or the relationship between the debt and equity markets. But here the aim is 
to fill the gap in the literature, by combining the theoretical background of the 
different default risk models developed and extend their work within the context of 
credit migration risk. 
The main contributions of this thesis are the following: 
(i) Usually credit risk models are linking different macroeconomic or firm 
specific variables with default. Here, we refer to less extreme movements in 
credit quality than default, i. e. credit migration risk is considered throughout 
this thesis. 
(ii) Estimation of a relation incorporating market and credit risk in forecasting 
credit spread changes. This thesis deals with an extensive list of firm specific, 
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market and macroeconomic variables that haven't been researched before. 
Significant part of this thesis is focused on how individual accounting ratios 
affect credit spread changes and to that extent credit ratings. Models that have 
been created up-to-date model credit spreads, mainly as a function of solely 
macroeconomic, market factors or company specific factors, but very limited 
work has been done in modelling simultaneously both micro and macro 
variables, especially within the context of credit migration risk, 
Construction of an index that represents constituents of the Merrill Lynch 
Indices (i. e. the US High Grade Broad Market Index and the US High Yield 
Master 11 Index), which includes unique bonds per company in the dataset. 
Data collection and elimination process used in this thesis is of great 
importance for the results reported. In particular, Merrill Lynch spread indices 
have been eliminated to include only one bond from a particular issuer. 
Although this might eliminate data observations and doesn't consider the 
reaction of different maturity bonds to credit and market factors, on the other 
hand it explicitly sets the cross sections to be used and in this way it is 
expected that results are more representative. Due to the nature of this data, 
results from constituents of the Merrill Lynch indices have been based on 
analysis of cross sectional data, and are compared to time series results of 
credit spread indices from Bloomberg, where appropriate (i. e. when the 
relation of credit spreads to equities and macroeconomic factors was tested). 
(iv) Credit spreads' data we use, is option-adjusted. In that way we avoid the 
problem of comparing two bonds of the same maturity which don't necessarily 
have the same duration (price sensitivity to interest rate changes) nor the same 
convexity (sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve). By using option adjusted 
spreads (OAS) the modified duration of bonds is calculated and option 
adjusted duration for bonds with an embedded option is also considered. 
Therefore, credit spreads correspond to the difference in the yield to maturity 
between bonds with the same duration, which may partially offset the coupon 
effect on the yield to maturity. Moreover, these spreads are clean of any 
coupon and index rebalancing effects. 
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(v) In part of the thesis, all broad seven rating categories are considered. This is 
very important since we can gain a better view on the overall spectrum of 
rating categories, compared to other studies that mainly deal with investment 
grade companies. Also we are testing whether different maturity credit spread 
indices are influenced differently by different macro or equity factors. 
(vi) Frequency of the data collected. Conclusions drawn from this thesis are based 
on monthly (Bloomberg & Merrill Lynch Indices) and quarterly (Merrill 
Lynch) data. The frequency of the data collected has very important 
implications for the results obtained. Considering both monthly and quarterly 
effects is very important since in this way both short and longer term effects of 
the relation between credit spreads and the independent variables are captured. 
On the other hand, the use of daily or weekly data for modelling credit spreads 
or yield changes, used by other studies, although producing statistically 
significant results, economic wise is not as significant since credit spreads 
shouldn't be modelled at such frequent time intervals, but rather this is a more 
appropriate treatment for market risk purposes, as we expect that movements 
in credit quality aren't that significant on a daily or weekly basis. 
(vii) Credit spreads are used as proxy for ratings. Contrary to other studies that 
explain credit spreads by using credit ratings as a dummy variable, or the 
default and recovery rates, here the pattern of credit spreads is estimated using 
solely macroeconomic, equity and firm specific variables as explanatory 
variables. I believe this is a much more accurate way for explaining 
movements and drivers of credit spreads rather than using credit ratings or 
default probabilities, since by using the latter there is a possibility of double 
counting, since this is information already incorporated in credit spreads. 
Moreover, all the reduced form models of default although proposing a simple 
framework for estimating credit spread changes 4, they typically deviate from 
the firm value process, and although they may do a good job in "fitting" the 
observed credit spreads, the aren't offering that good insight for estimating the 
' See Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) 
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determinants of credit spread changes5. On the other hand, structural models 
provide an intuitive framework for identifying the detenninants of credit 
spread changes and offer a prediction for whether changes in these variables 
should be positively or negatively related to changes in credit spreads. 
(viii) Existing literature focusing on the determination of a company's long term 
standing with the use of accounting ratios, uses credit/bond ratings as the 
dependent variable, and focuses on the use of those variables in predicting 
default or corporate collapses. In this thesis, we use changes in credit spreads 
as the dependent variable as we believe, in that way we can more accurately 
track changes in the creditworthiness of an issuer and hence predict upward or 
downward movements in credit spreads. Moreover, we don't only use the 
most "popular" financial ratios, as determined by the credit risk literature so 
far, but since our modelling involves high yield spreads, we are adjusting 
financial ratios to include depreciation and amortisation expenses, which are 
often very important for non-investment grade companies. 
1.1.2. Hypotheses under this thesis 
A number of hypotheses have been tested in the investment grade and high yield 
category alike, on short, medium or long term maturity indices. The concept is that 
the relation among credit spreads and the independent variables is looked at, initially 
in the investment grade sample, next in the sub investment grade sample and finally in 
whole sample together, including high yield and investment grade bonds and all the 
independent variables. 
There are four broad set of hypotheses to be tested, which are common for both the 
investment grade and sub investment grade sample, short, medium and long term 
indices, which are analysed further in the respective chapters. These include: 
5 As argued in Collin-Dufrense, Goldstein and Martin's study in December 2001. 
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HVpothesis I- Relation between changes in macroeconomic variables and credit 
spreads 
Changes in corporate bond spreads are not affected and/or negatively related by 
changes in macroeconomic factors (including, GDP, consumer confidence, the level 
of interest rates, industrial production, trade balance, money supply). Also changes in 
credit spreads are not positively related to changes in CPL These hypotheses will be 
tested separately for investment and non-investment grade bonds, short and long term 
maturing indices, as different results are expected to be reached from each separate 
category, due to the different specifications implied. Within the context of the same 
chapter, we will also test the lead lag relationship among macroeconomic variables 
and credit spreads. 
Hvpothesis 2- Relation between changes in equities and credit spreads 
Changes in corporate bond spreads are not positively related to VIX and/or their 
historical volatilities. Also changes in corporate credit spreads are not negatively 
related to changes in individual equity prices or equity indices such as S&P 500 and 
the Russell 2000. These hypotheses are tested not only within the context of 
constituents of the Merrill Lynch indices, their respective equity prices and their 
historical volatilities on a cross sectional basis, but also among Bloomberg investment 
grade bond and equity indices on a time series basis. We also test the hypothesis that 
changes in equity indices or implied volatilities don't granger cause changes in 
different maturing bond indices. 
HVpothesis 3- Relation between changes in accounting variables and changes in 
spreads 
Changes in credit spreads are affected and explained by changes in the respective 
company's financial information (including the company's current market 
capitalization, ratios such as cash flow to debt, Earnings before interest and tax to 
interest expense, debt to capital employed, Return on Equity, Return on Capital, Total 
Debt to Ebitda, etc). In particular, we will be testing the relation between the above 
accounting variables and groups of accounting ratios. In other words, the null 
hypotheses tested under this chapter, are that: 
(a) Changes in corporate bond credit spreads, aren't negatively related or explained 
by changes in accounting ratios. 
23 
(b) Changes in corporate bond credit spreads, aren't positively related or explained by 
changes in leverage ratios. 
(c) Changes in corporate bond credit spreads, aren't negatively related or explained 
by changes in liquidity ratios. 
(d) Changes in corporate bond credit spreads, aren't negatively related or explained 
by changes in the company's current market capitalisation, which is used as proxy 
for the finn's size. 
The above hypotheses are tested initially individually in the investment and non- 
investment grade category, while implicitly the hypotheses also entail testing the lead 
-lag relationship between the above mentioned financial variables and changes in 
corporate bond credit spreads. 
Hvpothesis 4- Relation between spreads and equities, accounting 
macroeconomicfactors 
Lastly, the ultimate hypothesis tested, which represents the core idea behind this 
thesis, is the establishment of the relationship integrating all the above variables into a 
unique framework in order to explain changes in corporate bond spreads. By testing 
all the above variables on a parallel basis we are effectively examining: 
(a) whether the inclusion of all the above variables will explain changes in credit 
spreads better than on an individual basis, 
(b) the positive or negative relations between the dependent and the independent 
variables can be also proven on a contemporaneous basis, and 
(c) conclude with the best functioning combination statistically and financially wise, 
in determining/forecasting credit spreads changes one and two years ahead. 
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1.1.3. Summary Results of Hypotheses tested 
(a)Hypothesis I 
Evidenceftom Bloomberg Indices 
- 
Investment Grade Bonds 
We reject the null hypothesis of the negative relation between the variables of trade 
balance, money supply and the term structure of interest rates for all maturities, but 
only for the lagged values of those variables at the 95% confidence level. We also 
reject the null hypothesis of the negative relation between consumer confidence and 
changes in corporate bond credit spreads for all maturities at time t or its lagged 
values at the 95% confidence. However, we don't reject the null hypotheses for the 
variables of GDP and industrial production. 
With respect to the direction of causation results obtained for long term maturing 
bonds, generally support confidence to reject the null hypothesis that macroeconomic 
variables don't granger cause changes in the credit spread indices. For medium and 
short tenn maturities the null hypotheses are rejected on a case by case scenario as 
analytically described in chapter 4. 
Evidencefrom Merrill Lynch Indices 
- 
Investment & non-Investment Grade Bonds 
We reject the null hypothesis about the negative relation between the variables of 
trade balance, money supply and the US consumer confidence for all ratings, at the 
95% confidence level. The null hypothesis of the negative relation between the term 
structure of interest rates and changes in corporate bond credit spreads is only rejected 
for investment grade companies at the 95% confidence level. However, we don't 
reject the null hypotheses for the variables of GDP and industrial production. We also 
strongly reject the null hypothesis that changes in high yield credit spreads contain no 
marginal information for the business cycle. 
(b) Hypothesis 2 
Consistent with the structural approach, we reject the null hypothesis of the positive 
relation between changes in individual equity prices or the S&P500 index and 
changes in credit spreads, for all rating categories and for short and medium term 
maturities. We also reject the null hypothesis for the negative relation between the 
VIX index for all rating categories and maturities. 
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Although evidence to reject the hypothesis of negative relation between the dependent 
and changes in historical volatilities, is statistically supported, it is suggested that the 
inclusion of historical volatilities doesn't provide even marginal support for 
explaining variation in changes in credit spreads. 
(c) HypothesiN 3 
We reject the null hypothesis of a positive relation between changes in credit spreads 
and profitability, liquidity ratios and the company's current market capitalisation, 
although we don't reject the second part of the same hypothesis with respect to the 
information content of those ratios on an individual basis in explaining changes in 
credit spreads. The null hypothesis of the negative relation between leverage ratios 
and changes in credit spreads is rejected. However, on a multivariate basis, we find 
that part of the variation in credit spreads is explained by the changes in the 
aforementioned ratios, particularly for the non-investment grade category, with the 
most important coefficients obtained for leverage ratios and the current market 
capitalisation. 
(d) Hypothesis 4 
Testing the above hypotheses on a parallel basis, provided confidence for rejecting the 
null hypothesis on an aggregate basis, irrespective of the time period tested. 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The above-mentioned developments in the area of credit risk (sectionl. l. ), together 
with issues in the credit risk literature that haven't been explored to a great extent (as 
analytically will be described in later chapters) have inspired the following thesis. The 
aim is to provide an in depth empirical analysis of the relation between corporate 
credit spreads and their key economic and company specific determinants. This 
implies an exploration of the relation between credit spreads and macroeconomic 
indicators, equity and volatility factors and firm specific information (accounting 
ratios). The ultimate goal will be to construct a multi-factor model that will assume 
the above factors and forecast credit spread changes. This model has been inspired not 
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only by factors employed in the models produced by McKinsey and KMV but also by 
variables considered by the credit rating agencies when assigning a rating. 
The thesis is structured in the following way: 
Chapter 2, provides a critical review of the current credit risk models developed by 
financial institutions and corporations world-wide. The purpose of such a review is to 
assess their inherent strengths and weaknesses and set the foundation for this thesis. It 
provides the settings to the approaches of credit risk modelling (structural and reduced 
form) as well as a brief literature review focused on the determinants of credit spread 
changes. 6 It also incorporates a brief review on the credit risk (VaR) models 
developed by JP Morgan "Credit Metrics", by CSFB "Credit Risk +", by Moody's 
KMV "KMV" and "Credit Portfolio View" as created by McKinsey. These models 
are value-at-risk and default models, which call for the full integration of market and 
credit risk. The reason for their inclusion, is to enhance the fact that all recently 
developed credit risk models, either value at risk or default and credit scoring models, 
call for the incorporation of market and credit risk into their assumptions. It should be 
noted that credit risk literature related to the specific hypotheses tested under this 
thesis, is provided in the relevant chapters. 
Chapter 3 sets the background to the proposed credit risk model suggested under this 
thesis. It outlines the main objectives and hypotheses which are tested and explored. 
The relations examined are based on US corporate bond market data. It provides the 
data and a detailed description of the statistical properties of credit spreads. The main 
sources of data used include spreads provided by the Merrill Lynch and Bloomberg 
investment grade and high-yield indices, US macroeconomic indicators, and the 
respective companies' equity information and accounting variables. This chapter 
explores the data selection criteria, data qualifying for this thesis and a descriptive 
statistical analysis of data by rating and years. 
Chapter 4 explores the relation between credit spreads and macroeconomic factors. 
The main idea behind this section is the exploration of the relation between credit 
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spreads and leading US macroeconomic indicators not only for investment and non- 
investment grade companies, but also for different maturity indices. Three issues have 
been identified and tested under this chapter. The first is the relation between 
macroeconomic variables and credit spreads, with the use of two sets of data, 
secondly the extent to which macroeconomic conditions influence different rating 
categories and maturities and thirdly the direction of causation between 
macroeconomic variables and changes in credit spreads. Overall, results provide 
support to the hypotheses tested more significantly though for the non-investment 
grade category. With respect to the direction of causation results are a bit mixed, as 
provided by the empirical tests in the times series data. Results from the non- 
investment grade category provide evidence that spreads might be a good indicator of 
financial conditions. 
Chapter 5 provides the ideas and background for the relation between changes in 
equities and the respective changes in spreads. The objective is to consider how the 
incorporation of market conditions (i. e. equity prices) can affect changes in spreads 
across the rating spectrum and across different maturities. Several hypotheses have 
been tested including the inverse relation between changes in credit spreads and their 
respective equities, the relation between credit spread and implied or historical 
volatilities, as well as the direction of causation between credit spreads and equities. 
Results reported have been based on two sets of credit spread indices coming from 
Merrill Lynch and Bloomberg and the econometric analysis performed has been 
different due to the nature of data collected (i. e. cross sectional and time series 
analysis was employed). The strongest relation between equities and credit spreads 
has been provided from the non-investment grade sample, and gives confidence as to 
the importance of implied volatilities in explaining credit spreads rather than 
historical ones. 
Chapter 6 tests the relation between changes in spreads and accounting infon-nation. 
The idea for the inclusion of this section is to check whether real accounting figures 
provide infon-nation to bond investors, and effectively whether they can be used as a 
6 Literature review on credit spreads and macroeconomic variables, equity factors and accounting 
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tool for proactive credit risk management. It examines the extent that changes in 
credit spreads are affected by results reported in a company's financials reports. 
Specifically, accounting ratios such as the cash flow to debt, or the Ebitda cover ratio 
are tested in the investment and high yield category, while the results share more 
confidence for supporting this relation for companies rated below BBB-. The most 
important variable, in all rating categories is the company's current market 
capitalisation. 
Chapter 7 considers in a multi variate context the informational content of all the 
above factors in determining credit spreads changes. Once the most important factors 
which provided the highest adjusted R2 were determined, these were then used for 
back testing the credit risk model and for forecasting out-of-sample credit spread 
changes. Although initially it was expected that a prediction of credit spread changes 
would be rather hard (due to the time period tested but also due to the nature of credit 
spreads), it was shown that due to the fact that this model entails both company 
specific and market variables, credit spread forecasts have been close to traded values. 
The model performs well especially within the first twelve months and more 
accurately for investment grade companies. 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the conclusions reached under this thesis, as well 
as the limitations inherent and points out some issues that could be further researched, 
mainly related to changes in the credit risk framework, stemming from the 
implementation of the New Basel Accord. 
information is being provided on the relevant chapters. 
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2.0. Literature Review 
Before proceeding with the theoretical concepts, models and issues relating to credit 
risk it is important to provide some background as to the nature of credit risk and its 
statistical properties. 
2.1. Credit Risk 
Credit Risk is defined as the loss in the event of default of the borrower or in the event 
of a deterioration of the borrower's credit quality. In the case of traded instruments, 
credit risk is the potential decrease in value generated by a change in credit quality 
during the life of the instrument. In the case of a bank loan, credit risk is considered 
primarily the risk that the borrower may not be able to make the scheduled payments. 
Credit risk is primarily focusing on default. The definition of default risk could be 
either a missed payment, a broken covenant or an economic default (when the value 
of the firm's assets falls below its liabilities). Rating agencies consider that default 
occurs when a contractual payment has been missed for at least three months, which 
coincides also with the Basel 11 definition of default. It should be mentioned however, 
that the various events of default do not necessarily mean that there are immediate 
losses, however, even a technical event of default would increase the probability of a 
bankruptcy. 
However, there are three other related areas to credit risk, which are equally 
important. These are: 
(a) Credit Migration: this refers to less extreme changes in credit quality than default. 
In the case of a corporate bond, credit risk takes the fonnat of credit spread 
changes which are accompanied by rating changes and vice versa. Although it is 
usually the first stage of the financial distress of a finn, bondholders are very 
interested in this kind of credit risk than the actual event of default, since they can 
have an immediate impact on the value of the security. Due to the fact that bonds 
are relatively liquid, bondholders are usually in a position to sell them before the 
issuer's financial state deteriorates. 
(b) Exposure risk: this is defined as the outstanding balance lent to the borrower and 
generated by the uncertainty prevailing with future amounts at risk. In some cases, 
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generally for all credit lines for which there is a repayment schedule, this risk can 
be considered as small or negligible. In cases of committed lines of credit, the 
borrower can draw on these lines whenever necessary, which effectively means 
that the exposure is contingent upon the borrower's needs, but always subject to a 
limit fixed by the bank. 
(c) Recovery risk: the exposure at risk is different to the loss in case of default 
because of potential recoveries. Those depend upon any credit mitigators, such as 
guarantees, collaterals and other forrns of securities provided by the borrower. The 
recovery rate depends additionally on the industry type, seniority of debt claims 
and other issues. According to Moody's data source, recovery rates can vary 
between 70% for secured bank loans to 30% for unsecured subordinated debt. 
2.1.2. Credit Risk & Market Risk 
Economic theory suggests that market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each 
other. If the market value of a firm's assets changes, generating market risk, this will 
in turn affect the probability of default, generating credit risk. Market risk could be 
defined as the chance that an investment's value will change in price as a result of 
market place forces or the potential loss resulting from adverse market movements, 
for example, during a liquidation period. According to a paper by Allen (1996), the 
integration of these two functions is desirable for at least three reasons: 
(a) There is a lot of transactional interactions between market and credit risk 
(b) The need for comparability between market and credit risk returns 
(c) The emergence of hybrid credit and market risk product structures 
The close relation between market and credit risk also affects economics for banks 
and regulators. This is particularly important for less developed countries, that are 
now in the process of developing their internal credit risk system. This flows from the 
new Basel 11 capital accord, which provides to banks more incentive to use internally 
generated credit ratings for their exposures, in order to calculate their capital 
requirements based on more objective risk weights. This relation, also affects the 
adjusted return on capital which is used for perfon-nance related uses in different 
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groups within a bank. Of course this correlation is not very straight forward and 
requires a deep understanding of the correlation between market and credit risk. This 
correlation between market and credit risk has been studied by Longstaff and 
Schwartz, (1995), Morris, (1999), Duffee, (1999). For example, Longstaff and 
Schwartz developed a simple approach to valuing risky debt, which incorporated both 
default and interest rate risk. They found that the correlation between default risk and 
the interest rate has a significant effect on the properties of the credit spread. Using 
Moody's corporate bond yield data they found that credit spreads are negatively to 
interest rates and that durations of risky bonds depend on the correlation with interest 
rates. 
However, as it will be described below, these two kinds of risk are quite different in 
nature but also in the way of measurement. Below, some of the main differences are 
going to be outlined. 
By credit risk we don't only mean the dimensions of risk mentioned in the previous 
section, but when referring to credit risk we should also mention an important 
component of it, market risk. Market risk refers to those cases where there is 
possibility of losses due to the changes in the prices of financial assets and 
instruments. For example shares of stocks are mainly subject to market risk since 
there is not an explicit scheduled payment on those. That would also be the case with 
a US treasury bond, treasuries which are only subject to interest rate risk. However, 
there are cases where this distinction is not so clear cut. For example, in the case of 
corporate bonds, both types of risk are assumed to be present. Although both of these 
types of risk are depicted by changes in bond values, they are generated from two 
different sources, namely market risk, resulting from adverse market movements and 
credit risk coming from changes in the borrower's credit quality. 
There are some inherent differences in the estimation of market and credit risk. These 
are outlined below: 
(a) Input data. While market risk data (mainly market factor returns and their 
respective variance/covariance matrices) is largely available in the market, credit 
risk data is not readily available, but rather data has to be transformed or exported 
for different variables in order to end up with the required values (for example 
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estimation of default probabilities or recovery rates). Another even more 
important issue is that credit data is not available for a long horizon, and usually 
data that we get on credit risk is outdated historical data. 
(b) Liquidity. Markets for credit risky debt are not that liquid, which is partly due to 
the size of the credit market, and partly due to the fact that credit risky debt is 
segmented, in that each company issues its own debt that trades at prices 
representing the investors' perception of that particular borrower. Moreover, 
changes in credit risk can cause the price of the associated instrument to exhibit 
large changes in price, especially in cases of multiple downgrades or default. 
(c) Time horizon in liquidation status. In the case of market risk instruments, the 
liquidation time horizon is very short (approximately 10 days) whereas in the case 
of credit risk usually the time is much longer (months or years). 
(d) Legal issues are very important in the case of evaluating credit risk, while they are 
almost not applicable in the case of market risk. 
2.1.3. Statistical properties of Credit Vs Market returns 
As a result of the above factors credit risk is more difficult to model than market risk. 
In particular, credit returns are highly skewed and fat tailed compared to equity 
returns which are relatively symmetric and approximated by normal distributions. 
The long downside tail of the distribution of credit returns is caused by defaults and is 
explained in terms of a large likelihood of earning a small profit and a small chance of 
loosing a large amount of investment. This implies that a credit portfolio's 
distribution cannot be simply represented by its mean and standard deviation and 
ultimately the computation of the appropriate capital reserves will be more difficult to 
model due to the estimation of tail risk probabilities of typical asymmetric fat tailed 
loss distributions. These properties of credit risk are analysed further within the 
context of the data used in this thesis for credit spreads, in section 3.4. 
The growing complexity of credit risk has driven the development of more 
sophisticated methods for measuring credit risk at a portfolio level, rather than just at 
the level of an individual bond or loan (see section 2.2). These methods are largely 
statistical and build on probabilistic models of creditworthiness and asset values. As a 
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result, nowadays there is a much larger variety of credit risk than market risk models 
available. The core difference between credit and market risk models, is that market 
risk models differ in the way they obtain the same result, the VaR of the portfolio, 
while credit risk models don't only differ in the way of estimating the end result, but 
also to the result they are trying to achieve (due to the many definitions of credit risk, 
as described in section 2.1. ). 
It is worth mentioning though, that despite the large number and variety of credit risk 
models that have been developed up to date(see section 2.2), there are instances that it 
can be hard to put these models into practice due to commercial and customer relation 
links. Additionally, most large banks, or investment houses tend to use models 
developed internally based on internal rating procedures and needs. 
2.1.4.0bstacles in the successful integration of market and credit risk 
The main reasons that make difficult the full integration of market and credit risk are 
outlined below: 
(a) Relevant Time Horizons 
In terms of market risk the daily horizon is an accepted industry standard time frame 
for risk management analysis, due to the fact that the unwinding of trading positions 
should be possible in 24 hours. However, regulators don't share such an optimistic 
view on the unwinding of trading positions and require that the market risk measures 
may be calculated on aI O-day period. 
In terrns of credit risk though, the choice of the time horizon is not as straightforward. 
For example, the time required to unwind a position in credit risk depends on the 
severity of credit crisis, the quality of the relation with the counterparty, on regulatory 
constraints and others. Another criterion may be the use of the time needed to 
appreciate a change in the counterparty credit quality. As it is obvious, choosing the 
right time horizon is so much harder in the case of credit risk, where the current 
practice followed by the large international banks is to use horizons between two 
weeks and one year. 
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(b) Scaling between time horizons 
The next issue that arises is that given the different time horizons considered, the two 
results are not directly comparable. One way to overcome this problem is to use a 
common time horizon. Given that the time horizon considered for market risk is 
usually shorter than credit risk, there are two alternatives to consider: 
either scale up market risk figure to the longer time horizon 
scale down the credit risk figure to the corresponding market risk 
value. 
Since the "square root of time" rule exists, and allows to measure the behaviour of 
volatility in dependence of the time horizon on which it is measured, this effectively 
means that if return volatility measured on daily and monthly data is compared, then it 
is expected that the I-month volatility is higher than the I-day volatility. In other 
words, longer time horizons are associated with a wider dispersion of potential 
returns. 
However, this type of time stretching is sensitive to the time periods considered as 
well as to the time series used, and an extreme case of time stretching might be 
dangerous. For example scaling I-day volatility into yearly volatility will produce 
more dubious results than scaling lets say the 1-week volatility to one month. 
(c) Market and credit correlations 
The next issue is to formulate some hypotheses on the correlation between these two 
measures of risk. A simple approach would be to compute the global exposure as the 
sum of the two individual exposures. Another would be to assume that the market risk 
measure and the credit risk measure are not linearly correlated. This assumption could 
be justified in cases where factors affecting credit and market risk are independent. 
Another more quantifiable alternative would be to try and model explicitly the 
relation between market and credit risk measures, determining in this way the 
correlation coefficients. 
(d) Conflicts of interest 
Even if a common risk measure could be achieved for market and credit risk within a 
bank or an investment banking institution, there are some limitations that are very 
hard to overcome. These relate to the potential cultural clash between credit and 
market risk management staff. While market risk, as measured by VaR, is mainly 
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dependent on quantitative assumptions, credit risk measurement and modelling is the 
result largely of subjective judgement. Switching therefore the subjective evaluation 
to objective quantitative models is very hard to achieve due to natural resistance from 
the credit departments. 
2.2. Review of Former Credit Risk Models 
Over the years a number of credit risk models have been developed ranging from 
systems relying solely on subjective analysis, i. e. the "4 CS9ý7 to more sophisticated 
objectively based credit systems. These include the: 
a. univariate accounting based credit scoring systems, which essentially compare key 
accounting ratios of the borrower with the industry norms under consideration or 
group norms and 
b. multivariate models, whereas the key accounting variables are combined and 
weighted to produce either a credit score or a probability of default measure and 
based on a benchmark, a loan application can be accepted or rejected accordingly. 
There are different methodological methods used in multivariate credit scoring 
systems. These are the linear probability model, the probit model and the logit model. 
The most widely used models are the logit and the discriminant analysis models. For 
example Martin (1977) used both the discriminant analysis and the logit model, in 
order to predict bank failures in the 1975-1976 period, when 23 banks failed. Platt and 
Platt (1991) used the logit model to test whether industry relative accounting ratios 
rather than simple firm specific accounting ratios can better predict a corporate 
bankruptcy, whereas the industry relative accounting model outperformed the 
unadjusted model. Smith and Laurence (1995) used a logit model to find the variables 
that offer the best prediction of a loan moving into default. Altman et al (1977) 
investigated the predictive performance by using the "zeta model"8. Scott (1981) 
compares some of the discriminant analysis models and concludes that the zeta model 
most closely approximate his own bankruptcy model. 
' "4 Cs" denote the character of the borrower, capital, capacity and collateral. 8 The zeta model, is a seven avariable discriminant analysis model which also includes the market 
value of equity as one variable. 
36 
However, the multivariate discriminant analysis system, although in some cases has 
been proved to perform quite satisfactorily, it has received some criticism from 
practitioners and academicians alike. These criticisms relate to the following: 
m The book value of the accounting data used is not very accurate as it doesn't 
incorporate changes in the borrower conditions as those are reflected in the capital 
market values. 
n The linear assumption inherent in the discriminant analysis cannot be accurate as 
the world is non-linear. 
m Credit scoring bankruptcy prediction models usually are tenuously linked to 
theoretical models. 
There are some other models the so called "risk of ruin" models, according to which a 
firm goes bankrupt when the market value of its assets falls below its debt obligations 
to outside creditors. Research of these models was made by Wilcox (1973), 
Santomero and Vinso (1977) and also Scott (1981), who actually observed that the 
risk of ruin model is similar in some aspects to the option pricing model - OPM - of 
Black and Scholes (1973), as well as Merton (1974), Hull and White (1995). In the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model the probability of a firm going bankrupt depends on the 
value of the firm's assets relative to its outside debt, as well as the volatility of the 
market value of the firm's assets. The ideas of the risk of ruin and OPM models, have 
also been used in the commercial area, where they have gained increased attention. 
However, one important aspect of economic theory which has been captured, but only 
to some extent, is the fact that market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each 
other and more importantly they are not separable (i. e. if the market value of the 
firm's asset changes, generating market risk, which in turn affects the probability of 
default, consequently generating credit risk). The relation between market and credit 
risk is of great importance, as it affects the risk-adjusted return on capital and 
therefore should be treated with increased attention. This relation has been implicitly 
captured within the context of the models developed by CSFB, JP Morgan, KMV and 
McKinsey, as analytically is described in section 2.3. 
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2.2.1. Approaches to Credit Risk Modelling 
A great deal of attention has been devoted to understanding the stochastic nature and 
determinants of credit spreads. This issue plays a central role in the fixed income 
literature, primarily due to its importance in the pricing of risky debt and credit 
derivatives (Duffee (1999), Duffle and Singleton (1997), Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995b) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)). In the literature there are two main 
approaches used in the pricing of risky debt: 
a. The first is the so called "structural approach"(or the "flrm-value") or option 
pricing model approach, which started with the work of Merton in 1974, and has 
been extended in different ways. The essential idea behind this approach is that it 
uses company-specific information and treats debt as a contingent claim (option) 
on the firm's value. 
b. The second approach is the "reduced form approach" developed by Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995a, b) to encompass difficulties regarding the unavailability of 
market data, whereas market and credit risk are intrinsically related. It models 
default risk from what is implied in market prices, credit spreads, and in some 
cases rating transitions. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of each of those approaches, below, it should be 
mentioned that the distinction between the structural and the reduced form approach is 
not clear cut. Models which use the value of the firm could easily be intensity based 
by describing the value of the firm as a jump process, and intensity based models 
could easily incorporate the value of the firm by using it as a variable affecting the 
default intensity. In other words, structural based models, could typically face 
problems as those encountered when extending Black-Scholes model to include 
american options, dividends, stochastic interest rates, whereas the reduced form 
models' setups resemble to the term structure modelling. 
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a. Structural Approach 
In particular, the structural approach relates default to the underlying assets of the 
firm. This approach was best developed by Merton (1974,1977), who considers a 
firm with a simple capital structure, and makes the following assumptions: 
a. firm issues a zero coupon bond with aface value F and maturity T Then two states 
are observed: 
1. At maturity, if the value of the firm's assets is greater that the amount owned to 
debt holders, then equity holders pay off debt holders and retain the firm. 
2. At maturity, if the value of the firm's assets is less than the face value, the equity 
holders default on their obligations. 
b. No costs are associated with default and priority is given in the repayment of debt. 
In this case debt holders take over thefirm and the value of equity is zero, assuming 
limited liability. 
To derive a specific valuation formula, as shown directly below, Merton assumed the 
following: 
" the terni structure of interest rates is detenninistic and flat, 
" the probability distribution of the firm's assets is lognormal, 
" the firm is assumed to pay no dividends over the life of the debt, 
" capital markets are perfect 
VI T) =FB T) 
-p [V( t 
whereby, 
V, the value of the risky debt 
F: Face value of debt 
B(t, T) : the time value of a zero coupon bond that pays one dollar for sure at time T 
V(t): the time t value of the firm's assets, and 
P[V(t)]: the value of a European put option on the firm's assets that matures at time T 
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with a strike price of F. 
Merton's model relates to the following: 
" when a put option is deep-out-of money (V(t)> F), the probability of default is low 
and corporate debt trades as if it is default free, P[V(t)]-O 
" if the put option is in-the money, the volatility of the corporate debt is sensitive to 
the volatility of the underlying asset, 
" if the default free interest rate increases, the spread associated with corporate debt 
decreases, i. e. the rate increase keeps the firm's value constant, the mean of the 
assets probability increases and the probability of default declines. As the market 
value of corporate debt increases, the yield to maturity decreases and the spread 
declines. The magnitude of the change is larger, the higher the yield on debt. 
Market and credit risk are intrinsically related. A decrease in the value of the 
firm's assets increases the probability of default and vice versa. Croughy et 
al(1998) also discusses market and credit risk 
. 
w As the maturity of the zero coupon bond tends to zero, the credit spread also tends 
to zero. 
Generally, structural models, generate predictions about what the theoretical 
determinants of credit spread changes should be and their positive or negative relation 
to changes in credit spreads. These proposed structural determinants are basically 
considered to be 9: 
Changes in the Spot Rate: As argued by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) the 
static effect of a higher spot rate is to increase the risk neutral drift of the firm 
value process. A higher drift, would effectively decrease the default 
probability and ultimately spreads. Further evidence on this issue is provided 
by Duffee(1998) who uses a sample of non-callable bonds and finds a negative 
relationship between changes in credit spreads and interest rates. 
Changes in the slope of the 3deld curve. Litterman and Scheinkman(1991) 
found that the two most important factors driving the term structure of interest 
rates are the level and the slope of the tenns structure. It is argued that an 
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increase in the slope of the treasury curve increases the expected future short 
rate and ultimately leads to a decrease in credit spreads. From another 
perspective though a decrease in yield curve slope might imply a weakening 
economy. Therefore, theory predicts that an increase in the Treasury yield 
curve slope will create a decrease in credit spreads. 
(iii) Changes in leverage. Since default is triggered when the leverage ratio is close 
to one, credit spreads are expected to widen with an increase with leverage. 
Following the same rationale, credit spreads are expected to tighten with an 
increase in the firm's return on equity. 
(iv) Changes in volatilit 
. 
The contingent claims approach, propose that debt claim 
has features similar to a short position in a put option. Since when volatility 
increases, credit spreads increase, it follows that credit spreads would increase 
with volatility. 
(V) Changes in the Portfolio probability of a downward juMp in firm value. An 
increase in either the probability or the magnitude of a negative jump should 
increase credit spreads. 
Changes in the business climate. Changes in credit spreads are dependent on 
recovery rates. The expected recovery rate is in turn a function of the overall 
economic conditions, as proposed by Altman and Kishore (1989) who find 
that recovery rates are time varying. 
However, there are at least four practical implications in Merton's model: 
a. It is difficult to find the exact market value of a firm's assets 
- 
V(t), required for 
the pricing formula, as usually firms have numerous complex debt contracts 
traded rarely. 
b. Return volatility on the firm's assets is also very important to be computed, but 
since market prices are not available so are return probabilities. 
c. The liability structure of the model is based on simultaneously pricing all different 
types of liabilities, senior to the corporate debt under consideration. 
d. According to the model, default can only occur when a principal or a coupon 
repayment is made. However, in practice payments to other liabilities may also 
trigger default. 
9 From the paper by Dufrense, Goldstein and Martin (2001) on the Determinants of Credit Spread 
41 
To overcome some of these practical limitations, Nielson et al(1993) and Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995a, b) assume that the firm's capital structure is irrelevant. 
Bankruptcy can occur at any time and in default the firm pays off some fixed 
fractional amount. But again the volatility of the firm's assets must be computed. To 
facilitate this process they also assume that interest rates are normally distributed, i. e. 
they follow an Ornstein-Unlebeck process. Cathcart and EI-Jahel (1998) also 
questioned this assumption while they impose an additional assumption which implies 
that spreads are independent of changes in the underlying default free term structure, 
which is in contrast to empirical observations. Kim et al (1993) assumed a square root 
process for the spot interest rate that is correlated with return on assets. 
b. Reduced Form Approach 
The earliest example of this approach was given by Jarrow and TurnbullIO (1995 b). 
JT allocate firms to credit risk classes and default is modelled as a point process. 
Using the term structure of credit spreads for each credit class they infer the expected 
loss (t, t+A t) which is the product of the conditional probability of default and the 
recovery rate under the equivalent martingale (risk-neutral) measure, i. e. they use 
credit spreads to infer the market's assessment of the bankruptcy process and then 
price the credit risk derivatives. In the JT model, stochastic changes in the credit 
spread only occur if default occurs. In order to model the volatility of credit spreads, a 
more detailed specification is required for the intensity or/and the recovery function. 
The specification of the recovery process is a very important component in the 
reduced form approach, i. e. the model assumes that if default occurs 
-for example on 
a zero coupon bond 
- 
then the bond holder is assumed to receive a known fraction of 
the bond's face value at the maturity date. This face value is determined with the 
default free term structure of interest rate. 
Changes 
10 Jarrow and Turnbull will be denoted for the remaining of this document as JT. 
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Other researchers of the topic, like Das and Tufano (1996) keep the intensity function 
deterministic and assume that the recovery rate is correlated with the default free spot 
rate. They assume that the default rate depends on the state of the economy and is 
subject to idiosyncratic variation. Monkkonen (1997) generalises the Das and 
Tufano(1996) model by allowing the probability of default to depend upon the 
default free rate of interest, and they develop an efficient algorithm, in order to infer 
the martingale probabilities of default. Lando (1994/1997) assumes that the intensity 
function depends upon different state variables, and this is referred to as the Cox 
process. 11 Lando makes a simple representation for the derivation of credit 
derivatives. Duffie and Singleton (1998) derived a simple representation for the value 
of a risky bond by assuming that in default, the value of the bond is equal to some 
fraction of the bond's value just prior to default. Hugston (1997) showed that the 
same result could also be derived in the JT model. Therefore modelling the intensity 
function as a Cox process, and after observing the empirical observations of Duffee 
(1998), Das and Tufano (1996) and Shane (1994), it was derived that credit spread 
depends on both the default free term structure and an equity index. In addition, the 
work of JT (1995a, b) Duffee and Singleton (1998), Hughston (1997) and Lando 
(1994/1997) implies that for many credit derivatives, only the expected loss needs to 
be modelled, i. e. the product of the intensity and the loss function. 
In the case that credit derivatives payoffs is dependent upon the rating changes, 
Jarrow et al(1997) described a simple model which included the credit rating of the 
firm as an indicator of default. There is evidence to a large extent which is consistent 
with changes in credit spreads and changes in default free interest rates being 
negatively correlated. In particular, Duffee (1998) used monthly corporate bond data 
from the period January 1985 to March 1995, and fit the following regression: 
A Spread, 
= 
b,, +b IAY, +b2A Term, +et 
where: 
Spreadt : is a spread at time t for a bond maturing at time t 
When the Cox process is dependent upon state variables acts as a Poisson process. 
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A Spread,: is the change in spread from t to t +1, keeping maturity T fixed, 
A Yt : is the change in the three month Treasury yield and the 3-month treasury 
bill yield. 
A Tenn, : the change in term over a period from t to t+1 
et Aenotes a zero mean unit variance random term 
, 
and 
b 1, b2 : are the estimated coefficients which are negative and increase in absolute 
magnitude, as the credit quality decreases irrespective of maturity. 
Das and Tufano in 1996, also reported similar results. Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995a, b) using annual data from 1977 to 1992, fits the following regression: 
A Spread, = b,, +b IA Yield, +b2 A I, +et 
where 
A Yieldt: the change in the 0-year treasury 
it : return on the appropriate equity index and 
et :a zero mean unit variance random term 
For Aaa, Aa, A and Baa industrial bonds, both the estimated coefficients are 
negative. This is not surprising since an increase in the treasury bill rate, increases the 
expected rate of return on a firm's assets, and hence lowers the probability of default. 
This in turn increases the price of the risky debt and thus lowers its yield. Irrespective 
of the bond's maturity, the coefficients b, and b2 increase in absolute magnitude as 
the credit quality decreases. However, as argued by Duffee (1998), Longstaff and 
Schwartz's results must be treated cautiously as their data includes bonds with 
embedded options which can bias the regression results. 
Shane(1994) used monthly data from 1982 to 1992 and found that returns on high 
yield bonds have a higher correlation with a return on equity index than low yield 
bonds and a lower correlation with the return on a treasury bond index rather than 
low yield bonds. Whether Shane filtered the data to eliminate bonds with embedded 
options is not known. 
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Wilson (1997a, b) examined the effects of macroeconomic variables, such as the 
GDP, unemployment, and growth rate, long term interest rates, etc, when estimating 
the default rates. It was argued that if an economic variable has an explanatory power 
then this could cause a change in the default rate, provided that the explanatory 
variables are not co-integrated. In order to examine this, Wilson tested the estimation 
using only levels whereas he should also use estimates based on changes in variables. 
Altman (1983/1990) uses first order differences, and as explanatory variables the 
percentage change in real GNP, the percentage change in the money supply, the 
percentage change in S&P index and the percentage change in the new business 
formation. The results were that there exists a negative correlation between changes 
in these variables and changes in the aggregate number of business failures. The 
reported R-squares are substantially lower than those reported by Wilson. All the 
aforementioned studies have a common underlying economic inference and that is 
the credit spreads. 
However, it should be noted that in addition to the above well-known approaches, 
there are some other proposals which are popular among practitioners, which could 
be concluded to the following: 
* Risk Factor Premium: In this approach, as has been conceived by Fisher (1959), 
credit spread is considered as a compensation for various risks in a linear relation. 
Company specific risk factors include leverage, earnings and sector. Factors 
relating to debentures embody seniority, maturity and marketability. The spread 
estimated from this model and Treasury rates from a term-structure model are 
used to price bonds. 
* Credit Fundamentals: In this approach default probabilities are estimated 
through a company's financial fundamentals. Recovery is based either on 
historical data or on comprehensive credit research of a specific deal. In order to 
price a bond the model applies both default and recovery estimates in a pre- 
specified risk-neutral relation. 
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Macroeconomic Approach: This approach deals directly with a company's 
systematic risk. Systematic risk factors are mainly estimated from some forms of 
lagged relations with other risk factors. In this approach different scenarios of 
macroeconomic factors are simulated to generate a pricing distribution or 
weighted average scenario. 
Direct forward Spread Pricing: This approach doesn't rely on fundamental 
assumptions about the default process but it rather relates to the default of other 
securities. A process describing spread movements is added on a risk free interest 
rate process, and when is properly defined, the default free process and credit 
spread process can be correlated, which essentially gives us a two-factor model. 
2.2.3. Determinants of Corporate Bond Spreads 
The literature that has focused on credit spreads is focused on three main topics: 
a. explanation of the credit risk premia 
b. specification of the risk structure of credit risk premia 
c. the valuation of risky debt. 
However, it wasn't until 1959 that the subject gained more attention with the pioneer 
work of Fisher (1959). His paper constitutes the first contribution to a structured 
approach in the credit risk premium area. In Fishers' study the risk premiums are 
defined as the difference between the market yield on the bond and the corresponding 
interest rate. Fisher performed a cross sectional analysis in order to find what are the 
main factors explaining the risk premium on US domestic and industrial corporations. 
Transportation and public utility companies were excluded from the sample since they 
were subject to different kinds of regulatory control and that would make them less 
likely to default on their obligations compared to other industrial companies. In 
Fisher's model, the risk that a company will default is based on the following four 
variables: 
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i) The variability of eamings, which is measured by the coefficient of variation of 
the firm's net income over the last nine years. There is a negative expected 
relation between this variable and default, as a firrn with a smaller coefficient of 
variation in earnings is less likely to default, compared to one with a higher 
coefficient. 
ii) The length of time that the firm has been operating, without forcing its creditors to 
incur losses. In other words, the longer the solvency period of the firm, the less 
likely is that the estimated coefficient of variation in earnings is much less than 
the coefficient in the hypothetical underlying population of annual net incomes. 
iii) The ratio of the market value of the equity to the firm's debt. Le. how much can a 
firm's asset value decrease before it becomes less than its liabilities. 
iv) The total market value of all publicly traded bonds that the finn has outstanding. 
The smaller the amount of bonds outstanding the higher the credit risk 
premium is expected to be. That is because a smaller amount of bonds outstanding 
means that there is less trading transactions, the market is thinner and the market 
price of the bond more volatile. 
Using cross sectional analysis, Fisher tested the logarithm of the average risk 
premium on the logarithms of the aforementioned four variables and found that: 
(a) for each cross section the four variables account for 75% of the variance of credit 
risk premiums and 
(b) the volatility of the risk premium with reference to those variables is stable over 
time. 
There are a number of limitations in his work, most importantly the fact that no 
macroeconomic or market factors are included and the fact that the influence of term 
to maturity on the risk premium isn't taken into consideration either through the level 
and shape of the underlying basic curve or on its possible effect on the yield 
differential itself. 
In another work by Fair and Malkiel (197 1) demand and supply factors are introduced 
in order to explain credit risk premiums. They argue that different type of bonds of the 
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same risk levels and maturities, may not be perfect substitutes, for the following 
reasons: 
i) legal restrictions which affect portfolio allocations in investment houses 
ii) window dressing of bonds 
iii) marketability, liquidity and transaction costs considerations 
Fair and Malkier (1979), employed monthly data from January 1961 until June 1969 
of long term US government investment grade utility and industrial bonds. It was 
argued that each bond is characterised by a demand schedule which depends 
positively on its own rate of interest and on the stock of wealth to be distributed 
among the assets and negatively on the interest rates of other assets. It was also 
assumed that supplies of government, utility and industrial bonds are exogenous. 
Assuming markets are in equilibrium, (supply is equal to demand) they derived that 
the assets yields are a function of the relation between the supply of assets 
themselves. This effectively means that the yield differentials are a function of the 
amount of bonds outstanding and by the anticipated new financing during the future 
six month period. 
In an effort to explain cyclical variations in spreads, Jaffee (1975) developed a 
supply-demand model, which achieved different results than those described above. In 
particular, Jaffee developed a model whereby the demand functions relates positively 
to its own rate and negatively to the rates of other categories and to a vector of 
exogenous variables. On the other hand, the supply function of the issuing firm is 
negatively affected by its own rate and by a vector of exogenous variables, as in the 
case of the demand function. Assuming equilibrium in each risk market (supply equal 
to demand) he obtained that the interest rate of any category is a function of the risk 
free rate and various exogenous demand and supply factors affecting the market. 
Demand and supply variables were found not to have any significant effect on the risk 
structure, in statistical terms. 
Elton et al (2001) examined corporate bond spreads based on reduced form models 
and measure credit spreads as a function of local and state taxes, default risk and 
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systematic risk factors. He concludes that similar to stock returns there are systematic 
risk factors in the returns of bonds. 
Duffee (1998) and Morris, Neal and Rolph (1998) apply macroeconomic changes 
captured in the Treasury curves as a proxy for changes in default risk. However, none 
of these studies have shown how systematic and default risk may influence credit 
spreads when considered on a parallel basis and hence don't account for the potential 
correlation between these variables. For example, the treasury curve variables found 
in Duffee (1998) and Moris et al (1998) may proxy for the systematic risk measures in 
Elton et al(2001) or vice versa. With the exception of the study of Moris et al (where 
the focus is only on the long run relation), these studies focus on short-term dynamics 
and have not examined the long run relation between the determinants of credit 
spreads. Furthennore, these studies only consider investment grade bonds and leave 
out the most volatile segment of the market, i. e. bonds belonging to the non- 
investment grade. 
Generally, bond pricing models, either explicitly or implicitly, include a correlation 
between credit spreads and the level of interest rates. However, most theoretical 
models reach different conclusions as to the sign of this relation. Some of the 
researchers document a negative correlation between changes in credit spreads and 
the level of interest rates (i. e. Duffee and Das & Tufano) which is consistent with 
Merton's model. The rationale behind this, is that the level of the Treasury rate 
should increase the value of the firm moving it away from the exercise price and 
therefore reducing the probability of default. On the other hand, as it is being argued 
by Leland and Toft (1996) there is the possibility of a positive relation between 
treasury yield and credit spreads. The idea behind this positive relation is that a 
change in the treasury yield doesn't only influence the discount rate but also the 
value of the underlying asset, which effectively implies that the value of the firm 
decrease and the probability of default increases. 
The relation between the slope of the treasury yield curve on credit spreads is being 
examined, by Littermanm and Then (1991), who provide evidence that risk premiums 
increase with maturity, Duffee (1998), who confirms the hypothesis that the option to 
call a corporate bond should rise in value when bond yields fall, at least for 
investment grade bonds, Joutz, Mansi and Maxwell (2000) who state that treasury 
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yield curves are positively related to credit spreads in the long run but are negatively 
related in the short run. 
Elton et al. (2001) and Guitteriez (2001) find that similar to stock returns there are 
systematic risk factors in the returns of bonds. They both find that the systematic risk 
factors identified by Fama and French (1993) are priced in bond returns as well. 
These factors include market risk premium (excess of the return on the market minus 
the risk free rate) and SML (size variable, i. e. small minus large portfolio returns) and 
HML (book to market variable, i. e. high minus low book to market portfolio returns). 
Finally, Joutz, Mansi and Maxwell (2000) extend this literature by empirically 
examining the determinants of credit spreads and their effects on the valuation of 
risky debt. In particular, they proceed as follows: 
They try to jointly model default and systematic measures compared to previous 
research which focuses on the determinants of either default risk (Duffee (1998)) 
or systematic risk (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann(2001)) 
2. They use cointegration analysis to examine the relation between credit spreads 
and the treasury term structure categorised by the level and slope 
3. They confirm the findings of Elton et al (2001) that the Fama and French (1993) 
systematic risk factors play a role in the pricing of risky debt. 
4. Finally, an analysis of investment and non-investment grade corporate bonds is 
included in order to better understand how these risk factors change across risk 
classes. 
They conclude, based on a monthly data sample, that over a twelve-year period credit 
spreads are a non-stationary or at least close to a unit root process, but the changes in 
credit spreads are stationary. In order to include stationarity the usual methodology 
adopted is to difference the variables, which though leads to loss of infortnation. As a 
result in their paper they are examining the presence of stationary cointegrating 
vectors between credit spreads and the treasury term structure. They use error 
correction models to deten-nine the factors that influence credit spreads over the short 
and long run. In summary their results could be concluded to the following: 
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Treasury yields are positively related to credit spreads in the long run, whereas 
they are positively related in the short run. 
When exploring the relation between credit spreads and the slope of the tenn 
structure, the results are somewhat mixed. In particular, for intermediate 
investment grade bonds, there is a positive relation in both short and long run, but 
for longer-term bonds this relation is negative in the long run, while there is no 
statistically significant relation in the short run. 
It was shown that Fama and French systematic factors do influence credit spreads 
over time and as a result corporate credit spreads are determined both by 
systematic and default risk. 
One of the few papers that looks at the deten-ninants of credit spread changes is the 
one by Collin-Dufrense, Goldsteing and Martin (December 2001). Using monthly 
observations of industrial bond prices from July 1988 through December 1997, they 
investigate the determinants of credit spread changes, once they have assigned each 
bond to a leverage group based on the firm's average leverage ratio. As explanatory 
variables, they use: 
(i) the slope of the yield curve, i. e. the change in the 10-year minus the 2-year 
treasury yields, 
(ii) finn leverage, i. e. the change in the firm's leverage ratio, 
(iii) volatility, i. e. change in implied volatility 
(iv) jump magnitudes and probabilities, i. e. change in the slope of volatility smirk 
(v) S&P 500 returns 
Using OLS regressions, they find that both the change in leverage and the firrn equity 
return are statistically significant and bear the expected sign, for most groups in the 
multivariate analysis. However, their economic significance is rather weak. Consisten 
with the empirical findings of Longstaff and Schwartz(1995) and Duffee(1998), they 
prove that an increase in the risk free rate lowers the credit spread for all bonds. 
Furthermore, they argue that the sensitivity to interest rates increases monotonically 
across both leverage and ratings groups. The convexity and slope of the term 
structure of interest rates are not very significant, either statistically or economically, 
while the change in VIX is statistically significant. The return on the S&P 500 is 
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extremely significant and so is the change in the steepness of the S&P 500 smirk. 
Although they found that most of the variables suggested by theory are significant 
both in economical and statistical terms, they only capture around 25% of the 
variation in credit spreads as measured by the adjusted R2. To understand the 
remaining variation they undertake principal component analysis, but still added 
financial and economic variables provide only limited additional explanatory power. 
Their findings suggest, that contrary to the structural models of default, aggregate 
factors appear much more important than firm specific factors in determining credit 
spread changes. 
In a similar fashion Huang, Zhi, Kong and Weipeng(2003), try to explain changes in 
credit spreads with the use of option adjusted credit spreads. Using weekly and 
monthly credit spread data from Merrill Lynch, they investigate the determinants of 
credit spread changes. As explanatory variables they use: 
(i) The realised overall default rate in the US corporate bond market 
(ii) Risk free interest rate dynamics 
(iii) Equity market factors, such as return and volatility 
(iv) Liquidity indicators from corporate bond mutual funds, 
(V) The state of the US economy 
They find that the Russell 2000 index historical return volatility and the Conference 
Board composite index have significant power in explaining credit spread changes, 
especially for high yield indices. Those variables together with the interest rate level, 
the historical interest rate volatility, the yield curve slope, the Russell 2000 index 
return and a high-minus-low variable explain 67.68% and 60.82% of credit spread 
changes for the B and BB rated indices. 
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2.3. Recent Developments in Credit Risk Framework 
As has already been mentioned in the previous section, the ultimate framework for 
analysing credit risk calls for the full integration of market and credit risk. Over the 
past decade financial institutions have developed and implemented a variety of 
sophisticated models of value-at-risk for market trading portfolios. These models have 
gained acceptance not only among senior bank managers but also in amendments in 
the international bank regulatory framework. Recently advances have also been made 
in modelling credit risk in lending portfolios. These new models are designed to 
quantify credit risk on a portfolio basis, and therefore have applications in control of 
risk concentration, evaluation return on capital at the customer level, and are proved 
to help more active management of credit portfolios. These models include Credit 
Metrics, developed by JP Morgan, Credit Risk +, as developed by CSFB, KMV and 
Credit portfolio view as presented by McKinsey. Each of these models are analysed in 
below: 
2.3.1. Credit Metrics 12 
CM represents one of the first publicly available attempts to develop a portfolio credit 
risk management model, which uses probability transition matrices, in order to 
measure the marginal impact of individual bonds on the risk and return of the 
portfolio. CM is based on credit migration analysis, i. e. the probability of moving 
from one credit quality to another, including default within a period of one year, 
chosen arbitrarily. Interest rates are assumed to follow a deterministic process. 
CM is a Merton-based model, in that it relies on Merton's model of a firm structure, 
i. e. a firrn defaults if the value of its assets fall below its liabilities. Effectively, a 
borrower's probability of default depends on two things: 
a. the amount by which assets exceed liabilities and 
b. the volatility of those assets. 
CM is based on the estimation of the forward distribution of the changes in value of a 
portfolio loan and bond type products at a time horizon, usually within one year. 
12 Credit Metrics will be referred to as CM, in the remaining of this document for simplicity reasons. 
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Value changes are mainly related to changes in credit quality of the obligor 
, 
which 
include both downgrade and default. Credit VaR when compared to market VaR has 
the following limitations: I't the portfolio distribution is far from being normal and 2 nd 
measuring the portfolio effect due to credit diversification is much more complex than 
for market risk. 
Credit returns are highly skewed by nature and fat tailed, and there is limited upside to 
be expected from credit quality improvements, while there is substantial downside 
potential when it comes downgrading and default. The level of distribution cannot be 
any larger, as estimated by the mean and the variance only, i. e. the calculation of VaR 
for credit risk requires simulating the full distribution of the changes in the portfolio 
value. In order to measure the portfolio diversification effect, the correlation of credit 
quality of all obligors should be estimated. But since these correlations cannot be 
directly observed, the CM model uses joint probabilities of assets returns, after 
making simplifying assumptions for the capital structure of the obligor and the 
generating process for equity returns. 
CM risk measurement framework assumes the following steps: 
1. The specification of the transition matrix and each borrower's default probability, 
which is mapped from the borrower's credit quality. The mean value of the bond, 
within a year horizon, is derived as the sum of each possible bond/loan value at 
the end of year I multiplied by the probability to migrate to another rating class. 
2. The second step is specifying the time horizon, which within the credit risk 
framework, tends to be assumed on an annual basis. 
3. The forward pricing model is specified. For each available credit quality, a spread 
curve is required to price the bond in all possible states, with all obligors within 
the same rating class being marked to market with the same curve. The sum of the 
discounted cash flows will provide the value of the bond in one year. If an issuer 
defaults, a recovery rate is estimated from the rating agencies' historical 
information on those rates. 
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4. The forward distribution of the changes in portfolio value due to eventual changes 
in the credit quality is derived. 13 
An important element of CM is that it can derive the individual asset's impact on the 
overall portfolio's standard deviation, and as a result the benefits derived ftom 
portfolio diversification can be evaluated. This is of course a very important pro- 
active management tool and needs to be accompanied by a RAROC model which 
provide information on the adjusted return on capital for each transaction. 
Additionally, equity prices are used as a proxy in order to calculate asset correlations. 
Because of the large number of bonds and loans, CM uses multi-factor analysis, 
according to which it allocates each obligor to the specified countries and industries, 
which are the most likely to determine its perfon-nance. Equity returns are then 
correlated to the extent that they are exposed to the same industries or countries. 
Then the industry and country weights are estimated for each obligor, as well as the 
finn's specific risk, which is idiosyncratic to each obligor and is independent of any 
other obligor or index. 
Exposures within the CM framework mean the forward pricing model, which applies 
in each credit rating. Forward pricing is derived form the present values of the model 
using the forward yield curve for the corresponding credit quality. 
14 
a. for bonds and loans receivables, commitments, LC 
, 
the forward exposure 
relates to the future cash flows, after the one-year time frame. 
b. For derivative like swaps and forwards, the exposure is conditional on future 
interest rates. As such, in order to estimate future cash flows some 
assumptions need to be made for interest rate movements. It should be noted 
that the process is quite complicated when it comes to swaps, whereby the 
risk exposure can either be positive or negative, is in or out of the money, for 
the bank respectively. If it is out of the money the counterparty is at risk. The 
13 An analytical description for calculating VaRs for specific loans, bonds or large portfolios as well as 
the calculation of capital charge is provided in Appendix 1. 14 Letters of Credit 
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bank is only at risk when that exposure is positive. As interest rates are 
assumed deterministic, the calculation of the forward price distribution relies 
on an ad hoc procedure., i. e. 
Value of the swap in I year with rating R= 
Forward risk-free value in I year 
- 
expected loss in year I to maturity for the 
given rating R 
The forward risk free value of the swap is calculated by discounting the future net 
cash flows of the swap 
, 
based on the forward curve and discounting them using 
the forward government yield curve. The data for the probability of default is 
either given by Moody's or S&P, or it can be derived from a transition matrix. 
The recovery rate comes also from statistical analysis provided by rating agencies. 
However, it should be noted that this ad hoc calculation of interest rate swaps, is 
not the most appropriate since only stochastic interest rates will allow a proper 
treatment of exposure calculations for swaps as well as other derivative securities. 
There are however, some problems with the VaR methodology employed by Credit 
Metrics. In particular, the transition matrix, is assumed to follow a stable Markov 
process, which means that movements between rating classes are independent, 
according to a paper by Altman and Kao(1992). However, the empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that rating transitions are autocorrelated, so that a bond or a 
loan that was previously downgraded is more likely to be downgraded again in the 
current period, as also supported by Perraudin, Nickell and Varotto(2000). 
The next thing to note, is that the transition matrix is assumed to be stable. The same 
matrix is used for different countries of the borrower, and for different points in time. 
Nickell et al(2000) show how industry and country factors, have a significant impact 
on rating transitions. 
Moreover, as noted by Altman and Kishore(1998) there is a significant difference 
according to whether the transition matrix is computed on newly issued bonds or on 
all bonds outstanding in a rating category at a particular point in time. Using bond 
transition matrices to value all bonds that belong to the same rating class, ignores all 
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other issues that make loans behave differently from bonds, such as covenants, 
collaterals, etc. Also the fact that interest rates and recovery rates are assumed to be 
deterministic leads to underestimating the VaR and the capital requirements. 
To summarise, although CM is one of the first publicly available attempts using 
probability transition matrices to develop a framework for the calculation of Var for 
individual loans as well as portfolios on the other hand it faces criticism on the 
following points: 
N Interest rates are assumed to be fixed 
, 
which effectively means that the model 
only considers credit events. 
There is no market risk included in the assumptions, which makes the VaR 
calculations of derivative transactions inaccurate, even though it is acceptable for 
floating and short term notes. 
w Default probabilities don't depend on the state of the economy, which is 
inconsistent with the empirical evidence. 
0 The equalisation of correlation arnong asset and equity returns can affect the 
correlation coefficients 
, 
where small errors are very important. However, the 
accuracy of this model cannot be directly evaluated since asset returns cannot be 
observed. 
2.3.2. Credit Risk +15 
CR+ is a model of default risk. There are only two end of period states for the 
obligor, default and non-default. In the event of default the lender suffers a loss of 
fixed size, i. e. its exposure to the obligor. CR+ applies an actuarial approach for the 
derivation of the loss distribution of the loan/loss portfolio. In CR+, no assumptions 
are made about the causes of default, i. e. an obligor A can either be in default with a 
probability Pa or not in default with a probability I-Pa. Further assumptions of the 
model are: 
15 For the remaining of this document Credit Risk + will be denoted as CR+, for simplicity reasons. 
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For a loan the probability of default in a given period, is the same for each other 
period. 
For a large number of obligors, the probability of default for a particular obligor 
is small, and the number of defaults that occur in any period is independent of the 
number of defaults occurring in any other period. The probability distribution for 
the number of defaults is given by the Poisson distribution. 
Lets assume that there are rn obligors in a portfolio, where rn is a finite number and 
the Poisson distribution which specifies the probability of n defaults for n=1 
.... 
cc is 
only an approximation. But if the number of the obligors is very large, then testing 
the probabilities n+l, n+2,... the number of defaults becomes negligible. Therefore, 
the following equation can be presented: 
P(n defaults) 
= L! "*e- 
n! 
A 
PA 
where n= 
ji: is the average number of defaults per year, and also is equal to 
whereby PA denotes the probability of default or obligor A. 
n: is the annual number of defaults, which follows a stochastic process with 
mean ýt, and standard deviation ý[t. 
In order to find the frequency of the default events, the distribution of the probability 
of default losses for a portfolio is derived as follows: 
A Poisson distribution approximates the distribution of the number of default events. 
Then the standard deviation should be expected to be approximately equal to ý[t, 
where [i is the average annual default rate. However, it is possible that the Poisson 
distribution will underestimate the actual probability of default. This is not surprising 
since the default rate variability changes over time depending of the business cycle. 
Therefore, the Poisson distribution can be used to represent the default process, 
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having assumed that the mean default rate is stochastic with mean g and a standard 
deviation of cy,, 
*The assumption of stochastic default makes the distribution of default 
highly skewed with a fat right tail. It should also be noted that in the CR+ framework, 
if default occurs, then the loss incurred by a counterparty is adjusted to the recovery 
rate. 16 
To conclude, CreditRisk+ has closed form expressions for the probability distribution 
of portfolio loan losses. Thus, the methodology doesn't require simulation and is 
advantageous from a computational point of view. Also the methodology requires 
minimal data: probability of default and the loss given default for each loan. No 
information is required about the term structure of interest rates or probability 
transition matrices. 
However, this model is also criticised as it assumes interest rates to be deterministic, 
which actually affects the credit exposure over time, i. e. the exposures are 
predetermined constants and disregards non-linear products such as options or even 
foreign currency swaps. 
16 Appendix 2 provides an analysis of how the distribution of default losses is derived for a portfolio 
under CR+. 
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2.3.3. Credit Portfolio View 17 
Another attempt which was made in order to eliminate some of the deficiencies of the 
above mentioned models was the one by McKinsey. This is the Credit Portfolio 
view, which was first developed by Wilson (1987,1997). CPV is multi-factor model, 
which is used to simulate the joint conditional distribution of default and migration 
probabilities for different rating categories, belonging to different industries and 
countries, based on a set of macro-economic variables such as the GDP growth, the 
level of foreign exchange and interest rates, the aggregate savings rate and others. 
CPV is based on the idea that default and migration probabilities are linked to the 
economy. When an economy is in recession then the rate of downgrades increase, and 
vice versa, i. e. when the economy grows stronger. In other words, the model assumes 
that credit cycles follow economic cycles. Accordingly, CPV proposes a 
methodology which links the macroeconomic variables to default and migration 
probabilities. The two most commonly used ways of dealing with cyclical movements 
are: 
the sample period is divided into recession and non-recession years and then two 
individual transition matrices are calculated in order to produce two separate VaR 
calculations. 
2. The relation between the macro factors and the transitional probabilities is 
modelled simultaneously, and then some macro shocks are generated into the 
model in order to simulate the evolution of transition probabilities. This is the 
approach which is followed by the CPV. 
In order to derive such a model, the following should be considered: 
Default probabilities are modelled as a logit function, where the independent variable 
is a country speculative grade index which depends upon current and lagged 
macroeconomic variables, i. e. 
j, t =I/1+e -Y J't 
" Credit Portfolio View, will be denoted as CPV for the remaining of this document for simplicity 
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which can take values between 0 and 1, due to the logit transformation assumption 
and where, 
P j, t, denoted the conditional probability of default in period t 
-yj, t, is the index value derived from a multi-factor model 
j: speculative grade obligors in country industry. 
According to CPV, the multi-factor model which is used to determine the state of the 
economy is presented as follows: 
yj, t = Pbo + Pi, I Xj, I, t + Pj, 2 Xj, 2, t+ 
---+ 
Pj, 
m 
Xj, 
m, t+ 
V J, t 
Whereas, 
Yj,, denotes the index value for the jth country /industry speculative grade, in period t 
Pj ý (Pj, o, Pjj, Pj, 2, 
... 
, 
pj, 
n, 
) denote the coefficients of the jth country industry of 
speculative grade, at time t, 
Xj, t ý (Xj, l, t Xj, 2, t 
..., 
Xj,,,, t )are the values of the macroeconomic variables of the jth 
country/ industry speculative grade, at time t. 
Vi Ij is the error term, which is independent of the of macroeconomic variables and is 
assumed to be normally distributed 
, 
whereby V j, t - N(O, aj ) and Vt -N (0, Ev), 
whereby the Vt stands for the vector of stacked index innovations 
, 
and V j, t and Y'v is 
the ixj covariance matrix of those index innovations. The value of these random 
variables can be generated by using Monte Carlo simulations, based on historical 
probability data 
The following step is to specify the set of the macroeconomic variables for each 
country and the probability of default P j, t and the index Y j, t are then defined at the 
country /industry level and the coefficients Pj are calculated accordingly. These 
macroeconomic variables are assumed to follow a univariate, auto-regressive model 
of order 2 (AR2), whereby: 
Xi, i, t -'ý Yi, i, O + ^fj, i, l Xj, i, t-I + Yj, i, 2 Xj, i, t-2+ e j, i, t 
where 
Xj, i, t-1, Xj, i, t-2, are the lagged values of the macroeconomic variables Xj, i, t, 
Yj, 
=( Yj, i, O, Yjj, 1, YjJ, 2), which are the coefficients to be estimated 
reasons. 
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e j, i, t -N (O, cy , j, i, t)and et - N(O, E, ) 
et is the vector of stacked error terms e j'j't of jxi AR(2) equations, and 
Y-, is the Oxi)Oxi) covariance matrix of the error terms e, 
Then the default probability model has to be calibrated and the Cholesky 
decomposition model is used to simulate the decomposition of the default 
probabilities. 
The essential idea of the CPV model is represented in an unconditional matrix for a 
particular country, whereby each shell of the matrix shows the probability that a 
counterparty of a particular rating at the beginning of the period will move to another 
rating at the end of the period. This probability is expected to move significantly 
during the business cycle. 
However, as shown in the model, it is possible that the unconditional transition matrix 
will underestimate the risk of default on low rated loans. In order to avoid this 
problem of underestimation all elements in the transition matrix should be adjusted 
for each year into the future reflecting the macroeconomic shocks on the transition 
probabilities. The simulated transition matrix would replace the historically 
unconditional matrix, and then given a particular rating, the transition probabilities 
could be used to calculate the VaR, which could be applied to long as well as to 
shorter periods. 
For longer time horizons J. e. t, t+l, transition matrices should be multiplied to yield 
mt, t+l = mt x mt+l 
Where a new matrix is produced, whose final column will give the cumulative 
probabilities of default for different loans during the periods t, t+L 
To summarise, the model implies that the credit cycles follow the business cycles by 
taking external macro economic variables into consideration in order to derive a 
rating. Provided that the data is available this methodology can be applied in each 
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country, to different sector s and various classes of obligors which react differently 
over the business cycle. 
However, the calibration of this model requires reliable default data for each country 
and/or industry which is not always available. 
2.3.4. KMV Model 
The accuracy of the Credit Metrics methodology / Credit Var has been strongly 
challenged by the KMV model. The reason for this, are the two critical assumptions 
on which the Credit Metrics rely, i. e. 1. All firms within the same rating class have 
the same default rate and 2. Actual default rate is equal to the historical average 
default rate. Indeed, as argued by KMV this cannot be the case, since default rates 
are continuous, while ratings are adjusted, simply because rating agencies take time 
to upgrade or downgrade companies whose default risk has changed. 
The idea of applying the option pricing model to the valuation of risky bonds and 
loans can be dated back to Merton's model (1974). He noted that when a bank makes 
a loan, its compensation is isomorphic to writing a put option on the assets of the 
borrowing firm. In particular, as there are five variables which enter the Black- 
Scholes-Merton (BSM) model of put option for stock valuation, the value of default 
of a loan or bond will also depend on five similar variables 18. i e. 
Value of a put option on a stock = ff s, x, r, cr,, T) 
Value of a default option of a risky loan =f (A, B, r, GA. TO 
Where a bar above a variable denotes that it is directly observable. 
r: short ten-n interest rates, 
Cysý GA are the volatilities of firms equity value and the market value of its assets 
respectively 
, 
18 The five variables included in BSM model of a put option are the original interest rate on the 
swap(the strike price), the current interest rate (the current underlying price), the volatility of interest 
rates, the sort term interest rates and the time to maturity of the swap. 
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T is the maturity of a put option or for loans it is the time horizon of the loan. 
As observed from the above two equations, all of the variables of the put option are 
directly observable, whereas the market value of a firm's assets and its volatility are 
not directly observable. Some researchers 
-Gordon and Santomero(1990) and 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996)- have assumed that the book value of assets is equal to 
the market value of assets which allows for to disregard the implied volatilites of 
assets. But without additional assumptions it is hard to find the values of A and (TA 
based on only one equation. 
Merton's ideas have been extended in many directions, such as by the KMV 
corporation of San Francisco, which generated default prediction models which 
updates default predictions for all big companies and banks whose equities are 
publicly traded. KMV argues that default rates are continuous, while ratings are 
adjusted in a discrete mode, since agencies take longer time to adjust for company 
downgrades or upgrades. Though a simulation exercise, it was shown that the 
historical average default rate and transition probabilities can differ from the actual 
rates. KMV doesn't use the S&P's or Moody's data in order to assign probabilities of 
default, which only depend on the rating of the obligor. KMV derives the Expected 
Default Frequency (EDF) for each obligor based on a Merton's type of model (1974) 
as aforementioned. Therefore, the probability of default is a function of the firm's 
capital structure, the volatility of asset returns and the current asset value. In 
particular, 
KMV model, in order to solve the two unknowns A and CTA, referred to in the 
equations above considers the following: 
9A structural approach is used between the market value of the firm's equity and 
the market value of assets, 
A relation between the volatility of the firm's assets and its equity. 
Once these values have been derived the EDF measure can be calculated for each 
borrower. KMV doesn't explicitly refer to transition al probabilities, as they are 
already included in the EDFs which are associated with a spread curve and an 
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implied credit rating. 19 KMV methodology best applies to publicly traded companies 
where the value of equity is actually determined by the market. 20 
The conclude the main contributions of the KMV methodology is that it relies on the 
market value of equity to estimate the firm's volatility, and as such it includes market 
information of default probabilities. On the other hand, the deficiencies of the model 
are focused on the following: 
a. The value of the firm, the volatility and the expected value of asset returns, cannot 
be directly observed, and therefore the accuracy of the estimates evaluated. 
b. Interest rates are assumed to be deterministic, and this can be disadvantageous, 
when applied to loans and other interest rate sensitive instruments. 
c. An implication of the KMV methodology (i. e. that as the maturity of a risky bond 
tends to zero, the credit spread also tends to zero) is not observed empirically. 
d. Historical data are used to determine the expected default frequency rates and 
consequently there is the implicit assumption of stationarity, which is not accurate 
as it has the potential to underestimate the actual probability of default. 
e. An ad hoc liability structure for a firm is used in order to apply the option theory. 
19 It should be noted that the EDF scores vary between 0 and 20. 20 KMV's model is derived in three steps. Analytical description of the methodology involved is 
provided in Appendix 3. 
65 
2.3. A Comparative Anatomy of the Credit Risk Models 
Having reviewed the basic and most influential credit risk models, which have been 
developed in the last years, it would be important to consider difference and 
similarities among those models as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each 
of those models. The following table summarises the four basic models together with 
their main framework of comparison: 
Framework for cm CR+ CPV KMV 
comparisons 
Basis for Credit risk Market Value Expected 
of assets Default Rates 
Macro- Market value 
economic of assets 
variables 
3. Interpretation of 
Risk 
MTM Default Model MTM or MTM or 
Default Model Default Model 
4. Volatility of micro Constant Variable Variable Variable 
& macro variables 
5. Correlation of MultivanateN Expected Factor Multivariate 
dependentand ormal Asset Default Rate or Loadings Normal Asset 
independent Return Independence Returns 
variables assumption 
5. Recovery Rates Random Constant within Random Constant or 
a band random 
6. Numerical Approach Simulation or Analytic Simulation Analytic 
Analytic 
As shown in the table above these models have some similarities and differences. In 
particular, 
1. Basis of Credit Risk 
Both CM and KMV models use the market value of assets and the volatility of assets 
in order to derive their credit risk, i. e. they are based on a Merton-type model. CPV's 
risk on the other hand is driven by a set of macro-economic variables, while in CR+ 
the risk is driven by the mean level of default and its volatility. However, it could be 
argued that all the above models could be linked to each other, since the volatility of 
the market value of assets as proposed by CM and KMV is linked to stock returns. In 
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turn, stock returns are affected by macroeconomic factors 
- 
systematic 
- 
as well as 
non-systematic factors. CPV is also driven by a set of macro economic factors and 
unsystematic- shocks- in the economy; while CR+ is driven by the mean default rate 
in the economy, which could also be linked to the state of economy. Therefore, each 
of the above models can be viewed as being linked to some macro-economic variables 
and effectively to the state of the economy 
- 
directly or indirectly. 
2. Definition of Risk 
Some of the models discussed above calculate the VaR based on changes in market 
values, which are the mark-to-market, and allow for downgrades /upgrades as well as 
defaults; whereas some others concentrate only on two states of the economy the 
default and non-default. 
3. Volatility of the variables 
In CM, the probability of default is assumed to be fixed based on historical data. In 
CR+ the probability if default is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution around a 
mean default rate, which in turn is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, which 
results in fat tailed distributions 
, 
than those produced by CM or CPV. CPV models 
the probability of default as a logistic function of a set of macroeconomic factors and 
shocks, which follow a normal distribution and therefore as the macro economy 
advances, so will the probability of default and the transition matrix. KMV model is 
based on EDF, which changes as new information is absorbed in stock prices. 
Correlation of credit events 
The correlations, in all the four models could be seen as correlation between an 
individual or portfolio of loans or bonds, and the state of the economy, as 
aforementioned. 
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5. Recovery Rates 
Generally speaking, the distribution of losses and the VaR calculation have proved to 
be rather volatile and dependent not only on the probabilities of default but also in the 
losses, once default has occurred. Therefore, modelling in a volatile recovery rate can 
increase the VaR calculation or the unexpected loss rate. The four models view 
recovery rates as follows: 
CM allows recovery rates to be random. In the non-nal distribution version of the 
model, the estimated standard deviation of recovery is included into the VaR 
calculation. In the actual distribution version, recovery rates are assumed to follow a 
beta distribution. In CPV recovery rates are estimated through a Monte Carlo 
simulation, while under CR+ recovery rates are assumed to be constant, but within a 
specified band. 
6. Numerical Approach 
CM uses both the analytic and the simulation approach for calculating VaR. This 
happens because since the number of loans in a portfolio increases, the analytic 
approach becomes very complex and thus Monte Carlo simulation approach is more 
advantageous and produces an approximate aggregate distribution of the portfolio 
loan values and thus VaR. 
CPV also uses a Monte Carlo simulation to generate macro shocks and the 
distribution of losses on a portfolio. On the other hand, CR+ based on a Poisson 
distribution for individual loans and a gamma distribution for the mean default rate, 
generates an analytic solution for the probability density function of losses. KMV also 
uses an analytic approach in order to generate the probability density function of 
losses. 
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2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed some of the basic ideas underlying the traditional 
framework of credit risk management and has given a brief review of the two most 
significant approaches to credit risk modelling, i. e. the structural approach and the 
reduced form approach. It provided some guidelines as to the theoretical determinants 
of credit spread changes and outlined two studies considered in the credit risk 
literature so far, that incorporate both market and firm specific factors, for 
determining credit spread changes. It considered recent developments made in the 
area of credit risk modelling at a portoflio level, as provided by the four mostly 
influential models considered in recent credit risk literature, i. e. the Moody's KMV 
model, the McKinsey model, Credit Metrics and the Credit Risk+. Each of the above 
models considered different micro and macro variables into their framework in order 
to model credit risk. 
The idea of integrating some of those factors contemplated in the above models, into a 
unique framework for modelling credit risk is a topic that has received and will be 
receiving a great deal of attention in the credit risk literature. In essence, this is also 
the main driver behind this thesis, as is analytically described in the next chapters. It 
should be noted that this chapter provided some general thoughts to credit risk 
modelling and measurement. However, one can easily derive that although credit risk 
has been the subject of most theoretical and empirical discussions, at least during the 
last decade, it is rather surprising that most of the credit risk literature has focused on 
determining the main drivers of default. Of course, this is the most important risk 
faced by banks and other financial institutions world-wide, but it is also significant to 
model changes in credit risk before defaults occurs. More specifically, literature on 
credit risk migration within the context of credit spread changes is rather thin. At this 
point, it should also be noted that literature review related to the specific hypotheses 
tested under this thesis is provided in the relevant chapters. 
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3.0. Model Specification, Data Description & Hypotheses 
3.1. Model Specification 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the impact of macro, equity, and accounting 
variables on credit spread changes. It constitutes an in depth analysis of the relation 
between the US corporate bond market, equity market and macroeconomy, while the 
ultimate goal is to construct a credit risk model which will provide the settings in 
order to forecast changes in credit spreads. The parameters used for testing the 
relation include not only spreads and equity information but also the respective 
companies' accounting information, which hasn't been included before, and a set of 
US leading macroeconomic indicators. 
The proposed model uses some of the variables considered by MKMV and the Credit 
Portfolio View model, but the effort is focused on estimating credit spread changes 
rather than default probabilities or EDF measures. Also the idea of using transition 
matrices or recovery rates in order to model default or transition probabilities, is not 
considered under the proposed model, since the idea is to figure future changes in 
credit spreads. Instead the infori-nation provided by the above variables is backwards 
looking, but more importantly this is information already implicitly reflected in credit 
spreads. 
3.1.2. Assumptions 
The assumptions made for testing this relation are: 
(1) Spreads are used as a proxy for credit ratings. When credit ratings improve, credit 
spreads are expected to tighten and vice versa. 
(2) Companies provide reliable and efficient inforination to the markets on a timely 
basis. 
(3) Financial markets are efficient in that, all information is available to investors and 
reflected in equity prices. 
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3.1.3. Proposed Credit Risk Model Format 
As mentioned before, the proposed credit risk model, combines the effects of 
macroeconic and equity variables, as proposed by McKinsey and KMV respectively 
and incorporates also company specific financial information. In other words it is a 
multi-factor model that conforms to the structural approach to credit risk modelling 
but also uses variables employed in traditional credit risk analysis. Based on 
fundamental economic theory, we expect the relationship between changes in credit 
spreads and the independent variables to be of the following forrn: 
ASpreadsit =f [(x+ (P I *(8Xit)) +(P2*(5Fit)) + (P3*(8Eit)) + 6it] 
Where: 
i= 1,2 
.... 
n and 
A Spreads: denotes the change in spread on corporate bonds i. e. the change in the 
extra yield offered to compensate investors for a variety of risks such as: (1) expected 
default loss 
- 
the risk that in the event of default, investors will not receive the full 
amount of the promised cash flow (directly related to the default probability of the 
finn and the recovery rate in the event of default (2) credit risk premium, due to the 
uncertainty of defaulted losses and (3) liquidity and tax premiums which result from 
the difference in liquidity and tax status of corporate bonds and treasury bonds-. 
8Xit: denotes the change in a set of US macro-economic variables including GDP 
growth, inflation, consumer confidence, the term structure of interest rates, etc. There 
is assumed to be an inverse relation between spreads and macroeconomic factors, i. e. 
when economy improves and macroeconomic factors pick up, credit spreads tighten 
and vice versa. In other words, we would expect credit ratings to improve when the 
economy is doing better and deteriorate with a slowdown in economy. 
BFit : denotes the change in a set of accounting factors composing the company's 
financial performance, i. e. ratios such as ROA, ROE, Debt/equity, cash flow /debt, 
etc. Again here, there is an inverse relation between spreads and accounting factors, 
i. e. when a company's financials improve, spreads tighten and when financials 
deteriorate spreads tend to become wider. However, this is a rather complicated issue 
with respect to the timing of those adjustments taking place. The reason for this is that 
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deterioration in a company's financial profile is received by the market long before 
the actual reporting of the companies' results. For example, a company may release 
information through the announcement of quarterly information, press reports or other 
company specific events to investors, which may proceed an actual negative change 
in the company's financials as those are reflected in the company's annual report. 
Indeed, when considering the issue of timing within the current thesis, we should 
assume at least for most of the cases that the accounting information as it is provided 
in the company's annual report is the only information investors have. 
8Eit: denotes the change on the company's stock price which is also inversely related 
to spreads, since when stock prices pick up spreads tighten and vice versa. Equity 
indices such as the S&P and the Russell Index are also considered and so are 
historical stock price volatilities as well as the implied volatilities as provided by the 
VIX Index. 
Data on spreads for industrial bonds together with their respective equity and 
accounting information as well as a set of US macroeconomic indicators common for 
the companies mentioned above, were collected from Bloomberg and Merrill Lynch. 
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3.2. Data Description 
Although the calculation of credit spreads between corporate and government bonds 
seems uncomplicated, since the most common way of figuring it, is to calculate the 
difference between the yield to maturity of a corporate bond and that of the 
government bond of the same maturity, there are other issues involved which should 
be carefully considered. Despite the type of the rate used or the availability of the 
rate, by directly comparing two bonds with the same maturity, we are effectively 
comparing two bonds that neither have the same duration (price sensitivity to interest 
rates changes) nor the same convexity (sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve). 
Calculating credit spreads on an aggregate basis using bond indices is subject to the 
same difficulties. 21 As a result in this thesis we are using two different sets of data, 
the first set, from Merrill Lynch which is option adjusted, and the second from 
Bloomberg calculated in the conventional way. 22 Therefore, the above hypotheses are 
tested with the use of two different sets of data. 
0 The flrst set includes the option adjusted credit spreads as provided by 
constituents of the Merrill Lynch Indices (investment and non-investment grade) 
on monthly and quarterly frequencies for the period from January 1997 until May 
2002. An elimination procedure to Merrill Lynch Indices has been followed, 
whereby one bond with a medium to long term maturity profile, would be 
included from each company and therefore it is expected that the results would be 
more comprehensive and accurate, since specific company's movements in credit 
spreads will be matched against their respective movements in equity and 
financial ratios. Analytical description of the bonds and data comprising the 
actual and final set of the Merrill Lynch Indices is provided in section 3.4.1. 
The second set of data collected includes credit spread indices extracted from 
Bloomberg on monthly frequencies for a much longer time period than the first 
data set, i. e. from May 1991 until June 2005. Twelve series of credit spreads have 
21 Catherine Lubochinsky, University of Paris 11, "How much credit should be given to credit 
spreads? ", November 2002 
2 Analytical description of the calculation of ML credit spreads is provided in section 3.2.3.1. and for 
Bloomberg in section 3.5.1. 
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been gathered for short medium and long-term maturities for the AAA, AA, A and 
BBB rating categories. Non-investment grade indices weren't available in the 
second set of data. A more analytical description of the indices collected under 
this second set of data is provided in section 3.5. 
3.2.1. Data Description 
-(1s' set of Data 
-Merrill Lynch Bond Indices) 
3.2.2. Rationale behind the frequency of the data collected and tested 
One of the initial arguments in this thesis, was the frequency of the data to be tested. 
There has been no evidence, based on previous studies with regards to what should be 
the frequency of data collected, although in most of the studies the frequency of the 
data collected has usually been linked to the frequency of the independent variables 
included or the idea tested. In other words, papers examining the relationship between 
credit spreads and macroeconomic variables or financial ratios have used quarterly 
data, while those dealing with credit spreads and equity have mostly used monthly or 
weekly. Consequently, in this thesis, data has been tested on monthly and quarterly 
frequencies for equities and macroeconomic variables, but solely quarterly 
frequencies have been used when testing the relation between credit spreads and 
financial variables and on the combination of all the independent variables. 
More specifically, data on credit spreads and equities as well some of the 
macroeconomic variables were available on monthly frequencies, while some of the 
macroeconomic and accounting variables were only available at quarterly frequencies. 
For those variables that data was not available on monthly intervals, i. e. 
macroeconomic variables, data has been reproduced to generate monthly frequencies. 
For example January's GDP figure was kept the same through until the next reporting 
date, March, in order to generate monthly frequencies. Although this may alter to 
some extent the results, any effects from this extrapolation are minimised once data 
has been further tested on quarterly frequencies. 
It should be noted from the outset, as it will be explicitly described in next chapters, 
that monthly and quarterly data was used to test the hypotheses on credit spreads and 
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the macroeconomic cycle as well as equities and solely quarterly frequencies to test 
the relation between credit spreads and accounting information. 
Another reason for focusing on monthly and quarterly frequencies is in order to 
implicitly induce to a longer time horizon, since in any case the concept and idea of 
this model is to forecast medium credit spread changes. 
3.2.3. Description of Data 
3.2.3.1. Data for Spreads 
Data for spreads was collected from Merrill Lynch 23 
. 
It is very important for this 
thesis that access to ML Indices was available, since most corporate bond databases 
available to academics such as the Lehman Fixed Income or Bloomberg's databases, 
mainly cover investment grade bonds. Also and most importantly is the fact that data 
collected on credit spreads takes account of the bond optionality, i. e. the modified 
duration 24 of bonds is calculated and the option adjusted duration for bonds with an 
embedded option is also considered. 
ML has a number of different indices, such as the global broad market index, the 
global sovereign index, and others. Each of these indices have different characteristics 
with respect to rating, maturity, market capitalisation the currency of issuance, etc. 
The one chosen for the purposes of this thesis, classifies bonds according to rating 
category for medium term maturing bonds and is concentrated on the US investment 
grade and high yield market. The reason why the US market is chosen for this thesis 
is because there is more information both in terms of stocks quoted but also because 
in the US, companies are required to publish their accounts on a quarterly basis which 
would provide more observations for testing the relevant hypotheses. 
in particular, information on credit spreads was collected from the following two 
indices: the US High Grade Broad Market Index and the US High Yield Master II 
Index: 
23 For the rest of this study, the abbreviation ML will be used to refer to Merrill Lynch 
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ML US HIGH GRADE BROAD MARKET INDEX 
- 
TICKER USOO 
The US Broad Market Index tracks the performance of the US dollar denominated 
investment grade government and corporate public debt issued in the US domestic 
bond market, including collateralised products. Qualifying bonds for the index must 
have at least one-year remaining term to maturity, a fixed coupon schedule and a 
minimum amount outstanding of US$1bn for US treasuries, US$25mn (per tranche) 
for asset backed securities and US$150mn for all other securities. Bonds must be 
investment grade based on a composite of Moody's and S&P. "Yankee" bonds (debt 
of foreign issuers issued in the US domestic market) are included in the Index 
provided the issuer is a supranational or is domiciled in a country having an 
investment grade foreign currency long tenn debt rating (based on a composite of 
Moody's and S&P). "Global" bonds (debt issued simultaneously in the eurobond and 
the US domestic bond markets) also qualify for inclusion. The index is re-balanced on 
the last calendar day of the month. Issues that meet the qualifying criteria are included 
in the index for the following month. Issues that no longer meet the criteria during the 
course of the month remain in the index until the next month end, re-balancing at 
which point they are dropped from the index. The number of bonds included in the 
index are 5,864. The inception date of the index is the 31/12/1996. 
ML US HIGH YIELD MASTER 11 INDEX 
- 
TICKER HOAO 
The US High Yield Mater 11 Index tracks the perforinance of below investment grade 
US-dollar denominated corporate bonds publicly issued in the US domestic market. 
"Yankee" bonds (debt of foreign issuers issued in the US domestic market) are 
included in the Index provided the issuer is a supranational or is domiciled in a 
country having an investment grade foreign currency long term debt rating. (based on 
a composite of Moody's and S&P). Qualifying bonds for the index must have at least 
one-year remaining term to maturity, a fixed coupon schedule and a minimum amount 
outstanding of US$100mn. Bonds must be rated below investment grade based on a 
composite of Moody's and S&P. The index is re-balanced on the last calendar day of 
the month. Issues the meet the qualifying criteria are included in the index for the 
24 Modified Duration, i. e. the duration divided by the interest rate factor (I +R) 
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following month. Issues that no longer meet the criteria during the course of the 
month remain in the index until the next month end, re-balancing at which point they 
are dropped from the index. The number of bonds included in the index is 1,422. The 
inceotion date of the index is 31/8/1986. 
Bonds qualifying for this thesis 
Although the indices described above include more than one bond from the same 
company, the sample used in this study has been carefully eliminated (analytically 
described in section 3.4.1). Initially, we had to ensure that bonds were considered 
based solely on the creditworthiness of the issuers, and accordingly issues with asset 
backed and credit enhancement features (such as financials, quasi and foreign 
government bonds, sovereigns, securitised securities and utilities) have been 
excluded. The reason for the exclusion of these bonds is because ratings assigned to 
securitised issues don't only consider the financial standing of the issuer but also 
collaterals or others securities attached. Also financial and utility companies have 
been excluded since credit analysis applied to such companies is based on different 
fundamentals than those applied to industrial ones. As a result in this study we will 
concentrate only on corporate bonds issued by industrial companies. According to the 
ML classification, industrial companies include technology and electronics, services 
cyclical and non-cyclical, telecommunications, energy, real estate, capital goods, 
basic industries and media. The sample includes US dollar denominated investment 
and high yield grade industrial sector corporate bonds, issued in the US domestic 
bond market. 25 In terms of the maturity profile of the bonds chosen, there has been a 
careful selection to include only bonds with an average maturity profile of seven to 
eight years. 
As a result corporate bond credit spreads were collected using option-adjusted spreads 
from Merrill Lynch from January 1997 through May 2002. The Merrill Lynch option 
adjusted credit spread indices start from December 31,1996 and are rebalanced on the 
last calendar day of each month. To avoid potential bias due to index rebalancing, 
monthly spread is taken excluding the rebalancing day. 
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3.2.3.2. Data for Equities 
For the sample of bonds that qualified for this thesis, we collected the respective 
equity prices from Bloomberg, for the period from January 1997 until May 2002. In 
addition to the company specific equity data, two equity indices have also been 
collected, the S&P500 index, which is dominated by large cap stocks and the Russell 
2000 index which is related to small cap stocks. The volatility Index has also been 
collected (known as the VIX), which measures the implied volatility in the prices of a 
basket of options on the S&P 100 Index. The index is developed by taking the 
weighted average of implied volatility for the Standard & Poor's 100 Index (OEX) 
calls and puts and measures the volatility of the market. The S&P 100 itself contains 
the largest 100 stocks in the S&P 500 that have options traded on them. The VIX 
covers a relatively narrow group of stocks, but those are among the largest companies 
traded in the United States. The S&P 500, the Russell and the VIX indices have been 
collected for a much longer time period from May 1991 until May 2005. 
3.2.3.3. Data on Accounting Factors 
Having collected the Bloomberg tickers for the data that qualified in terms of spreads 
and equities, the next step was to collect the data for the respective companies' 
accounting information. This data was taken from Bloomberg and since most of the 
companies report on a quarterly basis, that was the frequency of the data collected. 
Data on accounting information was collected for the period from January 1997 until 
May 2002, since accounting variables will only been considered when testing the 
hypothesis of the relationship between credit spreads and accounting information and 
the combination of all the independent factors on a cross sectional basis. For the rest 
of the thesis when it comes to accounting indicators the following abbreviations are 
going to be used: 
25 For a more detailed description of the ML indices by rating and industrial classification please refer 
to the pivot tables per rating category as shown in the Appendix 4. 
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Accounting Factors Abbreviations 
Cash Flow to Debt CFD 
Current Market Capitalisation CMT 
EBIT to Interest Expense EBIT 
EBIT to total interest expense EBTI 
EBITDA to total interest expense EBITDIN 
EBITDA per revenue EBDAR 
Return on capital ROC 
Return on common Equity ROE 
Return on Invested Capital ROIC 
Total Debt To EBITDA TDEBDA 
Total Debt to Total Capital DBCP 
3.2.3.4. Data on macroeconomic factors 
For the purpose of testing the impact of the macroeconomic cycle on credit spreads 
and the implicit influence of the macro economic variables when we are proceeding 
with a solution for forecasting credit spreads, macroeconomic variables have been 
collected from Bloomberg. These variables have been collected for the period from 
May 1991 until June 2005, on a monthly (where available) and quarterly basis. Data 
collected include: 
a Interest rates 
Short term 3 months and 2 years as well as medium term 5 years and long term I Oyrs 
and 30yrs have been collected on a monthly & quarterly basis. 
m GDP 
Bloomberg defines GPD as the value of all final goods and services produced in the 
country. GDP is the broadest measure of economic activity and the principal indicator 
of economic performance. Built as a system of interlocking sector accounts, the GDP 
report provides the most comprehensive reading of the nation's wealth. Also released 
with GDP statistics is the GDP deflator. The calculations of the GDP deflator are 
reported implicit deflator and a fixed weight deflator. The implicit deflator is the ratio 
of the current dollar GDP to constant dollar GDP. The fixed weight deflator is the 
sum of the deflators for individual components of GDP with each component 
weighted by its share of real GDP in the base period and consequently a better gauge 
of inflation. For the purposes of this thesis, the figure for GDP collected is the one 
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given by GDP/GNP. Data on the GDP is collected quarterly and converted to monthly 
data. 
a Employment Statistics 
Data on unemployment is also collected quarterly and is retrieved from the 
employment report released by the Bureau of Labour Statistics, which is probably the 
single most important economic series for the financial markets and generally viewed 
as one of the best concurrent measures of business activity. There are two surveys: (1) 
payroll survey which measures unemployment in non agricultural industries (2) 
household survey which measures civilian non-institutional employment aged 16 
years and older, which includes agricultural workers and self-employed. 
0 US Consumer Confldence 
Consumer confidence is measured by two widely followed confidence reports (1) 
University of Michigan and (2) Conference Board. Over the longer term both of these 
surveys move together as they serve as a reflection of the national mood. Consumers 
are more inclined to spend when they feel confident about their financial and 
employment prospects. Both indices of consumer confidence, i. e. the index from the 
Conference Board and the one from the University of Michigan are good leading 
indicators of consumer spending. The University of Michigan's index of consumer 
expectations is one of the leading economic indicators. Business confidence is 
watched for early signals concerning firms' capital spending and employment plans. 
Here the University of Michigan's consumer confidence index is being collected on a 
monthly basis. 
0 CP1 
CPI is one of the most widely recognised price measures for tracking the price of a 
market basket of goods and services purchased by individuals. The weights of the 
components are based on consumer spending patterns. For example an item that 
makes up 20% of the average household budget would have the same weight in the 
CPI. The food and beverage components has a relative importance of about 18% in 
the CPI, so a 1% rise in food prices would contribute 0.18 points to the change in the 
overall CPI. The CPI covers both goods and services. Here it differs from the 
Producer Price Index which covers just goods. The other difference between the two 
80 
indices is that the CPI covers cost facing consumers while PPI covers purchases 
and/or wholesalers. All items in the index are seasonally adjusted. Data on the CPI is 
collected quarterly and converted to monthly data. 
6 PPI 
PPI which is also collected quarterly, measures prices received by producers at the 
first commercial sale. The report published on PPI, measures prices for goods at three 
stages of production: finished intennediate and crude. The index for finished goods 
generally receives the most attention. Change in this index is the first aggregate 
inflation measure available for the month. Food and energy are large components of 
the PPI. As with the CPL the PPI excluding food and energy is a good measure of 
underlying inflation. Food and energy prices are often affected by temporary and non- 
economic factors such as weather. The PPI for consumer goods can be a good 
indicator of the goods component of the CPI which represents half of the CPI. Capital 
goods prices measure costs facing the industry. 
a Trade balance 
The merchandise trade balance report notes the difference between the dollar volume 
of exports and imports. The monthly numbers are the basis for the merchandise 
component of the net exports in the GDP account, although other adjustments are 
made. This report is broken down by industry, commodity and US trade with other 
countries. Quarterly figures are collected on the trade balance and then converted to 
monthly data. 
m Industrial Production 
Industrial production, is one of the oldest statistical reports in the economy and is 
defined as the measure of physical output in factories, mines and utilities. Activity in 
manufacturing accounts for about 85% of total industrial production with the 
remainder of output from utilities and services. Since it is a measure of actual volume 
of output in "goods-producing industries" influenced by prices, industrial production 
is one of the more important economic indicators. The industrial production statistics 
is broken down by industry (e. g. mining, autos, chemicals) and market grouping (e. g. 
final products, intermediate products and materials). For this thesis a broad measure 
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of industrial production index is being considered and is collected quarterly and 
converted to monthly. 
m Money Supply 
The H6 is published weekly providing stock and flow measures of the monetary 
aggregates (MI, M2, M3) of domestic non-financial debt and their components, MI, 
M2, M3 which are progressively more inclusive measures for money: MI is included 
in M2, which is included in M3. MI is the most narrowly defined measure, consists of 
the most liquid forms of money, namely currency and checkable deposits. The non- 
MI components of M2 are primarily household holdings of savings deposit, time 
deposits, and retail money market mutual funds. The non-M2 components of M3 
consists of depositories, namely large time deposits, repurchase agreements and 
Eurodollars. Here quarterly figures of money supply on aggregate are being selected. 
For the rest of this thesis the following abbreviations are going to be used for the 
macroeconomic factors. 
Macroeconomic Factors Abbreviations 
Interest rates IR 
GDP GDP 
Employment Statistics UNEMP 
US Consumer Confidence CONIF 
CPI CPI 
PPI PPI 
Trade Balance TRBA 
Industrial Production IP 
Money Supply 
3.3. Data Analysis 
3.3.1. Data elimination process 
Spreads collected from US High Grade Broad Market Index and US High yield 
Master Index include investment and high yield grade corporate bonds, which only 
have medium to long term maturities. (i. e. 7-8 years to mature). The spreads collected 
were the monthly OAS* spreads as provided by ML, from the 1/1/1997 until the 
31/5/2002. (*OAS: option adjusted spreads- i. e. calculating the spread over the 
theoretical yield curve taking into account any bond optionality). These spreads are 
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collected for trading days only. The start and end dates that data has been collected 
for, are the 31/01/1997 until 31/05/2002. 
The total number of issues included in the Merrill Lynch indices included 5,864 bonds 
from the investment grade category and 1,422 from the non-investment grade 
category (i. e. total number of bonds 7,286). The ultimate sample of data, which is 
used for the thesis, is limited to 674 bonds (corresponding to 674 companies) for the 
following reasons: 
* The reason why the initial number of bonds is high, is due to the fact that in the 
ML indeces, there are different bonds for the same company, but since they have 
different maturities they are rated differently. Additionally, there is a restriction 
with regards to spread history, as the spreads of the bonds which have matured are 
no longer in the index. Also one company can have a number of bonds trading 
with different maturities and different spreads. However, one bond is selected for 
each company, with medium to long term maturity (seven to eight years). 
* The history of some of the bonds, which are traded, doesn't go back to the starting 
date (i. e. 31/1/1997) and as such those bond are also deleted from the sample. 
9 Some of the companies which have issued debt are not quoted. As a result the data 
is further eliminated to include the companies which are both quoted in the stock 
market and also have issued bonds which means the respective companies' bonds 
that don't have equity traded are also deleted from the sample. 
The data has been further eliminated since not all the companies which were 
publicly listed on either debt or equity markets had accounting information 
available on a quarterly basis which means that these bonds were also excluded 
from the sample. 
Before proceeding with the detailed description of the final number of bonds per 
credit rating category, the table that follows provides a picture of the final sample per 
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credit rating category (credit spreads are presented in basis points while the last 
column presents the number of bonds included per credit rating category)26. 
Credit 
Rating 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Number 
of 
Bonds 
AAA 106.6 109.2 112.2 119.7 113.5 85.6 6 
AA 133.2 119.2 151.8 125.2 106.8 21 
A 122.2 124.2 152.2 162.9 143.1 141.4 68 
BBB 210.7 212.1 214.2 242.4 228.1 234.9 160 
342.7 344.2 346.9 356.1 392.6 388.7 143 
510.5 
- 
522.8 521.6 553.9 591.8 530.6 191 
07.2 -1,0 1,098.4 1,100.2 1,105.5 1,573.1 1,419.8 85 
However, as mentioned previously, the ultimate number of companies included in the 
sample is significantly lower than the initial one. Below is described in detail the 
elimination procedure of the number of bonds, during the data collection process for 
each of the rating categories in turn. 
AAA Rated Bonds 
The initial sample included 2,068 bonds. Most of the bonds in this category are quasi 
& foreign government bonds, securitised asset-backed and financial bonds, which 
from the outset have been excluded from the sample, as their rating is based on factors 
such as the quality of security and collateral, rather than the actual financial 
fundamentals of the CoMpany. 27 
As a result the number of bonds that qualify (i. e. bonds issued by an industrial 
company, with medium to long term maturities) under this rating category are 98. 
These 98 bonds correspond to 15 companies, which means that from the 98 bonds 
only 15 were selected. From those 15 bonds, 8 of them had been excluded since they 
didn't have trading history going back to 31/1/1997 and the rest didn't meet the 
maturity criteria set (Le. some of them had only I year to maturity). For one of the 
companies equity trading history wasn't available and as such, the final number of 
26 This table refers to Merrill Lynch corporate bond sample 
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companies which met the criteria for spreads and additionally had equity issued and 
accounting information available were 6. 
Initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final 
Number Industrial Companies Information Information 
of Bonds 13 o 11 ds 
2,068 98 15 7 6 6 
AA Rated Bonds (incl. AAI, AA2 & AA3 sub-categories) 
The initial sample included 583 bonds. The number of industrial bonds was 184. The 
number of companies which had issued the 184 bonds with the different maturities 
was 30.28 The bonds that met the maturity constraints were 24 and the final number of 
cross sectional observations for which there were both equity and accounting 
information available were 2 1. 
Initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final 
Number of Industrial Bonds Companies Information Information Data Set 
Bonds 
583 184 30 24 24 21 21 
A Rated Bonds( including Al, A2 & A3 sub-categories) 
A lot of bonds in this category have been deleted due to the fact that the number of 
bonds per company issued was very high 
. 
29 As a result for from an initial number of 
633 industrial bonds which corresponded to 85 companies, 73 of them were accepted 
due to the maturity constraints and 68 of them were finally included, as all of their 
information was available. 
initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final Data 
Number of Industrial Companies Information Information Set 
Bonds Bonds 
19489 633 85 73 68 68 
27 For a more detailed analysis of AAA rated please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot_AAA) 
28 For a more detailed analysis of AA rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot AA) 
29 For a more detailed analysis of A rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot_A) 
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BBB Rated Bonds (including BBI, BB2 & BB3 sub-categories) 
A number of bonds in this category were deleted as their history didn't go as far back 
as 31/1/1997 
. 
30 Following the same rationale from an initial number of 170 bonds that 
could be included in the analysis we ended up with 160. 
Initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final Data Set 
Number of Industrial Companies Information Information 
Bonds Bonds 
19723 1,280 211 170 165 160 160 
BB Rated Bonds (including BBI, BB2 & BB3 sub-categorieS) 31 
Using the elimination process, as being described above, the ultimate number of 
bonds in this band are 143. 
Initial No No of No of Spreads Equity Info Accounting Info Final Data Set 
of Bonds Industrial Companies 
Bonds 
603 535 213 166 150 143 143 
B Rated Bonds (including B1, B2 & B3 sub-categories)32 
A number of bonds were deleted in this category since there have been a number of 
bonds issued by the same companies. 
initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final Data Set 
Number Industrial Companies Information Information 
of Bonds Bonds 
520 484 228 215 203 191 191 
C Rated Bonds (including C, C2, CCI, CC2 & CC3 sub-categories) 
A lot of bonds in this category have been deleted due to the fact their spread history 33 didn't go as back as the 31/1/1997. 
Initial Number of Number of Spreads Equity Accounting Final Data Set 
Number of Industrial Companies Information Information 
Bonds Bonds 
298 279 176 124 86 85 85 
30 For a more detailed analysis of BBB rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot 
- 
BBB) 
" For a more detailed analysis of BB rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot_BB) 
32 For a more detailed analysis of B rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot_B) 
33 For a more detailed analysis of C rated bonds please refer to the Appendix 4 (Pivot_C) 
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The following table shows the summary of the data, in terms of the final number of 
bonds collected in each rating category: 
DATA SUMMARY 
ML Index 
Names 
Rating Category Number of Rated 
Bonds in the MIL 
Index 
Number of Unique 
Companies in the 
Index 
Number of companies for 
which all of the information is 
available(share price, spreads, 
accounting information) 
INVESTMENT GRADE 
C4AI AAA 2,068 15 6 
C4A2 AA 583 30 21 
C4A3 A 1,489 85 68 
C4A4 BBB 1,724 211 160 
Total Number of 
Investment Grade Bonds I 
5,864 341 255 
NON- INVESTMENT GRADE 
JOA 1 1313 603 213 143 
JOA2 B 521 . 228 191 
JOA3 C 298 176 85 
Total Number of Non- 
jde BonL(dis investm e n rr 
1,422 
- 
617 419 
! ý ý 
Total 
__ 
L 
7ý- 2_ 86 674 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
- 
Monthly Data 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics by Rating category 
Firstly the time series patterns of both credit spread level and credit spread changes 
are going to be examined. Descriptive statistics per rating category are provided 
below: 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of constituents of ML Indices spread levels 
-Monthly 
F), qtn ýIn basis noints) 
C REDIT SPREAD CENELS 
AAA AA A BBB BB B C 
Mean 88 102 117 185 308 521 1,310 
Median 79 89 ill 169 283 432 841 
Maximum 284 380 480 1,280 2,194 9,413 98,631 
Minimum 3 2 
-25 
-1,000 -43 -159 63 
. Std. Dev. 47 62 56 103 184 373 3,311 
Skewness 1 2 1 2 , 2 6 23 
Kurtosis 6 8 4 15 14 95 588 
Jarque-Bera 256 1,842 616 60,826 32,575 2,298,948 44,018,162 
Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 344 1,085 4,293 9,499 5,795 6,386 - 3,073 
Cross 
sections 
6 22 69 161 144 192 81 - 
I- 
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The above table shows descriptive statistics for credit spread levels for the seven 
broad rating categories. As it is obvious the mean credit spread level tends to increase 
as the rating deteriorates, starting from a mean of 88bps for the AAA rated bonds, and 
reaching 1,310 bps for C rated bonds. It is worth noting in the tables of descriptive 
statistics that as in Lohngstaff and Schwartz (1995b), the standard deviation of credit 
spreads tend to widen as credit rating deteriorates. Spread levels mainly present 
positive skewness, which means that the distribution has a long right tail. Credit 
spreads belonging to all ratings present kurtosis of more than 3, which means that 
they are leptokurtic (the distributions have higher peaks and thicker tails than the 
normal distribution doeS)34 
. 
Also the Jarque Bera statistic for the null hypothesis of 
normality is far beyond the critical value at the 5% level accompanied by the zero 
probability suggests that the credit spread series are far from being non-nally 
distributed. The unusually large values of the Jarque Bera statistic are due to the large 
number of observations, stemming from the nature of cross sectional data. As a result 
the null hypothesis for a nonnally distributed residuals is rejected. 
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of constituents of ML Indices spread percentage 
- 
Mnnthlv Dqtq iji, 
C REDIT SPR EAD CHANGES 
AAA AA A BBB BB B C 
ean 0.028 0.041 0.033 0.028 0.03 0.02 0.057 
edian 
F 
M i  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.015 
M aximu m 3.333 7.522 15.429 6.90 7.79 5.28 7.693 
,--. 
ýT 
Minimum 
-0.625 -0.889 -5.000 -2.00 -1.13 -27.50 : 0.787 
StT -Dev. 0.259 0.389 0.390 0.21 0.24 0.54 0.316 
Skewness 6 11 8 13 14 
-21 23 
Kurtosis 10 15 12 27 19 45 67 
Jarque- 
Bera 
2,710 27,815 59,298 486,976 244,183 908,754 772,359 
PýOý ýllit 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observati 
ons 
337 
I 
1063 4223 9335 5635 6182 2984 
Cross 
_, 
actions 
16 22 69 161 
I 
143 189 80 
II 
The above table shows descriptive statistics for credit spread changes for the seven 
broad rating categories. It can be noticed that mean changes in spreads are 
insignificantly different from zero. When we look at the standard deviation of credit 
34 If for example we use the normal distribution for risk management purposes in such kind of data, we 
will be underestimating the true risk and capital requirements will be insufficient. 
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spread changes there is not such a clear monotonical relation with a deterioration in 
credit quality as with credit spread levels. In particular, from AAA to A rated spreads 
standard deviation increases, then it tapers off for BBB and BB rated spreads and then 
increases for B rated bonds before it reduces again in the C rating category. This 
results contradicts partly to Pedrosa and Roll(1998) who find lower standard 
deviations for lower rating classes, while it coincides to the results found by 
Duffee(1998) or Longstaff and Schwartz (1995b) who indeed evidence the opposite 
effect. Credit spread changes mainly present positive skewness, which means that the 
distribution has a long right tail, except for the B rated bonds which seem to have long 
left tails. Credit spreads changes belonging to all ratings present kurtosis of more than 
3, which means that they are leptokurtic. Also the Jarque Bera statistic for the null 
hypothesis of non-nality is far beyond the critical value at the 5% level accompanied 
by the zero probability suggests that the credit spread series are far from being 
normally distributed. As a result the null hypothesis for a non-nally distributed 
residuals, at credit spread changes is also rejected. 
Descriptive statistics by year 
In table 3.3. descriptive statistics of the average mean spread levels are shown. These 
include the average spread of all investment and non-investment rated companies, and 
what is very clear from the table is that there is an increase of the average spread 
levels from 1998 until 2002, which is also depicted in their standard deviations. 
Average spread levels have increased in line with the increase in annual default rates, 
which according to Moody's study of default rates of corporate bond issuers, have 
increased by 638% in the period from 1997 to 2001. 
TAIc 3.3. Descriotive Statistics of constltucnts of M I, Indic" sm-cad I. cvcls ner Year 
DESCRIPTIVE STATS BASED ON AVERAGE MEAN SPREADS (LEVELS) BY YEAR 
AVG 1997 AVG 1998 AVG1999 A VG2000 AVG2001 A VG2002 
Mean 43 129 175 317 460 462 
Standard 
Error 
2.608 5.948 7.843 13.228 21.259 22.560 
Median 0.000 96.250 136.000 231.750 306.750 304.000 
Mode 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard 
Deviation 
65.726 149.882 197.642 333.343 535.709 568.498 
Kurtosis 8.458 4.464 14.298 10.001 18.338 18.518 
Skewness 2.499 1.810 2.910 2.559 3.547 3.669 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 
L: 0.000 ; 
Maximum 499.000 941.000 1826.250 2877.000 5312.500 0 6'3 
%0 
_L 
89 
3.4.2. Autocorrelation 
The next step of the analysis is to address the question of dependence of credit 
spreads. Since a series cannot be independently distributed if any of its 
autocorrelation coefficients are non zero, we compute the autocorrelation function 
(ACF) of credit spread levels and credit spread changes. The pattern of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation is important in indicating the plausible 
structure and nonlinear dynamics of the credit spread process. Below are presented 
the sample autocorrelations partial autocorrelation coefficients from lag I to 5 and 10, 
20, and 28 for all ratings for credit spread levels. 
The first lag autocorrelation in all of the rating categories is high. For example in the 
"AAA" rating it is 0.829, in the "1313" is 0.909 and tapers off gradually after the I Oth 
and some instances 20'h lag. This type of pattern together with the fact that the Q 
statistic exceeds the Q value from the chi-square table at the chosen level of 
significance, means that the null hypothesis that all Pk are zero, is rejected. At least 
some of them are non-zero. It should be noted that the results provided in the 
following tables are representative for each rating category. The particular results are 
based on the credit spread level series of one company from AAA band, one from AA 
band and so on. For illustrative purposes it wouldn't be that clear to show ACs for all 
674 time series of bonds. However, similar kind correlograms are produced for every 
of the 674 companies(bonds). 
, rýwý IaA ianrnrrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Fnnotinn-, ner Rmincy Cntoonrv- qnrenfi I evek 
AAA CR EDIT -SPREAD LEVELS BB - CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS ýs -kc PAC Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.829 0.829 46.797 0 1 0.909 0.909 56.197 0 
2 0.715 0.088 82.168 0 2 0.794 
-0.185 99.744 0 
3 0.61 
-0.013 108.32 0 3 
' - 
0.692 0.031 133.36 0 
4 0.502 
-0.064 126.28 5 ý 0.637 0.2 162.36 0 
5 0.417 0.006 138.92 01 5 0.586 187.271 0 
10- - 0.136 0.144 161.01 0 10 0.435 0.007 277.32 0 
20 --0064 
- 
0.1651 173.71 0 20 0.039 0.036 358.95 0 
28 -----70085 
-0.1211 176.78 0 28 1 -0.134 -0.115 362.84 0 
AA CREDIT-SPREAD LEVELS 
__ 
B CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS 
Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.898 0.898 54.898 0 1 0.906 0.906 55,879 0 
2 0.832 0.13 102.73 o ý 0.786 
-0.194 98.638 0 
3 0.71 
-0.297 138.18 0 3 0.722 0.271 135.24 0 
4 0.648 0.176 168.12 0 4 0.665 
-0.103 166.9_ 0 
0.587 0.117 193.16 O. i 0.594 
-0.016 , 
-1ý3 10 
0.307 
- 
-0.057. 2641 01 10 0.458 0.063 1 277.781 01 
134 ----70 0.023 278.521 01 20 1 
-0.027 0.049 1 331.04 1 01 
: 0-275 
-0.001 311.251 01 28 1 -0.057 0.017 1 331.71 ol 
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A CREDIT SPREAD L EVELS C CREDIT SREAD L EVELS 
Lags JAC PAC 
_Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 1 0.888 0.888 53.689 0 1 0.94 0.94 60.10-7 0 
2 0.782 
-0.035 95.925 0 2 0.857 
-0.225 110.88 0 3 0.66 
-0.132 126.5 0 3 0.776 0.009 153.2 0 
4 0.539 
-0.07 147.28 0 4 0.696 
-0.058 187.74 0 5 0.3951 
-0.192 158.571 0 5 0.645 0.225 217.91 0 
10 1 0.12 0.148 174.48 0 10 0.556 
-6.175 348.76 0 20 1 0.0581 0.045 182.87 0 20 
-0.001 -0.048 444.46 0 28 1 
-0.0361 -0.074 183.75 0 28 ----70-291 
-0.009 468.71 0 BBB CR EDIT SPREAD LEVELS 
Lags AC PAC 
- 
Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.937 0.937 59.684 0 
2 0.87 
-0.06 111.98 0 
3 0.797 
-0.084 156.59 0 
4 0.728 
-0.005 194.46 0 
5 0.666 0.012 226.63 0 
110 
- - 
0.516 
-0.013 348.48 0 F2 0 1 0.1471 0.031 443.81 0 1 
128 1 
-0.1451 -0.0281 451.351 ol I i I 
In the case of credit spread changes, we observe that autocorrelation coefficients at 
lag I are significantly lower than the respective autocorrelation coefficients of credit 
spread levels and much closer to zero, but we can't reject the null hypothesis at a high 
confidence level. Therefore, we will test for stationarity using the unit root tests as 
described in the next section. 
Table 3.5. Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions per Rating Category 
- 
Spread Changes 
AAA CR EDIT SPREAD CHANGES BB CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
LNLs AC PAC Q-Stat Pro Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.497 -0.497 16.321 0.00 
_ 
1 
-0.482 -0.482 22.387 0.00 
2 0.122 
-0.166 17.324 bý 00 -i- 0.196 
-0.216 24.977 0.00 
3 
-0.111 -0.168 18.171 0.00 3 
-0.123 -0.173 26.002 0.00 
4 
-0.085 -0.287 18.678 TOO 4 
-0.021 -0.241 26.034 0.00 
5 0.134 
-0.093 19.942 0.00 5 0.007 
, -0.23 , 26.038 
. 
0.00 
10 0.013 
-0.053 21.4081 0.02 10 0.19 1 0.052 1 29.762 1 0.00 
20 
-0.049 -0.094 25.8941 0.17 20 
-0.038 1 -0.072 1 38.886 1 0.01 
28 
-0.037 0.047 32.6291 0.25 28 0.039 1 0.054 1 40.70() l 
AA CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
__ 
B CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
- Lag! 
_ 
AC PAC Q-Stat 
- 
ProF Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.484 -0.484 30.883 0 1 
-0.465 -0.465 14.269 0.001 2 
- 
0.434 
-0.063 43.522 0 
- 
-0.098 -0.4 14.909 0.00 
-i 
-0.341 -0.129 51.438 0 
_ 
0.072 
-0.269 15.267 0.00 
- 
0.134 
-0.262 52.676 0 'i- 0.03 
-0.157 15.331 0.00 
-6 
-0.0 -0.139 52.95ý 
_0 
3- 
-0.05 -0.148. 15.506 0.01 10 
-0.143 -0.037 59.973 0 10 
-0.089 -0.1351 16.757 0.08 
20 
-0.091 -0.038 74.135 
-0 
0.047 0.0211 19.56 0.49 
28 0.091 0.016 80165 0 28 
-0.069 0,0091 30.121 0.361 A CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
__ 
C CREDIT SREAD CHANGES 
Lags J AC PAC Q-Stat Prb Lags AC PAC O-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.4_92 -0.492 15.961 
. 
000 .00 1 
-0.415 -0.415 10.872 0.00 2 
-0.002 -0.321 15.962 
p 
. 
000 .00 2 
-0.084 -0.31 11.327 0.00 3 
-0.003 -0.238 15.962 
. 
o 00 . T 00 3 0.129 
-0.061 12.418 0.01 
4 0.101 
-0.03 16.664 000 .00 4 
-0.162 -0.192 14.163 0.01 
-0.2 -0.367 22.694 
. 
000 .00 5 0.152 0.024. 15.719. 0.01 
33 
-0.264 27 0.00 lO___T _ 
-0.001 0.0281 17.4451 0.07ý 97 
-0.009 
1 
3? 0 
-0.0671 38.1361 0.01 0.137 0.092 ý0ý ; 121 0.061 28 1 
-0.061 0.0521 51. 
91 
BBB CR EDIT SPREA D CHANGES 
Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.487 -0.487 15.656 0.00 
2 0.092 
-0.19 16.224 0.00 
3 
-0.122 -0.219 17.235 0.00 
4 0.116 
-0.052 18.175 0.00 
5 
-0.143 -0.161 19.618 0.00 
lo 
-0.038 
- 
-0.206 26.735 
_0.001 : ýý 20 0.1011 0.008 T 46.269 
- 
0.001 
28 1 
-0.0741 -0.038 1 57.64 3 0.001 
3.4.3. Stationarity 
As a result as an alternative test for stationarity we will use unit root test. The 
stationarity of credit spreads is a very significant issue in the pricing of risky debt and 
credit derivatives as well as in the choice of the appropriate econometric method. This 
stationarity is being tested using the augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic. 
The power of the unit root tests, is a function of the span of the data and not the 
number of observations (as has been shown by Shiller and Peron (1985). Since a non- 
stationary process implies a huge volatility structure over time it seems inconsistent 
that the treasury yield, the slope of the yield curve or credit spreads to be non- 
stationary over long periods of time. On the other hand since pricing models usually 
have a rather short time horizon, it is plausible that credit spreads can be non 
stationary over an investment horizon. In other words the investment horizon drives 
the data frequency and the form of the model considered. 
The ADF test was first applied to credit spread levels and then their changes. Table 
3.6. shows that the t-statistic is lower (in absolute tenns) than the 95% MacKinnon 
critical value (-2.90), hence we conclude that the test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root in the credit spread series at the 95% confidence level. 
Tahle 3.6. ADF Tests i)er ratinLy calcoorv 
-- 
Credit S%nrt-nd I f-vt+z 
CREDIT SPREAD LEV ELS 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-1.982448 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-2.230132 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-1.709145 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-1.454805 
BB ADF Test Statistic 
-1.575144 
B IADF Test Statistic 1 
-1.248110 
C JADF Test Statistic 1-1.024247 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root 
. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.9084 
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The same test was applied to credit spread changes, and table 3.7. shows that the t- 
statistics are larger in absolute terms than the MacKinnon critical values at the 95% 
significance level 
, 
which effectively means that the null hypothesis of non 
stationarity is rejected for all rating categories of credit spread changes. 35 
Tahle 
-1.7. ADF 
Tests ner ratiml, entevorv 
- 
Creclit ýnri-qd Chnnuer, 
CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-4.465751 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-4.453018 A ADF Test Statistic 
-5.009464 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-4.878968 
BB ADF Test Statistic 
-3.902930 
B ADF Test Statistic 1-4.149036 
C ADF Test Statistic 1-5.163401 
*MacKinnon ciltical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root, 
. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.9084 
Phillips-Perron test, which is a method that allows for higher order serial correlation 
and heteroscedasti city in a series, was also implemented in parts of the sample, for 
comparative purposes, and it was observed that the results are totally consistent with 
those provided by the ADF test. 
3.4.4. Correlations among the independent variables 
Overall, for most of the variables the sign of the correlation coefficients provided in 
the correlation matrix below, seem to conform to intuition and the structural approach 
to credit risk modelling. As evident, there are no significant correlations amongst the 
macroeconomic variables. Comparatively higher correlations are exhibited within 
equity variables, namely, the positive correlation between the Russsell and the S&P 
index of 0.67, or the negative correlations between VLX and Russell and the S&P of 
- 
0.60 and 
-0.62 respectively. These correlations of the equity variables suggest that 
changes in implied volatilities should be negatively correlated to changes in equities 
and that changes in equity indices are positively correlated. 
" Pedrosa and Roll (1998) examine the daily time series properties of credit spreads from October 
1995 to March 1997, and cannot reject the null hypothesis that credit spreads are non-stationary, 
However, they conclude that it is implausible for credit spreads to have a unit root. 
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Table 3.8. Correlation Matrix 
- 
Macroeconomic & Fouitv Variable-, 
- 
Chaniye..,, 
CONF CPI GDP IP I MS PPI I TR 
BL 
LINEMP RUSSE 
LL 
S&P VIX SLOPE 
CONF 1 
CPI 
-0.10 1 
GDP 0.00 
-0.10 1 
IP 0.19 
-0.121 0.10 1 
ms 
-0.02 -0.2 1 -0.10 -0.2 1 
PPI 
-0.06 0.21 1 0.03 0.10 0.07 1 
TR BL 
-0.10 -0.3 0.07 -0.20 -0.0 0.20 1 
LINEMP 
-0.20 -0.2 -0.00 -0.40 0.00 -0.20 0.09 1 
iý-USSELL 0.21 
-0.1 -0.20 
. 
-0.10 -0.20 
. 
0.21 
-0.10 0.10 1 
-&p 0.12 0.18 
-0.20 -0.10 -0-10 0.12 -0.30 -0.10 0.67 1 
; ý-Ix 
-0.20 -0.10 0.17 0.19 0.01 -0.20 0.12 0.01 -0.60 -0.62 1 
-L- 0 -PE 0.50 0.23 
-0.10 0.26 0.09 -0.3 0.06 0.12 -0.20 1 
3.5. Data Description 
-(2 nd set of Data -Bloomberg Bond Indices) 
The second set of data includes short, medium and long term maturity investment 
grade industrial bonds (from AAA to BBB-). Corporate spreads are constructed using 
data on corporate bond yield extracted from Bloomberg's Fair market value curves 
(FMC). These curves are constructed on a daily basis for various sectors and rating 
classes from a sample of Bloomberg generic bond prices at market closing. All bonds 
for each sector are then subject to option adjusted spreads (OAS) analysis and the 
option free yields are then plotted to form the FMC without any yields being distorted 
by embedded call, puts or sinks. This allows bonds with different structures to be 
compared on an equal basis. A best fit curve is then drawn from the option free yields, 
resulting in a specific yield curve for each bond category. Debt issues are divided into 
hundreds of sectors that are grouped by several variables such as ratings or industry 
type. Monthly time series are created using month end observations. 
Data utilised here is on the curves for AAA, AA, A and BBB industrial ratings. Credit 
ratings are based on the Bloomberg Composite Rating, which is a blend of ratings of 
the major rating agencies. In particular, eight time series (namely AAA, AA, A+, A, 
A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-) observations have been collected for nine maturities, i. e. for 
years two, three, four, five, seven, eight, nine, ten and fifteen. However, not all of the 
different maturity indices have been considered, but rather as proxies for short terrn 
medium and long term maturities the two year, five and ten years maturity indices 
were used respectively. It is worth noting that the selection of those particular 
maturities was made in order: 
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(a) to include the liquid indices (for example the 15 year index is known not to be a 
very liquid one) and 
(b) to obtain more time series observations (for example the 8 and 9 year credit spread 
indices have available observations from 1996). 
This data is provided on a monthly basis for the period from May 1991 until June 
2005. Credit spreads have been calculated after deducting from each time series 
observation the US Dollar Treasury Composite bearing the corresponding maturity. 
The following table presents the average credit spread of ML and Bloomberg credit 
spread indices per broad credit rating category, in basis points. It is worth recalling 
that the ML credit spreads have been averaged for the period from January 1997 until 
May 2002, while Bloomberg Credit Spread Indices refer to a much longer time period 
from May 1991 until June 2005. Also we can't infer to comparisons from the non- 
investment grade category, since we don't have such information from Bloomberg 
Credit Spread Indices. 
CREDIT RATING MERRILL LYNCH BLOOMBERG 
AAA 88 109 
AA 102 119 
A 117 138 
BBB 185 173 
BB 308 N/A 
B 521 N/A 
c 1,310 N/A 
3.5.1. Credit Spreads 
The time series patterns of both credit spread level and credit spread changes are 
going to be examined. Figure 3.1. shows the time series of the level of credit spreads, 
for short term maturing indices for the eight rating categories considered. Figures 3.2 
and 3.3 show the pattern of credit spreads for medium and long term maturities 
respectively, for the eight rating categories. Although the level of credit spreads seems 
to be different for the different matutiries, it is increasing as the index maturity 
increases especially for AAA, AA and A+ rated indices. We can recognise a rather 
cyclical behaviour in the three figures over the sample period considered. There is a 
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decreasing trend (tightening of credit spreads) observed in the period from 1994 until 
1998-99 and then the series appears to trend steeply upwards and being highly volatile 
during the period 2000 to fall 2003. Around that time, the series seem to stabilise 
around the same mean level it had experienced before 1992 and in 2004 mid 2005 
there seems to be a gradual tightening of credit spreads. 
Figure 3.1. Long Tenn maturities 
- 
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Tables 3.9,3.11 and 3.13, show the descriptive statistics for long, medium and short 
term credit spread levels respectively. The mean levels of the indices are expressed in 
basis points. Comparing the mean levels of the Bloomberg indices to those of Merrill 
Lynch for the respective rating categories, it is observed that the levels of the fonner 
are higher than those of ML. However, these two indices aren't directly comparable, 
since different companies are considered. In the ML case we have excluded a number 
of companies from the index, and therefore the mean levels of spreads considered are 
the result of the companies we have identified to qualify for this thesis. On the other 
hand, data from Bloomberg, refers again to US industrial companies, but the 
constituents are different and hence not directly comparable. However, it should be 
noted that despite the differences observed, the results won't be influenced since the 
bottom line is that we are testing percentage changes in credit spreads and not levels. 
Table 3.9. Descriptive Statistics of Long 
- 
Tenn Bloomberg Indices spread Levels 
- 
Monthly 
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Data (In Basis Points) 
LONG TERM CR EDIT SPREAD INDICES (10 years) 
AAA AA A BBB 
Mean 113.2 121.1 141.6 178.1 
Median 112.0 118.0 138.5 172.0 
Mode 110.0 115.0 127.0 220.0 
Standard Deviation 11.3 12.5 19.6 34.9 
Kurtosis 0.3 1.1 
-0.2 -1.3 
Skewness 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.3 
Minimum 78.0 101.0 108.4 126.0 
Maximum 144.0 167.0 206.0 253.8 
Count 170 1 170 1 170 170 
Table 3.10. Correlation Matri among Long Term loomberg Spread Ind ices (Leve s) 
AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- 
AAA 1.00 
AA 0.83 1.00 
A+ 0.67 0.88 1.00 
A 0.58 0.79 0.90 1.00 
A- 0.49 0.68 0.82 0.93 1.00 
BB 0.44 0.67 0.82 0.93 0.95 1.00 
BBB 0.39 0.60 0.76 0.90 0.96 0.97 1.00 
0.40 0.62 0.76 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.97 1.00 
Figure 3.2. Medium Term maturities 
- 
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Table 3.11. Descriptive Statistics of Medium Term Bloomberg Indices spread Levels 
- 
Monthly Data (In Basis Points) 
M EDIUM TERM CR EDIT SPREAD I NDICES (5 years) 
AAA AA A BBB 
Mean 109.7 116.5 141.7 178.1 
Median 110.9 117.0 139.2 176.5 
Mode 115.0 117.0 133.0 139.0 
Standard Deviation 10.4 9.9 18.6 31.3 
Kurtosis 0.7 0.8 
-0.8 -1.1 
Skewness 
-0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.3 
Minimum 76.17 83.92 96.83 131 
Maximum 129.63 143 186 2_4 
Count 170 170 170 170 
12. Correlation Matrix mong Med Table 3 ium Terni Bloomberg Spread Indices (Levels) 
AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB 
1 
AAA 1.00 
AA 0.83 1.00 
A+ 0.65 0.82 1.00 
A 0.58 0.76 0.92 1.00, 
A- 0.50 0.67 0.85 0.91 1.00 
B 0.38 0.59 0.82 0.89 0.95 1.00 
D. 51 0.76 0.84 0.92 0.95 1.00 
rBBB-___ L__ 0.27_ L___0.48_ 1 0.73 0.83 0.91 0.95 
. 
0.96 1.00 
Figure 3.3. Short Terrn maturities 
- 
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Table 3.13. Descriptive Statistics of Short Tenn Bloomberg Indices spread Levels 
- 
Monthly 
Data (In Basis Points) 
SHORT TERM CREDIT SPREAD INDICES (2 years) 
AAA AA A BBB 
Mean 105.9 112.1 132.3 164.3 
Median 104.0 1 11.3 130.9 165.0 
Mode 100.0 _ 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Standard Deviation 9.6 11.0 20.1 37.5 
Kurtosis 1.1 0.8 
-0.3 -0.6 
Skewness 0.8 0.8 0.2 
-0.2 
Minimum 83.0 89.6 100.0 100.0 
Maximum 137.5 149.0 184.0 239.0 
Count 170 170 170 170 
Tnhle, 1- 14. Correlation Matrix amonu Short Term RInnmht-ru qnrf-nti Indirp,. (I evekz) 
AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- 
AAA 1.00 
AA 0.82 1.00 
A+ 0.61 0.79 1.00 
A 0.58 0.78 0.89 1.00 
A- 0.53 0.71 0.82 0.92 1.00 
BB 0.47 0.68 0.75 0.85 0.93 1.00 
BBB 0.42 0.63 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 
BBB- 
_0.36 
0.58 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.90 0.90 
, 
1.00 
it is worth noting in the tables of descriptive statistics 3.9.3.11. and 3.13, that the 
standard deviation of credit spreads tend to widen as credit rating deteriorates. Spread 
levels mainly present positive skewness, (except the AAA and AA medium tenn 
series that present negative skewness). Credit spreads belonging to the AAA, AA 
rating categories are leptokurtic, whereas the kurtosis of credit spreads of the 
remaining categories (broad A and BBB rating categories) are platykurtic. Also the 
Jarque Bera statistic for the null hypothesis of non-nality is far beyond the critical 
value at the 1% level, which suggests that the credit spread series are far from being 
normally distributed. The results obtained with respect toe skewness and kurtosis are 
the same irrespective of the maturity profile of the index. 
Tables 3.10.3.12 and 3.14, show the correlation matrices among the bond indices for 
long, medium and short term maturities respectively. As anticipated there is a high 
correlation among the broad rating categories, while as evident, all correlation 
coefficients are positive, suggesting that a direct relation amongst those indices exists. 
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3.5.2. Autocorrelation 
As described in section 3.4.2. the next issue was to address the question of 
dependence of credit spreads. Since a series cannot be independently distributed if 
any of its autocorrelation coefficients are non zero, we compute the autocorrelation 
function (ACF) of credit spread levels and credit spread changes. The pattern of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation is important in indicating the plausible 
structure and nonlinear dynamics of the credit spread process. Below are presented 
the sample autocorrelations from lag I to 5 and 10,20,40,70 and 100 for all ratings 
long term series for credit spread levels and changes. Similar results are reported for 
short and medium maturities, but not reported herein. 
The following table presents the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation functions 
for credit spread levels. The first lag autocorrelation in all of the rating categories is 
high. For example in the "AAA" rating it is 0.599, in the "BBB" is 0.888 and so on, 
which indicates the presence of a unit root for credit spreads levels. 
Table 3.15. Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions per Rating Category 
- 
S, nrvad Levels 
Lags AAA CREDIT SPREAD L EVELS Lags A- CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS 
AC PAC O-Stat Prob AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.599 0.599 62.088 0 1 0.866 0.866 129.85 0 
2 0.436 0.12 95.141 0 2 0.795 0.177 239.73 0 
3 0.318 0.026 112.85 0 3 0.745 0.103 336.84 0 
4 0.219 
-0.016 121.28 0 4 0.713 0.103 426.48 0 
5 0.137 
-0.028 124.61 0 5 0.641 
-0.128 499.32 0 
10 0.227 0.022 156.42 0 10 0.541 
-0.028 801.18 0 
20 0.063 0.026 164.94 0 20 0.205 0.062 1078.6 0 
40 0.013 0.086 204.11 0 40 
-0.249 -0.009 1171.9 0 
70 
-ro. 1 19 -0.016 232.85 0 70 
-0.334 0.016 2039.5 0 
100 0.008 
-0.03 272.29 0 100 0.036 0.029 2288.4 0 
AA CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS BB B+ CREDIT SPREAD LE ELS 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob AC I PAC b-Stat Prob 
0.650 0.65 73.121 0 
- 
1 0,888 0.888 136.5 0 
2 0.498 0.131 116.33 j T-- 0.814 0.121 251.92 0 
3 0.412 0.08 146.04 0 3 0.779 0.173 358.23 0 
4 0.323 0 164.47 0 4 0.749 0.075 457.16 0 
5 0.257 0.004 176.17 0 5 0.713 0.011 547.23 0 
10 0.314 0.06 248.39 0 10 0.586 
-0.042 917.7 0 
20 0.103 
-0.053 298.86 0 20 0.346 0.098 1291.4 0 
40 
-0.108 0.054 361.12 
- 
0 40 
-0.178 0.02 1414.2 0 
70 
-0.164 -0.075 
T24.48 0 70 
-0.364 -0.003 2460.5 0 
100 0.000 
A+ CREDIT 
0.004 7324 
SPREAD LEVELS 
0 100 
-0.07 0.048 2868.7 0 
BBB CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS 
AC PAC 
- 
5-Stat 
-Prob AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.743 0.743 
- 
95.55 0 1 0.928 0.928 149.11 0 
2 0.646 0.21 168.28 0 2 0.876 0.102 282.62 0 
3 0.559 0.054 222.95 0 3 0.836 0.083 405.04 0 
4 0.52 0.101 
- 
270.62 0 4 0.79 
-0.039 515.11 0 
5 0.452 
-0.016 306.84 0 5 0.752 0.031 615.4 0 
10 0.451 0.041 468.66 0 10 0.636 
-0.07 1027.1 0 
20 0.114 
-0.069 605.1 0 20 0.391 0.03 1525.9 0 
40 
-0.303 -0.052 739.74 0 40 
-0-105 0.048 1703.1 0 
70 
-0.237 -0.074 
- 
1388.9 T- 70 
-0.413 -0.006 2647.9 0 
loo 1 0.177 0.001 
- 
1597.6 0 
---- 
100 F-- 0.141 , -0.052 3439 0 
100 
A CREDIT SPREAD LEVELS BBB- CREDIT SREAD LEVELS 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.81 0.81 113.61 0 1 0.917 0.917 145.59 0 
2 0.73 0.214 206.42 0 2 0.862 0.127 274.8 0 
3 0.65 0.034 280.34 0 3 0.829 0.148 395.27 0 
4 0.583 0.017 340.15 0 4 0.78 
-0.073 502.57 0 
5 0.524 0.011 388.79 0 5 0.761 0.165 605.22 0 
10 0.387 
-0.03 552.96 0 10 0.59 
-0.075 1010.8 0 
20 0.085 
-0.08 672.56 0 20 
. 
332 0.001 1396.4 0 
40 
-0.292 -0.03 816.31 0 40 -0.255 0.026 1528.1 0 
70 
-0.249 -0.054 1448.4 0 70 -0.431 -0.004 3034.3 0 
100 0.14 0.019 1 1597.1 0 100 0.04 0.079 3494.3 0 
The table above presents coefficients for lags up to 5 and for lags 10,20,40,70 and 
100 for credit spread levels for all maturities. The last two columns reported are the 
Ljung Box Q statistic and their p-values. The Q statistic at lag k, is a test statistic for 
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. Under the null 
hypothesis Q, is asymptotically distributed as x2 with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of lags. The null hypothesis is rejected at a significant level of less than I 
percent for all lags for all rating series. 
Table 3.16 presents coefficients for lags up to 5 and for lags 10,20,40,70 and 100 for 
credit spread changes for all maturities. The last two columns reported are the Ljung 
Box Q statistic and their p-values. When looking at the results of credit spread 
changes it is obvious that the sample autocorrelations at lag I are significantly lower 
than the respective autocorrelation coefficients of credit spread levels and much closer 
to zero. but we can't reject the null hypothesis at a high confidence level. Therefore, 
we will test for stationarity using the unit root tests as described in the next section. 
Table 3.16. Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions per Rating Category 
- 
ýZnrt-nd chnnges 
AAA CREDIT SPREA D CHANGES A-CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
Lag ! AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. __ 1 
-0088 
- 
-0.088 1.2994 0.254 1 
-0.259 -0.259 11.646 0.001 
2 0.008 0 1.3108 0.519 2 
-0.096 -0.176 13.266 0.001 
3 
-0007 -0.006 1.318 0.725 3 0.045 -0.033 13.621 0.503 
4 0.188 0.189 7.358 0.118 4 0.039 0.03 13.892 0.008 
5 0.026 0.062 7.4731 0.188 5 
-0.112 -0.096 16.109 0.007 
10 0.038 0.022 8.8949 0.542 10 0.049 0.06 17.267 0.069 
20 0.037 0.063 19.257 0.505 20 
- 
0 
-0.033 31.141 0.053 
40 0.003 0.047 40.186 0.462 ZO 0.182 0.146 74.658 0.001 
70 0.052 0.011 62.63 0.722 70 
-0.029 -0.128 138.66 0 
100 
-0.044 -0.06 74.057 0.976 
TO-O 0042 
-0.031 173.77 0 
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II AA rRFnIT SPRFAD CHANr. F. q I IRRRý tDr-niT QDDCArk tUAKJflCQ 
Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.149 -0.149 3.8247 0.051 1 
-0.346 -0.3461 20.766 _0 
2 0.042 0.02 4.1331 0.127 2 0.044 
-0.0871 21.1 0 
3 
-0.066 -0.058 4.8902 0.18 3 
-0.042 -0.0631 21.406 0 
4 0.095 0.078 6.4769 0.166 4 0.061 0.032 22.055 0 
5 
-0.085 -0.059 7.7601 0.17 5 
-0.109 -0.089 24.162 0 
10 
-0.0311 -0.027 12.175 0.274 10 0.063 0.023 27.736 0.002 
20 
-0.088 -0.082 22.967 0.29 20 
-0.038 -0.097 
" 
42.486 0.002 
40 
-0.007 -0.04 37.123 0.601 40 0.069 0.082 66.264 0.006 
70 
-0.025 -0.037 74.107 0.346 0 
-0.064 0.02 116.53 0 
100 0.005 
-0.099 100.76. 0.46 100 0.00 161.36 0 
A+ CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES BBB CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES 
Lags J AC PAC Q-Stat Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.246 -0.246 20.766 0 1 
-0.169 -0-169 4.9238 0.026 
2 0.044 
-0.087 21.1 0 2 
-0.08 -0.111 6.0298 0.049 
3 
-0.042 -0.063 21.406 0 3 0.058 0.025 6.6186 0.085 
4 0.061 0.032 22.055 0 4 
-0.095 -0.092 8.2021 0.084 
5 
-0.109 -0.0891 24.162 0 5 
-0.015 -0.042 8.2396 0.144 ý-o 
- 
0.063 0.023 27.736 0.002 10 
-0.023 -0.0181 8.7785 0.553 ý o 
-0.038 -0.097 42.486 0.002 20 
-0.07 -0.0541 16.713 0.672 ýj-o 0.069 0.082 66.264 0.002 40 2 
-0.0571 38.163 0.553 To- 
-0.064 0.02 116.53 0 70 - 
-0.009 -0-031 77.458 0.253 jo-O 0.007 
-0.022 161.36 0 100 
-0.041 -0.0161 102.07 0.424 
A CREDIT SPREAD CHANGES BBB- CRE DIT SPREA D CHANGES 
Lags AC PAC Q-Stat 
. 
Prob Lags AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 
-0.173 -0.173 12.881 0 1 
-0.158 -0-158 11.544 0.001 
2 
-0.108 -0.197 14.917 0.001 2 -0.069 -0.145 12.365 0.002 
3 0.073 
-0.018 15.852 0.001 3 0.123 0.072 15.023 0.002 
4 
-0.035 -0.043 16.072 0.003 4 -0758 -0.124 19.413 0.001 
5 
-0.069 -0.091 16.919 
. 
0.005 5 
-0.02 -0.085 19.485 0.002. 
10 
-0.018 -0.031 19.647 0.033 110 0.003 0.051 22.535 0.013 
20 
-0.115 -0.056 42.996 0.002 20 -0.001 0.027 29.005 0.088 
40 0.169 0.066 84.776 0 40 
-0.682 -0.068 50.796 0.118 
70 0.019 
-0.063 143.2 0 70 0.028 0.005 73.183 0.374 
10 0.037 0.058 206.02 o loo 
-0.056 
. 
-0.022 
. 
104.17 
. 
0.368 
3.5.3. Credit Spread Stationarity 
As a further test to check for credit spread series correlation and in the effort to 
specify the best model, we test for the stationarity of the credit spread series. The 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) is employed to test for the presence of a unit 
root. The ADF test was first applied to credit spread levels and then the changes. For 
credit spread levels as we move down the rating scale there have been instances as 
shown in the tables that follow, that the null hypothesis of unit root wasn't rejected at 
the levels but only at the changes. The t-statistic for this test is below the MacKinnon 
critical value at the 5% level at all rating categories for credit spread changes. As a 
result the null hypothesis of a unit root in the credit spread changes is rejected at the 
5% significance level. 
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Table 3.17. ADF Tests per rating cateizorv 
- 
Short Term Credit Soread Levels 
SHORT TERM MATURITIES 
- 
LEVELS 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-4.52456 AA ADF Test Statistic 
-3.27499 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-3.19178 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-3.41968 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-2.23403 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-7.44246 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-2.61394 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-1.88291 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-2.59478 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-10.4812 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8 78 7 
'Fable 3.18. ADF Tests per rating category 
- 
Medium Term Credit Spread Levels 
MEDIUM TERM MATURITIES 
- 
LEVELS 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-3.35543 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-2.97761 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-3.38281 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-2.97425 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-2.72625 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-9.31926 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-7.44246 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-2.40657 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-9.29243 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-2.26357 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-9.73236 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-2.33914 
1 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-10.4812 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hyp othesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8787 
I'able 3.19. ADF Tests per rating category 
- 
Long Term Credit Spread Levels 
LONG TERM M ATURITIES 
- 
LEVELS 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-5.06163 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-3.61133 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-2.91557 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-3.19283 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-2.78584 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-9.31926 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-11.6636 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-2.80103 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-12.0217 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-2.30107 
BBB J ADF Test Statistic 
-10.6048 
BBB- I ADF Test Statistic 
-2.82941 
BBB- J ADF Test Statistic 
-11.4256 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hyp othesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8787 
II able 3.20. ADF Tcsts per rating category Short 'f'crm ('rcdlt Sprcad ('11, ing 
SHORT TERM MATURITIES 
- 
CHANGES 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-5.596037 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-6.388282 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-7.611434 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-7.372508 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-6.730726 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-6.994736 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-6.714302 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-5.748751 
*MacKinnon cri tical values for rejection of hyp othesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8787 
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MEDIUM TERM MATURITIES 
- 
CHANGES 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-4.141781 
AA ADF Test Statistic 
-4.484401 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-5.763020 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-5.216730 
A- j ADF Test Statistic 
-6.883357 
BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-6.620228 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-6.478447 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-6.476230 
*MacKinnon cri tical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8787 
Table 3.2 I. ADF 'I'ests_pcr rating category 
- 
Mcdium Tam Crcdit Sprcad Changes 
Tihle 3.22. ADF Tests ner ratinLy catepnrv 
- 
T. nno Term Crt-dit qnri-. qii Chanvoc 
LONG TERM M ATURITIES 
- 
CHANGES 
AAA ADF Test Statistic 
-3.869530 AA ADF Test Statistic 
-5.833574 
A+ ADF Test Statistic 
-6.753924 
A ADF Test Statistic 
-7.117285 
A- ADF Test Statistic 
-6.794814 BBB+ ADF Test Statistic 
-6.857824 
BBB ADF Test Statistic 
-6.631109 
BBB- ADF Test Statistic 
-7.224470 
*MacKinnon cri tical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
5% Critical Value: 
-2.8787 
Credit spread stationarity has also been tested with the Phillips-Perron test, which is a 
semi-parametric method that allows for higher order serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in a series. The results obtained for some of the series (for 
comparative purposes) are consistent with those provided by the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test. 
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3.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the model we will specify, the data used 
and the parameters tested under this thesis. It has been described that the proposed 
model shares some of the assumptions and variables proposed by the KMV and 
McKinsey's macroportfolio view models, while incorporates other variables that seem 
to be important based on traditional credit risk analysis. As evident, the proposed 
model has several important differences compared to all other credit risk models 
developed so far, including the variables analysed, data sources, the elimination 
process used for selecting the bonds to test our hypotheses and the model 
specification. 
The importance of using option adjusted spreads has been explained, in the sense that 
despite the type of the rate used or the availability of the rate, by directly comparing 
two bonds with the same maturity, we are effectively comparing two bonds that 
neither have the same duration (price sensitivity to interest rates changes) nor the 
same convexity (sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve). To overcome this 
problem, credit spread data is option adjusted, i. e. data collected on credit spreads 
takes account of the bond optionality, (the modified duration of bonds is calculated 
and the option adjusted duration for bonds with an embedded option is also 
considered). Therefore, credit spreads correspond to the difference in the yield to 
maturity between bonds with the same duration, which makes may partially offset the 
coupon effect on the yield to maturity. 
An analytical description of the two sets of data, that will be used to test the 
hypotheses was provided, and the rationale for eliminating the initial set of data, in 
order to get the bonds that qualified for this study was also postulated. A descriptive 
statistical analysis of the results coincided with our anticipation that standard 
deviations of bonds (in level terrns) tend to increase as credit rating categories 
deteriorate, and that the levels of credit spreads increase as an issuer's credit quality 
worsens. This is like assuming that an investor requires a higher return for higher risk. 
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Results obtained from descriptive statistics of Bloomberg indices, share some of the 
same properties to those reported from the ML data, although a much higher volatility 
is observed for long term maturing bond indices. Results obtained from the ADF tests 
for both sets of data, provide confidence as to the mean reverting properties of credit 
spread changes. 
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4.0. Macroeconomic Factors and Credit Spreads 
This chapter of the thesis explores the relation between macroeconomic variables and 
credit spreads. So far, little work has been done on the empirical relationship between 
credit spreads and the macroeconomy, while more work has been done in examining 
the link between default risk and the macroeconomy 36 
. 
Therefore, we will test this 
relation within two different sets of data and by using both time series and cross 
section analysis (due to the nature of data) for estimating coefficients. The relation is 
examined for investment and non-investment grade companies, and for short, medium 
and long terin maturity indices. 
This chapter of the thesis is structured in the following way: 
The first Section, 4.1 provides a literature review relative to credit risk and the 
macroeconomic variables. Section 4.2 considers the effect of macroeconomic 
variables on different maturity Bloomberg investment grade indices, for the period 
from May 1991 until June 2005, using monthly data and time series analysis. So does 
section 4.3, although this time a different set of monthly and quarterly data is used, 
from investment and non-investment grade constituents of the Merrill Lynch indices, 
where the results are based on cross sectional analysis of data for a sub-period of the 
one mentioned above, i. e. from January 1997 until May 2002. 
4.1. Credit Spreads & Macroeconomic variables 
- 
Literature Review 
Finance theory has suggested that there is a relation between interest rates and default 
risk and hence a relation between interest rates, default risk and credit spreads. 
However, the theoretical models conflict as to the nature of this relation. 
On the one hand the structural models based on option pricing suggest that higher 
interest rates may be associated with lower credit spreads. Such models view equity as 
a call option on the value of the firm with the strike price being equal to the face value 
of debt. A famous model belonging to this category is the Merton's model, which is 
based on options theory. In 1974, Merton showed that for a given maturity, the risk of 
default varies directly with the variance of the returns on the firm value. Within this 
framework, the business cycle and the macroeconomic factors impact both the level 
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of the risk free rate and the variance of returns of the firm's value. These kinds of 
models are often used for companies that are very big in size and their stocks are 
traded on a stock exchange. 
Reduced form models, don't attempt to model why firms default on their debt but 
instead assume that some bonds default on the balance of probability. There are 
different types of reduced form models (i. e. investors may demand compensation for 
default risk by grossing up the coupon paid on a default free bond by the expected 
probability). If interest rates rise by I bp the gross up effect increases the coupon by 
more than lbp. Thus the differential between the coupon on the corporate bond and 
the coupon on the risk free bond increases in absolute terms with the size of the 
default free coupon and credit spreads rise when the defaultfree interest rate rise. 
Prior research by Forbes and Petersen (1975), Beston and Rogowski (1978) and 
Dialynas and Edington (1992) have shown that yield spreads are higher during 
recessions than during recoveries. In particular, they tested the hypothesis that 
economic conditions are expected to affect the size of the yield spread investors 
demand. The effects of economic conditions and the business cycle on yield spreads 
are captured with the use of three proxy variables: the annual rate of change in the 
consumer price index (inflation rate), the change in the shape of the term structure of 
interest rate and the annual rate of change in the industrial production index. 
The inflation rate should be directly related to yield spreads, since during inflationary 
periods investors may require higher risk premia from their investments in corporate 
bonds. 
The change in the shape of the term 3tructure of interest rates, as presented by the 
quarterly change in the difference between the 20-year treasury rate and the three 
month T-bill rates, is also used as a proxy for the business cycle since much research 
in the past has linked the shape of the treasury term structure to future variations in 
the business cycle. A steepening term structure is usually a sign of strong economic 
growth and lower short-term interest rates and reflects a general belief that the 
36 For example default probabilities depend upon macroeconomic variables in two widely appreciated 
risk management models, McKinsey's Credit Portfolio View and Algorithmic's Mark to Future. 
108 
economic conditions are going to be robust in the future and vice versa, i. e. a 
flattening term structure or one that would turn negatively sloped would be a sign of 
deteriorating economic conditions. Therefore this proxy should be negatively related 
37 to spreads 
Lastly the annual rate of change in industrial production should be negatively related 
to spreads since increased economic activity will bolster investor's confidence in the 
corporate sector and lead to a reduction in the risk premia demanded for investment 
grade corporate bonds. 
Other research by Stock and Watson (1989), Chen (1991), Estrella and Hardouvelis 
(1991) and Estrella & Mishkin (1996) have linked the behaviour of the yield spreads 
to the shape of the term structure, as a proxy of the business cycle. In particular, they 
study the ability of the term structure to predict recessions in France, Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The authors find that the term structure 
predicts recessions quite well in the United States and Germany and to a lesser extent 
in the United Kingdom and Italy. In France however, the term structure does not seem 
to contain information useful for predicting recessions. The authors also demonstrate 
that leading indicators do not contain any information in addition to that in the term 
spread about the likelihood of recessions. The conclusion that the term spread is 
useful for predicting macroeconomic conditions suggest that it is a good monetary 
policy indicator. 
Following Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Mishkin(1996), Bernard and Gerlach 
(1996), study the ability of the term structure to predict recessions in eight countries. 
Using a probit model their results are summarised to the following: 
(a) The yield curve provides information about the likelihood of recessions in all 
countries. 
(b) Tenn spreads are useful for predicting recessions as much as two years ahead. 
(c) While leading indicators contain infon-nation beyond what is included in the term 
spreads, this information is only useful for forecasting recessions in the immediate 
37 Section 4.1.2. provides a descriptive analysis of the term structure of interest rates. 
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future, which provides further evidence of the usefulness of term spreads as 
indicators for monetary policy purposes. 
Studies such as those carried out by Bierman & Haas (1975) and Forts (1987) model 
yield spreads on the basis of differing default probabilities. Yawitz et al (1985) extent 
the previous work in order to take explicit account of tax effects. Rodriguez (1988) 
derives a general model of the relation between default risk and yield spreads in a risk 
neutral environment. He provides different relations for premium and discount bonds. 
In his model, he allows yields to depend on time to maturity. In other words, yields 
are evaluated on the basis of expected values. The implicit equation defining the 
relationship between the return on a risky bond, r, and the default free, tax free rate, i, 
differs for bonds sold above and below par value. For discount bonds Rodriguez finds 
that: 
(1) 
Cn [y(1-T)-x]+F[y(1-G)-x]+BG 
yn+ 
I-P " 
Y, 
]=o 
p 
and for premium bonds he find that: 
C(I 
- 
T) + T(B - F) + BG(l - P) yt + F[y n-xnI 
_[B-F - 
P]j 1-CX ]G[I l(t-I)Y' 
=0 
npnp 
(2) 
where: 
y= P(I+ i) -1 
,y= (1+ r) -' and C: coupon payments, T: tax rate on ordinary income, 
G: tax rate on capital gains, B: bond's purchase price, F: Par value, P: probability of 
default, n: years to maturity, t: Year(1,2,... n) 
An important feature of equations (1) and (2) is that return depends on time until 
maturity which conflicts with the well known Bien-nan & Hass (1975) and Yawitz 
(1977) conclusions that argue that the default premium is invariant with respect to 
maturity. However, they assume that the probability that a borrower makes the full 
contractual payment in the stated period is constant over time and that there are no 
taxes (T=G=O). Under these assumptions equation (1) and (2) can be written as: 
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r= 
(3) 
-P 
P 
+ 
P 
Assuming that bonds sell at par (B=F) transforms Rodriguez's model into Yawitz, 
Maloney ad Ederington's (YME) model as shown in equation: 
(4) 
(1 -P)* (1 -G+ 
r= P(1- T) 
(1 -T )i 
P 
Although Rodriguez did not estimate his model empirically, Fons and YME (1987) 
have tested similar models. In both cases the probability of corporate default risk is 
derived rather than measured objectively. 
YME's model is an alteration of equation (4) where the yield on the municipal bond 
depends on the government bond yield. Their data set of aggregate monthly yields on 
new bonds cover the period from August 1965 to March 1981. Using non-linear least 
squares they estimated the probability of default and the tax rate on ordinary income 
and concluded that the theoretical model has a high degree of explanatory power. 
Fons (1987), compares a monthly index of low rated bonds to an index of high-grade 
bonds. He chose corporate over government bonds because they are callable. Forts 
alters Rodriguez's equation (4) to reflect the partial value received by investors after a 
bond defaults. Holding the values of 1, T, G, and the in-default value of bonds 
constant, he estimated the probability of default (P). His estimates of (P) exceed the 
actual default experience of low rated bonds leading to the conclusion that a well 
diversified portfolio of low rated corporate bonds appears to be rewarded for bearing 
default risk. 
Other empirical studies show that a significant relation exists between yield spreads 
and issue specific features, such as liquidity, callability, etc. For example, Litterman 
and Then (1991) provide evidence that risk premiums increase with maturity. Ho and 
Singer (1984) show that the existence of a sinking fund is associated with lower bond 
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yield spreads. Cook and Hendershott (1978) show that the time to maturity and call 
provisions are associated with higher bond yield spreads. 
Other studies (Jaffee, 1975; Cook and Hendershottt, 1978) find evidence that risk 
premiums vary with the business cycle. Usually papers take the index of consumer 
sentiment which is based on data collected by the University of Michigan and 
described in detail by Fair (197 1) in order to control for macroeconomic effects. 
An interesting paper that incorporates macroeconomic factors in explaining credit 
spreads has been published by Amato and Luisi (2005). They provide new empirical 
evidence on the role of macroeconomic factors in an arbitrage-free model of the term 
structure of credit spreads. The novel feature of their approach is the inclusion of 
observable macroeconomic variables as explicit determinants of yields and spreads. In 
particular, they propose that changes in real activity and financial conditions appear to 
have a strong effect on BBB- and B- rated spreads at most maturities (they only 
investigate bonds of these rating categories). Additionally they find that changes in 
risk premia in treasury yields and spreads, are mainly driven by macroeconomic 
variables. They also find that the price of default risk in BBB-rated bonds is large and 
volatile and is driven to a large extent by variation in the financial conditions 
indicator. 
Tang and Yan (2004) explore the effects of macroeconomic conditions on credit yield 
spread dynamics in a Lucas type economy. Unlike most other structural models, their 
model explicitly incorporates equilibrium macroeconomic dynamics and prices all 
securities consistently. Their model allows to examine how credit spreads are affected 
by the interaction of macroeconomic variables and firm characteristics. They find that 
(i)credit spread is negatively correlated with interest rates and ceteris paribus, this 
correlation is stronger for bonds with higher default probabilities 
(ii) credit spread yield curves are upward sloping for low rated bonds, 
(iii) firm characteristics, other than leverage ratios have significant effects on credit 
spreads and these effects also vary with economic conditions. 
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4.1.2. The term Structure of Interest Rates 
The relationship between credit spreads and interest rates is a rather complex one. 
Many are the articles 38 that focus on the valuation of corporate securities and allow 
for both credit risk and interest rate risk. The comparative statics of these models 
predict that in equilibrium credit spreads are negatively related to the risk free rate. 
Despite strong theoretical arguments that support the relation between credit spreads 
and the risk free interest rate level, it is rather difficult to provide an intuitive 
explanation to support this negative relation. 
If we rely on the Merton's (1974) model, spreads and interest rates can be negatively 
related. According to this approach, a corporate bond is considered as a risk free bond 
and a short position in a put on the finn's assets. For an investor who buys a risky 
bond and sells it prior to maturity, two states are observed: 
a. If interest rates increase, the risk free component will decrease the investor's 
wealth, while the short put will increase wealth. 
b. If interest rates decrease, the risk free component will increase the investor's 
wealth, while the short option will decrease wealth. 
While it could be possible that a flight to quality could induce a short-lived negative 
relation between corporate and government rates, it seems more possible that higher 
nominal rates would be associated with high risk premiums for corporate bonds. 
Bemanke and Gertler (1989) imply that higher interest rates are associated with 
higher agency problems for borrowers. Effectively, this will increase credit spreads 
since it widens the gap between internal and external financing. 
38 These include Merton (1974), Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1986), Hull and White(1992), Maloney (1992), Jarrow and Tumbull (1995,1997,2000) Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Ginzburg, 
Maloney and Wilner (1993), Shimko, Tej ima. and Deventer (1993), Genotte and Marsh (1993) Nielsen, Saa-Raquejo and Santa Clara (1993) and Longstaff and Schwartz( I 995b). 
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in favour of a positive relationship are two arguments: 
a. A fiscal argument which is based on the differing default rates applicable to 
corporate and Treasury bonds. Since corporate bonds, are more heavily taxed than 
government bonds, an increase in bond yields augments the tax gap between 
corporate and treasury bonds. To offset this increased tax gap, corporate yields 
should rise more than treasury bond yields. 
b. A mathematical argument derived by Bierrnan and Hass (1975). Assuming that 
investors are risk neutral and the recovery rate given default is constant and 
known, he derives the following fon-nula, at market equilibrium: 
(1+1) = (I 
-EDF) * (I +YTM) + EDF (0) 
where, EDF : expected default frequency, i: the default free one period rate and 
YTM, is the yield to maturity of the risky debt. This formula, can then be applied 
for the computation of credit spreads, as follows: 
Credit Spread = YTM-i = (I +I) EDF / (I 
-EDF) 
As long as EDF is a constant probability with values between 0 and 1, a positive 
relationship exists between i, the default free interest rate and credit spreads. If the 
risk premium decreases as the risk free rate increase, this lowers the positive risk 
neutral effect. 
4.1.3. Other Factors Pushing spreads away from equilibrium 
Before empincally exploring the relation between credit spreads and the business 
cycle it is very important to bear in mind that there are three important factors that 
could push spreads away from equilibrium, which are not easily quantifiable and/or 
publicly available but they should be considered very carefully. These are: 
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(i) Liquidity Considerations: Liquidity risk refers to the ease with which an issue can 
be sold at a reasonable price. For an investor who plans to hold the bond until 
maturity liquidity risk is less important. However, for someone who is uncertain about 
the investment horizon, liquidity risk can play an important factor in the decision 
making process. The dollar amount of bonds outstanding is usually used as the proxy 
variable. According to a study made by Elton and Green (1997), it is suggested that 
the best proxy for liquidity is the trading volume. However, since trading volume isn't 
usually information publicly available, the amount of bonds outstanding is used 
instead. The amount of bonds outstanding is used as a proxy on the basis of the 
potential high correlation between the amount of bonds outstanding and the trading 
volume in the bond. Thus, the higher the dollar amount of bonds outstanding, the 
higher the liquidity of the issue and the lower its spread. This proxy for liquidity has 
been suggested by Fisher(1959) and Gardabe and Silber (1976), its advantages and 
disadvantages have been extensively discussed in the paper by Sarig and Warga 
(1989) 
(ii) Temporary demand and supply fund,, imbalances. These imbalances may also 
affect yields, as examined by Dialynas (1988) who looked at the supply and demand 
imbalance theory and found that spreads vary as quantities at different risk classes 
change. As a proxy for supply and demand imbalance between corporate and treasury 
bonds the difference in quarterly supply between treasury and corporate bonds is 
used. An inverse relation between this proxy variable and yield spreads is expected, 
since an increased difference would suggest a greater supply of treasuries or a smaller 
supply of corporate bonds or both and the result would be lower yield spreads. 
(iii) Tax Effectst These occur, since an investor in corporate bonds is subject to state 
and local taxes on interest payments, whereas government bonds are not subject to 
these taxes. Thus corporate bonds have to offer a higher pre-tax return to yield the 
same after tax return. 39 Indeed what has been found in Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and 
Manns' paper(2001) is that taxes account for a significant portion of the differential 
between corporate and treasuries. For example, for 10-year A rated bonds, taxes 
account for 36.1% of the difference compared to the 17.8% accounted for by expected 
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loss. State and local taxes are important since they are paid on the entire coupon of 
corporate bonds, not just on the difference in coupon between corporate and 
treasuries. 
4.2. Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses 
Credit spreads are going to be tested to check their dependence on economic 
variables. Two sets of data are going to be employed to test this hypothesis as 
described in section 3.2. The first set refers to the period from May 1991 until June 
2005 and is based on Bloomberg short, medium and long-tenn maturity credit spread 
indices. Time series analysis is employed for the first dataset between credit spreads 
and their relation to the economic variables as described in section 4.2.1. The second 
set of data refers to the sub-period from January 1997 until May 2002 and uses 
constituents of the ML indices (the extraction of these constituents is analytically 
described in section 3.3.1. Data Elimination Process). This section employs cross 
sectional analysis to test the aforementioned relation, although this time a distinction 
is made among investment and non-investment grade companies. 
The reason for the utilisation of two different sets of data is fourfold: 
1. Compare differences in the results of credit spreads from Bloomberg Indices to 
credit spreads given by constituents of Merrill Lynch Indices. 
Tests and conclusions drawn from the first set of data is limited to investment 
grade category, whereas in the second dataset the effects on non-investment grade 
companies are also considered. 
3. Due to the nature of the data, the first set will be based on time series analysis and 
results will be compared to tests coming from a cross sectional analysis. 
4. Testing the hypotheses reported below, to different sets of data will allow to 
derive more accurate conclusions, with respect to the positive or negative relation 
between credit spreads and macroeconomic variables. Additionally, the robustness 
of results will be further explored, once the stated hypotheses will be rejected or 
accepted irrespective of the data used, period covered or the methodology 
employed. 
39 Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann, " Explaining the rate spread in corporate bonds", The Journal of 
Finance, February 2001. 
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The hypotheses tested under this chapter include: 
a. Test the relation between the different macroeconomic variables and credit 
spreads on a separate basis and compare the results to those presented by other 
studies. In other words, macroeconomic variables are expected to influence credit 
spreads. However, the expectation is that factors such as GDP, Consumer 
Confidence, the term structure, etc, although overall should drive credit spread 
changes, the extent of change may be different in investment and non-investment 
grade companies, in short or long term credit spreads. In particular, the hypotheses 
tested are the following: 
Ho: Changes in GDP, Consumer Confidence, the term structure, money supply, 
industrial production and trade balance, are directly related to credit spread changes. 
Ho: Changes in CPI aren't directly related to credit spread changes. 
b. Test the interaction of the macroeconomic variables to credit spread changes on a 
multiple regression context. 
c. Test the direction of causation between changes in the economic conditions and 
credit spreads. The specific hypotheses are stated in section 4.2.2. 
One important aspect of the relation between credit spreads and the business 
environment that hasn't been captured explicitly within the context of the existing 
literature, is an examination of this relationship between investment and non- 
investment grade companies. Some literature that includes an examination of low 
rated bonds behavious is specific to their relation to the term structure of interest 
rates. In particular, Tang and Yan(2005) and Helwege and Turner (1999) find that 
credit yield curves are upward sloping for non 
-investment grade bonds. Intuitively, it 
can be argued that macroeconomic factors are expected to affect differently 
investment and non-investment grade companies and not only with respect to the 
shape of credit yield curves. 
Although macroeconomic conditions such as a deteriorating, for example, economic 
environment will according to theory and empirical evidence lead to a widening of 
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credit spreads, this increase in credit spreads is not expected to be the same across the 
rating categories. Indeed, the expectation is that non-investment grade companies will 
be more affected than their investment grade counterparts, i. e. high yields are 
expected to yield higher sensitivities to macroeconomic conditions. Considering that 
investment grade companies are characterised by stronger financial fundamentals 
compared to the high yield companies, a deteriorating macroeconomic environment 
should lead to a more severe deterioration in credit spreads of the high yield 
companies. 
Similarly, a shift in macroeconomic conditions will influence credit spreads of short, 
medium and long term bonds, but the effect of each individual factor should be 
different with respect to the different maturities. The rationale behind this is that the 
investment in different maturity bonds is ruled by different investment objectives and 
therefore, probably a deteriorating figure for GDP might influence more negatively 
medium or long term bonds, whereas a negative change in the consumer confidence 
index, will probably lead to a steeper deterioration in short term rather than long term 
maturing credit spread indices. 
4.2.1. Empirical Evidence based on Bloomberg Credit Spread Indices 
The relation between macreoconomic indicators and credit-spread indices is tested 
initially on a monthly basis, based on 14 years of data, from 1991 to 2005. Due to the 
non- stationary properties of credit spread levels data, we will employ changes in 
credit spread indices as the dependent variable, as discussed in chapter 3 40 
. 
For those 
macroeconomic variables that are reported on a quarterly basis, such as GDP, monthly 
frequencies have been reproduced (where the values of GDP are kept the same for 
three months and then change once the next figure of GDP is reported. The same 
procedure is followed for all quarters and variables reported on quarterly 
41 frequencies) 
. 
40 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995a and 1995b) and Duffee(1998) avoid the spurious regression problem 
by examining changes in credit spreads. 
41A detailed description of the macroeconomic variables used in this thesis is provided under section 
3.2.3.4. 
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Table 4.1. shows correlations amongst the independent variables on a monthly basis, 
for the period from 1991 through 2005. Apparently, there are no independent 
variables in this set of data that are significantly correlated, and therefore all of them 
can be used as independent variables on a parallel basis. As described in section 
3.4.4., the signs of correlation coefficients, for most of these relations, conform to 
intuition and the structural approach to credit risk modelling. For example, as 
consumer confidence increases, we should expect CPI, unemployment or interest rates 
to decrease, hence the negative signs in the correlation coefficients of those variables, 
and so on. However, for other variables, the relationship is not that intutitive. 
Table 4.1. Correlation Matrix of Macroeconomic Variable. 
-, 
- 
Mnnthlv Rqci. q 
CONF CPI GDP ms PPI SLOPE TRBL UNEMP IP 
CONF 1 
CPI 
-0.016 1 
GDP 0.029 
-0.154 1 
ms 
-0.059 -0.099 -0.022 1 
PPI 
-0.118 0.106 0.037 0.043 
SLOPE 
-0.324 -0.174 -0.165 0.058 0.037 1 
TRBL 
-0.067 -0.550 0.349 -0.048 -0.047 0.043 1 
UNEMP 
-0.035 
- 
A. 109 
-0.068 0.050 0.068 0.244 0.027 1 
P 0.191 
f 
-0.032 1 0.105 -0.144 0.021 
-0.228 -0.006 -0.311 1 
In order to test the relation between macroeconomic factors and credit spreads, a 
number of functional relations were tested and numerous regressions were run on the 
different maturity credit spread changes, in order to get the most meaningful, in 
statistical terms, model. 
The relation between changes in credit spreads and macroeconomic variables, is 
expected to be of the following form: 
Equation 4.1. 
ASpreads, =c+ Pi* (ACons Conf t,.. t-n) + P2* (ACPI t,.. t-n) + P3* (AGDP t,.. t-n) + P4* 
(APPI t,.. t-n) + P5* (AUnemployment t,.. t-n) + P6* (ATrade Balance t,.. t-n) +P7* 
(Aindustrial Production t,.. t-n) +P8* (AMoney SUPPlY t,.. t-n) +P9* (ATerrn Structure t,.. t-n) 
+ Et 
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Where Aspreads: changes in credit spreads at time t from (t-1), ACons Conf. monthly 
change in consumer confidence, ACPL the monthly rate of change in the consumer 
price index, AGDP: the monthly change in GDP, APPI: monthly change in the 
producer price index, AUnemployment: monthly change in the unemployment rate, 
ATrade Balance: monthly change in the trade balance, AIndustrial Production: 
monthly rate of change in industrial production, AMoney Supply: monthly rate of 
change in money supply, ATerm Structure: the change in slope, i. e. the ratio of the 
ratio between the I 0-year to the 2-year interest rate, and e it : error term. Predicted and 
actual signs for those variables are shown in the tables 4.2-4.5. 
The adjusted R2 criterion and the Akaike and Schwartz inforination criteria were 
considered. The White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent method was used to 
estimate the coefficient covariance matrix. The main results using the OLS model by 
broad credit rating category and by maturity are provided in the following tables 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.5. Tests reported in the tables are significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Results have been separately reported for the different maturities and the different 
broad investment grade rating categories. 
Overall it should be noted that the overall explanatory power of macroeconomic 
variables in investment grade credit spread indices appears to be relatively low. They 
seem to explain at best one fifth of the variation in credit spreads, as exhibited by the 
adjusted R2 of 22% of short -term BBB rated indices. This is relatively low compared 
to the empirical study by Athanassakos and Carayannopoulos (2001), of the 
relationship between bond yield spreads and macroeconomic factors, where the 
overall's model adjusted R2 is 76.1 %. The reason for the difference is that we are not 
using the lagged values of credit spreads or credit ratings as explanatory variables, but 
we only focus on the effect of changes in macroeconomic variables. Moreover, they 
are looking at changes in yield spreads, whereas here we are testing credit spread 
changes. The most statistically and economically significant variable in all the OLS 
regressions we run, is the change in US Consumer Confidence Index. 
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Tables 4.2,4.3 and 4.4. present results of macroeconomic variables on long, medium 
and short credit spreads respectively. There are two things to bear in mind before 
considering the regression results. Firstly, the variables of CPI, GDP, PPI and Trade 
Balance have been transformed from quarterly to monthly frequencies and secondly 
the same variables have been regressed against all credit spread categories but for 
those macroeconomic variables that we didn't obtain any statistically significant 
results, no results have been reported in tables 4.2,4.3 and 4.4. Also it should be made 
clear, that lagged values of macroeconomic variables have been used where it made 
economic sense to do so and when the values at time t, weren't statistically significant 
(in most cases we obtained statistically significant results at the third lag which 
represents the previous quarter). Comments on the results reported in the following 
tables are provided below and are surnmarised by macroeconomic variable. In 
particular, 
GDP: The expected sign of the relation between short, medium and long term credit 
spreads is expected to be negative, since a growing figure for GDP would result in a 
tightening of credit spreads. However, although the relation is expected to be 
negative, the coefficients of GDP have positive signs. Economic wise, we can't 
explain this positive relation. However, it can be argued that this might be a bad effect 
of correlation between the independent variables, which have individually negative 
signs and yield a positive sign. Another possible explanation for the wrong sign 
might be the reproduction of monthly GDP figures from quarterly data. Running 
univariate regressions between credit spread indices and the variable of GDP, 
although provided us with the correct sign, the coefficient and its accompanying t- 
values were insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that economic wise our 
results aren't that significant. 
Conf (US Consumer Confidence): The relation between consumer confidence and 
credit spreads is also expected to be negative, since growing consumer confidence 
should lead to a tightening of credit spreads. The sign of the relation is proven 
negative in all three maturities and all the rating categories. The change in monthly 
consumer confidence at time t, proves to be the factor that has the greatest impact on 
credit spreads changes and the most significant variables economically and 
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statistically wise. Lagged values of the consumer confidence index were also 
statistically and economically significant at all lags up to the fifth. 
CPI. The only relation that is expected to be positive amongst the macroeconomic 
variables and credit spreads is the one between CPI and credit spreads. As CPI 
increases, credit spreads are expected to increase (widen). Results support this 
positive relationship, although coefficients and their accompanying t-statistics 
although statistically significant are not significantly different from zero, hence not 
significant economic-wise. 
Term Structureý2: The relationship between interest rates and credit spreads is a 
rather composite one. As mentioned before, for some theoreticians, the interest rate 
effect is positive (high interest rates lead to increased vulnerability for indebted firms) 
and negative for others as it may result in a crowding out effect, since higher interest 
rates curb the supply of corporate bonds. Assuming demand remains constant, this 
results in a rise in prices i. e. a narrowing of spreads. There is also a negative interest 
rate effect in the structural approach, where higher interest rates result in an increase 
in the firm's forward value (beyond the strike price) which reduces the default 
probability and thus contributes to narrowing the credit spread. 
In other words, the term structure will slope upwards steeply when interest rates are 
expected to rise in the future, amplifying the desire and need for liquidity of investors 
and speculators, who will avoid long term bonds. The opposite will occur when there 
are strong expectations that interest rates will fall in the future. In the absence of 
strong expectations about the direction of interest rates movements, the shape of the 
term structure would be determined by the importance of investors requiring liquidity 
versus those demanding income stability. 
Tenn structure is defined as the change in slope, i. e. the ratio of the 10-year interest 
rate to the two-year interest rate. Results presented here, support the structural 
models' theory, whereby the relation is expected to be negative, which suggests that 
higher interest rates may be associated with lower credit spreads. The exception is the 
42 The term structure of interest rate is representing the change in slope 
122 
long term BBB rated indices where the sign of the coefficient is positive. This is 
consistent with the idea that highest risk bonds are more sensitive to long term 
changes in the slope of the yield curve, which is related to economic actiVity. 43 The 
slope variable is statistically significant, only in tenris of its lagged values, which 
suggests a lag relation between the change in interest rates and the change in credit 
spreads. In the medium maturities the change in interest rates becomes progressively 
more statistically significant, as we move down the rating grades, while such a pattern 
doesn't exist in the short maturing indices. 
MS (Money Supply): An increase in money supply stimulates increased spending. In 
a buoyant economy stock market prices and firms issue equity and debt. Therefore an 
increase in money supply should cause a tightening of credit spreads. Results prove 
the negative relation between changes in money supply and the respective changes in 
credit spreads for the third lagged value of money supply. Considering that values of 
money supply are reported on a quarterly basis and that monthly figures have only 
been produced here, in order to test them against the monthly figures of credit 
spreads, it makes sense to look at the third lagged value of money supply, which 
corresponds to the previous quarter. Consistently higher negative coefficients and 
accompanying t-values for money supply have been reported in short term Bloomberg 
indices, suggesting an immediate influence on short term spreads. 
IP (Industrial Production): Industrial production should also be negatively related to 
credit spreads since increased economic activity should boost investors' confidence 
and therefore lead to lower credit spreads. The variable of industrial production, 
although statistically significant, doesn't bear the expected sign, suggesting that 
investors require higher premiums at times of increased production activity, which is 
contrary to theory and intuition. Running reduced form regressions between the 
variable of industrial production and changes in credit spreads, provides negative 
coefficients for this variable, which effectively means that the wrong sign we get on 
the aggregate regression level, might be the result of correlation. (i. e. individual 
" joutz, Mansi and Maxwell (2000) have reported that treasury yields are positively related to credit 
spreads in the long run, but negatively related in the short run. This can have implications in the 
contingent claims and the reduced form approaches. 
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variables, which are individually negative, in multivariate context may have a positive 
sign). 
TRBL (Trade Balance): We also tested the variable of trade balance, even though no 
clear cut decision could be made with respect to the expected sign of the relation. This 
is due to the fact that simply running a trade surplus does not necessarily indicate that 
a nation is performing well. After all, some very poor countries have trade surpluses 
and some rich countries have deficits. Indeed, what was shown from the results 
reported here is that the variable of trade balance, is negatively related to credit spread 
changes, at least as far as the US economy is concerned, or in the period tested. This 
result does make sense, considering that during the time period covered under this 
section, US runs a trade deficit, which recently (September 2005) has hit new records 
of approximately US$ 66bn. 
Unemployment : The variable of unemployment was also tested to check its impact 
on credit spreads. However, the inclusion of this variable on an aggregate regression 
level wasn't statistically significant, at all maturities. Interestingly enough, this 
variable wasn't even statistically significant when reduced form regressions were run. 
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Table 4.2. Lona Term Credit SDread Regressionq 
LONGTERM 
AAA (OL 
, 
S) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-Que P-value 
Constant 
-0.01- 
-0.93 0.08 GDP (LAGS 3) 0.01 2.03 0.04 
CONF 
-0.02 
-2.09 0.03 CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.00 0.80 0.00 
Term Structure 
(LAGS 3) 
-0.03 
-0.83 0.07 MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.03 
-3.06 0.00 I P(LAG 3) 0.02 2.28 0.02 
TRBL (LAGS 3) 
-0.13 
-2.07 0.03 iF 20.9 
Adjusted R" 17.3 
Durbin Watson 2.3 
AA (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0-64 2.72 0.04 
GDP(LAGS 3) 0.01 3.47 0.00 
CONF 
-0.02 
-2.15 0.03 CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.00 1.60 0.06 
MS (LAGS 3) 
-0.01 
-- 
-2.54 0.01 TRBL(LAGS 3) 
-0.1 ý 
-2.04 0.04 
Term Structure 
-0.02 _ 
-2.78 0.00 
IP LAG 3) 
- 
- 
0.01 2.28 0.02 
W 18.2 
Ad'usted W' 15.6 
Durbin Watson 
A (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 
-0-M 
-1.08 0.08 GDP (LAGS 3) 
- 
0.01 2.96 0.00 
CONF 
- -0.04 
-3.12 0.00 Term Structure 
(LAGS 3) 
- 
_ 
-0.08 
_ 
-2.62 0001 MS (LAGS 3) 
- -0.03 
-2.97 0.00 I P(LAG 3) 
- 
0.02 2.33 0.02 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.01 1.71 0.07 
20.8 
Ad4usted R2 17.18 
Durbin Watson 2.2 
(OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.07 
7ý 
-1.92 
ý 
0.07 
GDP (LAGS3) 0.01 1.98 0.06 
CONF 
-0.04 
-3.31 0000 Term Structure 
(LAGS 3) 0.08 
_ 
1.88 0.06 
MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.02 
-3.06 0.00 I P(LAG 3) 0.01 
- 
1.10 0.07 
CPI (LAGS 3) 
- 
+ 0-01 -1.68 0.06 R7 
f 
11.5 
Adwui tied R 9 
Durbin Watson 2.2 i 
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Table 4.3. Medium Term Credit SDread Revressions 
MEDIUM TERM 
AAA (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 
-0.00 
-1.21 0.08 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.01 2.16 0.03 
CONF 
-0.02 
-3.00 0.00 CPl(LAGS 3) + 0.00 0.80 0.09 
Term Structure 
-0.05 
-1.70 0.08 
MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.01 
-1.93 0.07 IP(LAGS 3) 
- 
0.02 1.96 0.06 
FF 20.2 
Adjusted R' 16.7 
--- Durbin Watson 2,3 
AA (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.05- 1.96 0.00 
CONF 
-0.03 
-3.14 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.02 2.78 0.03 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.01 0.88 0.08 
Term Structure 
(LAGS3) 
-0.07 
-2.41 0.00 
IP 0.01 
- 
1.79 0.07 
MS(LAGS 3) 
- 
- -0.0ý 
-3.06 0.00 W 11.6 
Ad*usted W 9.3 
Durbin Watson 2.3 
A (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 
-0.01 
-1.17 0.08 CONF 
- -0-0ý- --3.86 0.00 
Term Structure 
(LAGS 3) 
- -0.06 
-2.88 0.00 
MS (LAGS 3) 
- -0.01- 
-1.84 0.06 
IP (LAGS 3) 
- 
0.02 1.71 0.08 
GDP(LAGS 3) 
- 
0.01 2.09 0.03 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.00 1.01 0.07 
R 14.1 
Ad'usted R" 11.9 
Durbin Watson 2.05 
BIBB (OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.03 1.44 0.06 
CONF 
- -O. OT- 
-3.38 0.00 MS(LAGS 3) 
- -0.02 _ 
-2.37 0.01 Term Structure(LAGS 
3) 
- 
_ 
-0.01 
_ 
-1.56 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 
- 
- 0.00 1.04 0.03 
CPl (LAGS 3) + 0.00 - 0.79 0.09 
lp LAGS 3) 
- 
- 
0.03 1.65 0.08 
fF 11.3 
Admusted R" 9 
Durbin Watson 2.05 
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Table 4.4. Short Term Credit SDread Regressinm 
SHORTTERM A 
AAA(OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.001 1.25 0.09 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.01 2.04 0.04 CONF 
-0.15 
-3.31 0.00 Term Structure 
(LAGS 3) 
-0.12 
-3.19 0.00 TRBL (LAGS 3) 
-0.09 
-2.37 0.01 MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.04 
-3.06 0.00 CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.00 0.56 0.09 
RI 14.2 
Adjusted W 12.1 
Durbin Watson 2.5 
AA(OLS) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.05 0.09 0.09 
GDP(LAGS 3) 0.01 1.84 0.07 
CONF 
-0.02 0.00 Term Structure (LAGS 
3) 
-0.12 
-3.63 0.00 TRBL(LAGS 3) 
-0.09 
-2.47 0.01 MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.04 
-3.66 0.00 I P(LAG 3) 0.01 
- 
1.11 008 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.01 - 0.80 0.09 
R 14 
Adjusted R" 12 
Durbin Watson 2.3 
A(OLS) 
Expected Sign Coeff icii-n-t t-value P-value 
Constant 0-0ý- - 1.25 0.09 
GDP(LAGS 3) 
- 
0.01 2.57 0.01 
CONF 
- -0.03 
-3.83 0.00 Term Structure (LAGS 
3) 
- -0.02 
-2.7 0.00 MS (LAGS 3) 
- -0.03 
-3.64 0.05 ip (LAGS3) 
- 
0.02 1.66 0.09 
TRBL (LAGS 3) 
- 
_ 
-0.01 
-2.9 0.00 CP1 (LAGS 3) + 0.01 0.84 0.09 
fF 23.9 
Ad4usted R" 20.5 
Durbin Watson 2.13 
BBB(OLS) 
- Expected Sign COW nt ff lent ffi c I l t-value   P-value 
onstant -0.0  '0 . -0.17 0  
l 
0.09 
CONF 
-0.  02 0 
-1.88 0.08 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.02 62  5 22.57 . 0.01 
Term Structure(LAGS 
3) : 0.07 -0-07 
W 
-1 .69 0.09 MS(LAGS 3) 
-0.03 -
-3.30 
-E 
 0.01 IP(LAGS 3) 0 0 2 1 
.9  99 0.04 TRBL (LAGS 3) 
-0.01 
-2.50 0.01 pPl (LAG 3) + ). 03 1.70 0.09 
CPi (LAGS 3) 
- 
+ 0.01 0.72 0.09 fF 26.8 
Adjusted R" 22.3 
Durbin Watson 2.02 
Overall, as provided from the results of the OLS regressions the most important 
relation and driver of credit spread changes in all maturities and rating categories is 
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the US Consumer Confidence Index. This means that there is much more infori-nation 
contained in than index, than any other macroeconomic measure. Also this variable 
has been significant at time t, rather than at previous periods, and bears the expected 
negative sign. In essence, this means that a close look on the movement of this 
variable can prove to be a very significant management too] for predicting changes in 
credit spreads. 
4.2.2. Direction of Causation between spread movements & the business cycle (based on times series analysis & Bloomberg Indices) 
Studies made on the direction of causation between macroeconomic variables and 
credit spreads suggests that there is a direct link between aggregate economic activity 
and default rates and/or credit spreads widening. When the economy is in an 
expansion, corporate earnings and profitability are on the rise so it seems logical that 
the default rate should go down. Conversely, during an economic contraction, slack 
demand may result in lower operating margins and cash flow, prompting an increase 
in the default rate. The direction of causation is assumed to flow from measures of 
economic growth, such as GDP or industrial production to default rates 
In the case of the emerging markets, defaults in the period 1997-1998, the direction of 
causation seemed pretty clear cut: the dramatic slowdown and freezing up of debt 
capital markets resulted directly in a high number of corporate defaults. Moody's 
research has found that the relation between the macroeconomic factors and default 
rates is more complex than simple, intuitive explanation suggests. From 1920 to 1965 
significant increases in the default rate were typically preceded by weakness in the 
economy (as presented by industrial production). Since 1965, it has been noticed that 
increases in the default rate occur in advance of a weakening in industrial production. 
This shift in the lead lag relation demonstrates that the statistical relation between 
default rates and macroeconomic variables is tenuous. 
Moody's default forecasting model includes changes in real (inflation adjusted) US 
Industrial production to measure the effect of the fluctuations in the macroeconomy. 
The industrial production variable actually adds very little to the forecasting power of 
Moody's default forecast model and is in fact only barely statistically significant. 
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Fears that a dramatic increase in defaults would cause the broader economy to falter 
fail to recognise the distinction between correlation and causality. A rise in default 
rate can precede an economic downturn in time, but not be the cause of it. The 
possibility exists that stirrings of problems in the macroeconomy affect firstly the 
most highly levered, cash dependent firms before manifesting themselves in 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP or industrial production. 
The predictive power of the term spread for future output has been studied by 
Harvey(1988,1989), Chen(1991) Estrella and Hardouvelis(1991), Estrella and 
Mishkin(l 998) and Stock and Watson(I 989) among others. The tenn spread contains 
information on inflation expectations as well as monetary policy. Because the 
underlying assets are default risk free, the term spread does not capture infonnation 
about credit risk. 
Other literature, that relates output forecasts to credit risk is focused on the paper 
-bill 
spread ( Bemanke and Blinder, 1992, Stock and Watson, 1989, and Friedman and 
Kuttner 1992,1993a, b, 1998, among others). As a leading indicator, the paper bill 
spread faces at least two problems. 
(1) the underlying assets (commercial paper and Treasury bills) are short term debts 
that are not affected by long term credit risks. Therefore, they cannot reflect 
investors' expectations regarding business cycles in the future. 
(2) According to Friedman and Kuttner (1998), commercial paper and Treasury bills 
could be nearly perfect substitutes because of the low default rate in the 
commercial paper market. The empirical failure of the paper bill spread to 
anticipate the 1990-91 recession calls into question its extra predictive power 
beyond the federal funds rate. 
Within the context of this thesis using the same set of data as has been described 
above, the goal is to test the following hypothesis: 
Changes in macroeconomic variables don't cause changes in spreads. Effectively this 
would mean that the causation of change in spreads is not driven by changes in 
economic activity. In other words, the hypothesis tested is that changes in credit 
spreads precede changes in economic activity. 
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In order to find the direction of causation between macroeconomic factors and 
changes in credit spreads, Granger causality tests have been performed and the null 
hypothesis for each pair of credit rating category and macroeconomic variables are 
shown in tables 4.5,4.6,4.7, and 4.8. In particular, the four tables show the granger 
causality tests for AAA, AA, A and BBB rated indices respectively and according to 
maturity (short, medium and long terrn). Granger causality, measures precedence and 
information content, but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use 
of the term. 
The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see how 
much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether 
adding lagged values of x can improve the explanation. Y is said to be Granger- 
caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the 
lagged x's are statistically significant. Note that two-way causation is frequently the 
case; x Granger causes y and y Granger causes x. 
In particular, the hypotheses tested, for AAA rated indices (for example) are of the 
following form: 
Ho: Consumer Confidence doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread 
indices 
Ho: CPI doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: GDP doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: NIS doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: NIS doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: PPI doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: Slope doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: Trade Balance doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
Ho: Unemployment doesn't granger cause changes in AAA credit spread indices 
The same hypotheses are tested for the remaining rating categories at the 5% and 10% 
level of significance. Results presented below are a bit mixed in terms of statistical 
significance. 
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In particular, granger causality tests performed for long terni maturity indices provide 
evidence that changes in macroeconomic variables precede changes in credit spreads, 
i. e. the null hypotheses that macroeconomic variables don't granger cause changes in 
the credit spread indices is rejected. However, results obtained for unemployment in 
all rating categories aren't statistically sufficient to reject neither the null or the 
alternative hypothesis. This result is contrary to the Zhang's (2002) conclusion, who 
looks at the predictive power of corporate spreads to predict business cycles and finds 
that high yield bond spread and investment grade spread can explain 68% and 42% of 
unemployment variation one year ahead. 
With respect to medium term maturities, the null hypothesis is rejected for the 
macroeconomic variables of consumer confidence, CPI, GDP, money supply and the 
slope of the interest rates. This effectively means that changes in the US consumer 
confidence index, in CPI, etc, cause credit spreads to change. For the rest of the 
variables, i. e. for PPI, trade balance and unemployment, results don't provide 
confidence to reject neither hypotheses. 
Particularly interesting results are provided from the short term maturing indices. 
When CPI 
, 
PPI and money supply were tested against spreads, results lead to the 
rejection of the inverse of the null hypotheses previously reported, i. e. we reject the 
hypothesis that credit spreads don't granger cause changes in CPI, PPI or money 
supply. This implies that changes in short-term credit spreads can proceed CPI, PPI, 
unemployment or money supply changes. Of course this doesn't mean that changes in 
credit spreads cause macroeoconomic variables to change, but rather that credit 
markets may incorporate and or reflect this information in credit spreads quicker than 
this information is reported in the monthly or quarterly macroeconomic reports. This 
could suggest that short term spread indices could help investors to improve forecasts 
with respect to the above variables. For the rest of the variables in short term 
maturing indices, we can reject the null hypothesis that macroeconomic variables 
don't granger cause changes in credit indices. 
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Table 4.5. Granger Causality Tests AAA Rating 
- 
Long, Medium & Short Term 
Credit Spreads 
LONGTERM I MEDIUM TERM I SHORT TERM 
AAA 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CONF does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.565 0.069 1.030 0.035 1.986 0.099 
AAA does not Granger Cause CONF 0.123 0.885 1.799 0.169 1.414 0.232 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CPI does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.054 0.094 2.720 0.069 0.377 0.864 
AAA does not Granger Cause CPI 1.419 0.245 2.301 0.103 2.423 0.038 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
GDP does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.599 0.075 1.676 0.090 0.810 0.059 
AAA does not Granger Cause GDP 0.407 0.667 0.075 0.928 1.011 0.431 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
MS does not Granger Cause AAA 168 1.596 0.020 2.954 0.014 4.499 0.113 
AAA does not Granger Cause MS 0.419 0.658 1.491 0.196 2.740 0.068 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
PPI does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.478 0.062 0.054 0.947 2.665 0.173 
AAA does not Granger Cause PPI 0.771 0.464 2.096 0.126 2.437 0.091 
Null Hypothesis: S OýL F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
SLOPE does not Granger Cause AAA 1638 1.032 0.035 0.733 0.082 3.192 0.025 
AAA does not Granger Cause SLOPE 0.903 0.408 0.173 0.841 1.520 0.211 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
TRBL does not Granger Cause AAA 168 1.314 0.027 1.392 0.251 3,143 0.046 
AAA does not Granger Cause TRBL 1.716 0.183 0.844 0.432 1.430 0.242 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
UNEMP does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.538 0.158 0.106 0.900 1.086 0.374 
AAA does not Granger Cause UNEMP 1 0.422 0.657 
1 
1.706 0.185 
1 
0.835 0.5441 
Table 4.6. Granger Casuality Tests AA Rating 
- 
I-onL,, Mcdium & Sliort'l'cn-n Credit Sorcads 
LONGTERM I MEDIUM-T-E-R-M- FSHORT TERM 
AA 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CONF does not Granger Cause AA 168 1.737 0.017 0.080 0.077 2.455 0.089 
AA does not Granger Cause CONF _ 
- 
0.478 0.621 1.294 0.257 0.022 0.978 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CPI does not Granger Cause AA 168 0.581 0.056 1.603 0.017 0.442 0.723 
AA does not Granger Cause CPI 1.430 0.242 2.879 0.025 2.520 0.060 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
GDP does not Granger Cause AA 168 3.049 0.050 1.171 0.031 3.051 0.083 
AA does not Granger Cause GDP 0.789 0.456 2.182 0.116 0.032 0.858 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
MS does not Granger Cause AA 168 1.092 0.033 0.368 0.093 1.098 0.367 
AA does not Granger Cause MS 1.429 0.243 1.729 0.181 1.391 0.213 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
PPI does not Granger Cause AA 168 0.794 0.095 2.348 0.099 1.253 0.288 
AA does not Granger Cause PPI 1.203 0.303 2.106 0.125 2.454 0.089 
Nuff Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
SLOPE does not Granger Cause AA 168 0.447 0.064 1.314 0.072 2.751 0.067 
AA does not Granger Cause SLOPE 0.135 0.874 1.417 0,245 0.245 0.783 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CHTRBL does not Urainger Cause AA 168 1.349 0.026 0.041 0.196 2.961 0.055 
AA does not Granger Cause CHTRBL 1.118 0.329 3.474 0.033 0.131 0.877 
Null Hypothesis: 
- 
Ob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
UNEMP does not Granger Cause AA 168 1.480 0.223 0.710 0.193 2.789 0.197 
AA does not Granger Cause UNEMP 1 1 0.048 0.953 1 0.520 0.595 1 0.369 0.544 
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Table 4.7. Granger Casuality Tests A Rating 
- 
Long, Medium & Short Term Credit Soreads 
LONG TERM I MEDIUM TERM SHORT TERM 
A 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CONF does not Granger Cause A 168 1.589 0.020 2.083 0.086 0.467 0.062 
A does not Granger Cause CONF 
. 
0.430 0.651 0.606 0.659 0.607 0.546 
Null Hypothesis: Obs I F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
CPI does not Granger Cause A 168 1 0.537 0.058 2.793 0.064 0.212 0.957 
A does not Granger Cause CPI 1 0.573 0.565 0.664 0.516 2.140 0.064 
Null Hypothesis: Obs I F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
GDP does not Granger Cause A 167 2.671 0.049 0.979 0.378 0.455 0.063 
A does not Granger Cause GDP 0.356 0.785 0.701 0.498 0.554 0.576 
Null Hypothesis: Obs 
1 
F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
MS does not Granqer Cause A 163 0.971 0.094 0.746 0.076 1.158 0.283 
A does not Granger Cause MS 0.690 0.680 1.908 0.152 4.624 0.033 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
PPI does not Granger Cause A 168 0.074 0.092 0.205 0.815 1.849 0.176 
A does not Granger Cause PPI 0.557 0,574 1.682 0.189 5.148 0.025 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
SLOPE does not Granger Cause A 168 0.107 0.089 0.040 0.061 2.513 0.084 
A does not Granger Cause SLOPE 1 1.040 0.356 0.691 0.503 1.160 0.316 
Null Hypothesis: Obs 
-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob F-Stat Prob 
ause A 168 0.073 0.192 1.439 0.203 0.063 0.193 
A does not Granger Cause UNEMP 11.001 0.370 10.893 0.502 10.960 0.385 
_J 
Table 4.8. Granger Causality Tests BBB Rating 
- 
Long, Medium & Short Term Credit 
.., 
nreads Q 
LONG TERM I MEDIUM TERM SHORTTERM 
BBB 
NulLt! ýý... Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
CONF does not Granger C; ause BBB 168 1.572 0.021 1.268 0.028 3.422 0.066 
BBB does not Granger Cause CONF 0.213 0.808 0.674 0.511 0.090 0.764 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
cPi Toes not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.216 0.080 1.913 0,095 0.774 0.463 
BBB does not Granqer Cause CPI 0.486 0.616 0.904 0.480 0.187 0.083 
Nul Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
GDP does not Granqer Cause BBB 168 1.613 0.020 0.673 0.012 3.697 0.027 
BBB does not Granger Cause GDP 1.387 0.253 1.397 0.250 1.492 0.228 
Null7-Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
MS does not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.425 0.054 0.083 0.092 1.247 0.290 
BBB does not Granger Cause MS 3.649 0.028 1.417 0.245 2.944 0.055 
Null Hypothesis: Obs I F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
PPI does not Granqer Cause BBB 168 0.326 0.072 0.770 0.546 1.801 0.168 
--gBB does not Granqer Cause PPI 0.073 0.929 2.566 0.140 2.683 0.071 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
SLOPE does not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.386 0.068 0.206 0.014 3.551 0.031 
BBB does not Granger Cause SLOPE 0.101 0.904 0.764 0.468 0.365 0.695 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
TRBL does not Granqer Cause BBB 168 0.199 0.082 0.929 0.448 3.514 0.063 
BBB does not Granger Cause TRBL 
P 
0.257 0.774 1.764 0.139 0.070 0.792 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. F-Stat Prob. 
UNEMP does not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.022 0.097 0.446 0.064 1.006 0.368 
BBB does not Granqer Cause UNEMP 1 0.288 0.750 2.533 0.183 1 2.899 2.058 j 
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4.3. Evidence based on Merrill Lynch Indices & Cross Sectional Analysis 
In this section, the relation between credit spread changes and macroeconomic 
indicators is examined. The difference compared to the previous section focuses on 
the following three points: 
(1) A different set of credit spreads will be used. Instead of looking on how 
macroeconomic variables influence spread indices, we focus on how changes in 
financial conditions affect constituents (analytically described in section 3.3.1. ) of 
Merrill Lynch credit spread indices. Contrary to other studies that use the so called 
refreshed indices which are constructed by bonds that have the same 
characteristics (but not necessarily the same bonds comprise the index in the 
previous period), in this section of the thesis, only bonds that have the same 
characteristics and have the same remaining years to maturity that would cover for 
the remaining life of the index are going to be included and tested. Additionally 
here, we are looking at option adjusted spreads. In that way we avoid the problem 
of comparing two bonds of the same maturity which don't necessarily have the 
same duration (price sensitivity to interest rate changes) nor the same convexity 
(sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve). 
(2) Both investment and non-investment grade companies making the constituents 
will be tested and analysed. Jaffee (1975) was first to introduce the idea that risk 
spreads between low and high quality bonds move differently with the business 
cycle. In particular he suggests that top quality bonds might be risk-free regardless 
of the business cycle, while low rated bonds are expected to deteriorate 
significantly during recessions. Hence, in recessions, spreads of low quality bonds 
widen more than top quality bonds. 
(3) Due to the new set of data and since we have infon-nation on credit spreads of 
particular companies, over time, cross sectional analysis of data will be employed. 
Due to problems usually arising with intercorrelated error terms in cross sectional 
regressions, two different methods of cross sectional analysis will be used, the 
cross section weights method and the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Results 
will be tested on a fraction of the period mentioned above, i. e. from January 1997 
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to May 2002. Quarterly data was used at an initial stage in order to mitigate any 
effects from autocorrelation. Even if the period under this section is much tighter 
than the previously analysed, it covers both high and low interest rate regimes. 
Since we are testing quarterly data in this section, macroeconomic variables have 
been tested to check whether there were any signs of correlation on a quarterly basis. 
As shown in table 4.8. presenting the correlation matrix amongst the macroeconomic 
variables on a quarterly basis, the following variables exhibit correlations of above or 
below 0.70 and hence can't be used as regressors on a parallel basis. These are 
interest rates with unemployment and industrial production (correlation: 0.78 and 
- 
0.78 respectively), industrial production with unemployment (correlation 
-0.75) and 
PPI with CPI (correlation 0.87). Comparing correlation coefficients of 
macroeconomic variables on a quarterly basis, to those based on a monthly data (table 
4.1. ), we observe that the former exhibit much higher correlations than the latter. This 
can either be due to the fact that since some of these macroeconomic variables report 
on a quarterly basis, they change at the same point in time, hence provide higher 
correlation or it may be due to the fact that during this short time period tested 
(January 1997 through May 2002) macroeconomic variables have indeed exhibited 
higher correlations. 
Tnhlf- AQ Correlation Matrix arnonest Macroeconomic Varinhlp,. (nnarterlv basis) 
Slope GDP UNEMP CONF CPI PPI TRBL IP MS 
1.00 
GDP 
-0.49 1.00 
UNEMP 0.78 
-0.62 1.00 
CONF 
-0.36 0.28 -0.05 1.00 
CpI 
-0.40 0.58 0.23 -0.17 1.00 
PPI 
-0.48 0.65 0.43 -0.30 0.87 1.00 
TRB-L 0.26 
-0.40 0.01 -0.58 
-0.04 -0.11 1.00 
IP 
-0.78 0.38 -0.75 0.28 0.06 0.17 
-0.23 1.00 
ms 0.46 1 
-0.27 0.17 -0.55 
, 
O. OT- 0.15 
-0.52 
. 
-0.21 1.00 
After running numerous regressions we end up with a regression equation of the 
following form: 
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Equation 4.2. 
ASpreadsit =c+Pi* (ACons Conf it-it-n) +P2* (ACPI it-it-n) + P3* (AGDP it,.. it-n) + P4* 
(APPI it,.. it-n) + P5* (AUnemployment it,.. it-n) + P6* (ATrade Balance it,.. it-n) + P7 * 
(AIndustrial Production it,.. it-, ) + P8* (AMoney Supply it-it-n) + P9* (ATerm Structure 
it-it-n) + Cit 
Where Aspreads: changes in OAS at time t from (t-1), 
ACons Conf. quarterly change in consumer confidence, 
ACPL the quarterly rate of change in the consumer price index, 
AGDP: the quarterly change in GDP, 
APPI: change in the producer price index 
AUnemployment: quarterly change in the unemployment rate, 
ATrade Balance: quarterly change in the trade balance, 
Aindustrial Production: quarterly rate of change in industrial production, 
AMoney Supply: quarterly rate of change in money supply, 
ATen-n structure: the quarterly change in the slope, i. e. difference between the I 0-year 
and the 2-year interest rates, and 
e it : error term. 
Predicted and actual signs for those variables are shown in the table 4.10. 
Despite the correlation of some of the independent variables, at an initial stage, all of 
the parameters are regressed against spreads, on a univariate context. However, only 
those not correlated amongst them and those, which are statistically significant, are 
reported in tables 4.10 - 4.12. Regressions on quarterly data have been estimated with 
the use of cross section weights and the White test for hetero scedasti city and 
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix to calculated t-statistics. 
Table 4.10: Pooled Cross-section, time series regression, Total Sample 
GPD 0.07 4.17 0.00 
US Confidence 
-2.58 -19.23 0.00 
CPI + 3.12 8.19 0.00 
industrial 
Production 
4.13 13.3 0.00 
Interest rates 
(Term Structure) 
-1.64 -7.5 0.00 
Money Supply 
-4.04 -13.6 0.00 
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The estimation of the above coefficients is achieved using pooled cross-section and 
time series data. 
The expected coefficient of GDP is negative, since it is expected that at times of GDP 
growth, investors would demand lower premiums. In terrns of the US consumer 
confidence index the expected sign is also negative, since when consumer confidence 
is high spreads are expected to tighten. The expected sign of CPI is positive and 
displays the direct relation between the size of yield spreads, which means that at 
inflationary times investors require higher premia. Lastly, the negative sign of the 
term structure of interest rates suggests that a steepening curve has a mitigating effect 
on the yield spread investors demand from corporate bonds, while a flattening in the 
slope of the structure (which is associated with a slowdown in economic activity) 
decreases investors' tolerance towards risk and as a result a higher yield spread is 
required. 
As shown above, most coefficients are highly significant with high accompanying t- 
values. The most significant coefficient is obtained for the variable of US consumer 
confidence, with a high t-statistic of 
-19.23 and the variable of money supply. 
Significant results are obtained for the rest of the variables with the exception of the 
coefficient of GDP and industrial production where we don't get the correct sign for 
which is in contrast to our initial expectation. This finding coincides with results 
obtained from the OLS regressions. However, this doesn't make good intuitive sense 
for two reasons. 
* First, when the economy is doing well, the chances of default tend to diminish. 
Rating agencies try to rate through the economic cycle, but the probability of a 
default varies substantially through time. 
Second, when the economy is doing well, the improvement in sentiment means 
that investors are prepared to settle for lower spreads on a credit with a given 
rating. Conversely, when the economy is in trouble, spreads widen as sentiment 
becomes more bearish and investors tend to shift in safer assets, in an attempt to 
avoid defaults and to a lesser extent downgrades. 
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Thus, the positive sign of the coefficients of industrial production and GDP, are not 
correct, mistakenly implying that increased GDP or increased production mean that 
investors need to be compensated by higher spreads. However, one possible 
explanation, might be a bad effect of correlation that still exists between the 
independent variables which are individually negative, in a multivariate context may 
have a positive sign. Another explanation might be that the wrong signs are the effect 
of testing on a parallel basis investment and non-investment grade companies, the 
latter of which seem to be ruled by some inconsistencies caused by extreme 
movements in credit spreads in the high yield category. 
The overall model has an adjusted R2 of 40%, while the Durbin Watson statistic is 
2.23, which indicates that there is no serial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The next step of the analysis focuses on testing the above hypotheses separately on 
investment and non-investment grades categories. To examine the differences in the 
rating categories, the equation to be estimated, is run separately for corporate bonds in 
the investment grade and high yield categories. 
In particular, a set of time series regressions stacked cross sectionally are run for 
investment grade bonds (i. e. AAA, AA, A& BBB), whose estimated parameters are 
shown in table 4.11. 
Tnhlt- 411- Pooled Cross section. time series rcivres.,, ion Invi, 0mvnt Gracle Samnle 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
GPD 0.00 1.42 0.00 
US Confidence 
-2.14 -14.4 0.00 CPI + 7.57 6.25 0.00 
industrial 
Production 
4.82 14.3 0.00 
Interest rates 
(Term Structure) -0.72 -8.71 
0.00 
NIS 
-4.89 -14.3 0.00 
Overall, the investment grade model has an adjusted R2 of 27.9%, while the Durbin 
Watson statistic is 2.25. Particularly significant t-statistics are reported for the 
variables of US consumer confidence (14.4), money supply (14.3), and the term 
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structure of interest rates (8.71). Still though, we are left with the variables of GDP 
and Industrial production not bearing the expected sign. 
Considering though, that investment grade companies include by definition BBB 
rated bonds, which are highly volatile in nature compared to their investment grade 
counterparties, it will be interesting to see how the results look if we exclude that 
rating category from the sample. 
Indeed once we remove bonds belonging to this rating band from the investment 
grade sample, we find that even if the coefficient of GDP bears the expected sign, the 
coefficient of industrial production is still positive and the overall adjusted R2 is lower 
than before, i. e. 21.3%. Testing the lagged values of GDP and industrial production, 
although provides a slightly higher R2 of 31.5%, still the expected negative relation 
between GDP and Industrial production isn't empirically proven. 
Next the high yield category (i. e. BB, B, C) is being tested. The estimated parameters 
are shown in table 4.12. 
Tnhle 4ý 12: Pooled Cross section. time series revres., -ion Hiah Vield Samnle 
Variables Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value P-value 
GPD 0.01 5.05 0.00 
US Confidence 
-3.09 -18.6 0.00 
CPI + 4.04 2.52 0.00 
Industrial 
Production 
5.19 12.1 0.01 
Interest rates 
(Tenn Structure) 
0.58 7.00 0.00 
Money Supply 
-3.45 -12.9 T 0.00 
The non-investment grade model, as defined by the above variables has an adjusted 
R2 of 44.4%44 while the Durbin Watson statistic is 2.21, which indicates that there is 
no serial correlation in the residuals. The very strong relation between the changes in 
sentiment and credit spreads, is also depicted here, with a t-statistic of 
-18.6. The 
variables of GDP and industrial production, still don't have the expected sign, while 
44 It should also be noted that when the lagged value of CPI and money supply are used as independent 
variables in the regression, the explanatory power of the non-investment grade model is significantly 
increased to an adjusted R2 of 60%. 
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we also find here that the tenn structure of interest rates is positively related to credit 
spreads. 
Econometric studies carried out on this issue (Litterman and Then 1991, Fons 1994 
and Duffee 1999) converge to the same result, i. e. for investment grade issues the 
structure is upward sloping, while this slope becomes steeper for lower rated bonds. 
Authors such as Sarig and Warga (1989) and Fons (1994) find that for lower rated 
issues the term structure of credit spreads is inverted, consistent with the structural 
approach, while others such as Helwege and Turner (1999) argue that in the tests 
carried out there is a selection bias in the choice of maturities, among firms with the 
same rating the least risky tend to issue the longest bond. Effectively, the spread 
narrows as the maturity lengthens, while for a given firm the spread widens along 
with maturity. 45 In particular, they examine sets of bond issued by the same firm 
with equal priority in the liability structure, but with different maturities, thus holding 
credit quality constant. They find, counter to prior research that risky bonds typically 
have upward sloping credit yield curves. Moreover, when they combine their matched 
sets of bonds(no longer controlling for quality) the estimated slope is negative, 
indicating a sample selection bias problem associated with maturity. Contrary to the 
above studies, Tang and Yan (2004) found that credit spread is negatively correlated 
with interest rate, and ceteris paribus, this correlation is stronger for bonds with higher 
default probability, i. e. non-investment grade bonds. 
The relation between macroeconomic variables and credit spreads was also tested on 
two more levels: 
a. On a monthly basis, for the total investment and non investment grade sample 
respectively, under the GLS method and the White test for hetersocedasticit Y46 
and consistent covariance. 
b. On a monthly basis for the individual credit rating categories, using the SUR 
method 
47 
45 
. 
For more comments on this issue, refer to the Lubochinsky's paper "How much credit should be 
ven to credit spreads"(2002) 
Analytically, results are reported in Appendix 5(a) 
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Results reported with respect to the first set of tests, are complying with the evidence 
provided by inferences drawn from the quarterly data not only with respect to the 
individual structure of the relations but also support the hypothesis that changes in 
macroeconomic conditions affect mostly the high yield sector, as evident from the 
adjusted R2 statistic, as part of the weighted statistics, which is almost doubled for 
non-investment grade companies. (adjusted R2: 7% in the investment grade to 
adjusted R2 : 14% in the non-investment grade) 
As far as the second set of tests is concerned, based on the SUR method of estimating 
weighted versions of the required specification, results show that the relations 
between the independent macroeconomic variables and credit spreads become 
progressively more significant as we move down the rating bands. Highly statistically 
significant t-values are being reported from A category and towards the C-rated bonds 
and the adjusted R's also progressively increase the lower the credit rating (from an 
adjusted R' of 2% for AAA-rated bonds to an adjusted R2 of 14% for C-rated bonds). 
Very important results are reported for the variables of consumer confidence, CPI 
and industrial production. It is worth noting that when those "reduced" form 
regressions were run on the individual rating categories, it was shown that the third 
lagged value of GDP (corresponding to the previous quarter) had the expected sign, 
although only in the investment grade categories. It is also important to note that the 
term structure of interest rate was negatively related for investment grade companies, 
while the coefficient was positive for the most of the non-investment grade categories, 
and indeed highly significant. Rather interesting is also the finding that under the SUR 
method, the relationship between credit spreads and the term structure is positive from 
the BBB rating category and for all rating categories until C. This provides further 
support to the argument put forwards in previous chapter of this thesis, i. e. that bonds 
in this category tend to be very volatile and share properties of their non-investment 
grade counterparties. 
It should also be noted that results provided from quarterly data, propose higher 
coefficients for the variables under question and also are accompanied by higher t- 
47 Analytically, results are reported in Appendix 5(b) 
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statistics and R2s. There most possible explanations for this, as has been previously 
explained, is that for some of the macroeconomic variables that are only reported on a 
quarterly basis, had to be reproduced to monthly figures (by keeping observations 
constant from the one reporting period to the next). Hence, on a monthly basis, the 
change in those variables might not be immediately or accurately reflected in credit 
spreads. 
4.3.1. Direction of Causation between spread movements & the business cycle (based on time series stacked cross sectionally & Merrill Lynch Indices) 
The literature on the relationship between corporate bond spreads and business cycle 
is limited. Chan 
-Lau and Ivaschenko (2000,2002) illustrate the predictive power of 
the investment grade spread for the business cycle. Only two papers explore this 
relationship between the context of the high yield category, i. e. the one by Gertler and 
Lown (1999) and that by Zhang (2002), which are analysed further together with our 
results. 
When using time series data stacked cross sectionally, Granger causality tests can't be 
performed, since those are considering the causality effects between two groups, 
whereas in this set of data we have company specific credit spreads. 
As a result, as a way to test the hypothesis of the precedence effect between 
macroeconomic factors and credit spreads, we employed cross sectional regressions 
for lagged values of the dependent and the independent variables. This is not to say 
that by running the cross sectional regressions on the lagged values we'll get similar 
information to that measured by the granger causality tests, but the purpose is to find 
whether we can gain some more insight with reference to investment or non- 
investment rated companies. 
The first set of regressions performed tests the null hypothesis that changes in 
investment and high yield credit spreads don't influence (contain no marginal 
infon-nation) for the business cycle (results of which are shown in table 4.13. ). In 
other words, the direction of causation is assumed to flow from changes in credit 
spreads to macroeconomic factors, i. e. macroeconomic variables are the dependent 
variable (y) and changes in credit spreads are the independent variable (x). This 
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hypothesis is tested initially for all companies and then separately for investment and 
non-investment grade ones. 
After perfon-ning regressions of spreads at time t, (t-4) and (t-8) against the six 
macroeconomic variables, which are not correlated, it was shown that previous 
months' spreads have explanatory power on macroeconomic fundamentals especially 
when it regards the non- investment grade category. This effectively means that 
ratings as those are reflected into spreads incorporate useful financial information at 
least for the non- investment grade category. It can also mean as explained above, that 
a slowdown in economic activity is firstly becoming apparent to companies that tend 
to be in financial difficulties and then be reflected in the macroeconomic variables. A 
virtue of the high yield spread is that because it is extremely sensitive to default risk, 
it may detect a greater variety of factors that influence the macroeconomy than do 
other indicators. It is found that all of the parameters of the variables were statistically 
significant. For non-investment grade companies the null hypothesis is strongly 
rejected at the 95% level, whereas for the investment grade companies it is rejected at 
the 90% level but not for all variables. For simplicity reasons herein only the adjusted 
R2 are depicted. 
Table 4.13 Direction of Causation (Dependent Variable: Macroeconomics, Independent: 
Cr,, Jit ý%nrt-, idc) 
Macroeconon* Variables Investment Grade Hilth Yield 
GDP I% 2.2% 
GDP (t-4) 45.4% 91.2% 
GDLjL§L 55.4% 95.9% 
_ US Confidence 4.2% 19.6% 
US Confidence (t-4) 52.3% 59.7% 
-U-SConfidence (t-8) 64.9% 83.6% 
CPl 0%* 10.1% 
CPI (t-4) 35.2%* 63.2% 
CPl (t-8) 37.6%* 47.3% 
Industrial Production 2.7% 1.1% 
Industrial Production (t-4) 25.4% 35.1% 
Industrial Production (t-8) 54.3% 86.7% 
Term Structure 0% 2.1% 
Term Structure ýt-4) 55.3% 63.7% 
Term Structure (t-8) 60.5% 88.6% 
Money S pply 0%* 3.1% 
Money Supply (t-! Il_ 54.8%* 75.8% 
Money Supply (t-8) 55.3%* 85.6% 
*Not statistically significant at the Y)Yo or the 90% confidence level. 
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Our result coincides with a paper published by Zhang (2002), of Bank of Canada 48 
, 
despite the fact that he uses credit spreads in level tenris. His paper focuses on 
forecasting solely the employment growth rate one year ahead, based on credit 
spreads. He finds that the high yield bond spread and investment grade spread can 
explain 68% and 42% of output variations (employment growth) one year ahead, 
while the term spread based on government debts can explain only 12% of them. 
Results also point to the fact that for one year ahead output forecasts, the corporate 
bond spreads outperform popular indicators such as the paper-bill spread, federal 
funds rates, consumer sentiment index, Conference Board leading indicator, and the 
S&P's index. 
Results are also similar to Gertler and Lown (2000)49, who using quarterly data look 
at the information in the high yield bond spread for the business cycle. Their results 
also support that the high yield bond spread contains statistically significant and 
quantitatively important information for aggregate economic activity since the time of 
the development of the market for below investment grade debt. They find that since 
the middle 1985, the high yield spread outperforins the other leading financial 
indicators of real economic activity, including the paper 
-bill spread, the terin spread 
and the Federal Funds rate. They argue that the high yield spread may be a good 
proxy for overall financial conditions. However, Duca (1999) points out that the 
conclusion of their experiment largely relies on the collapse of the high 
-yield bond 
market in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which could be coincidental. 
Our results show, the information content of high yield credit spreads, is not only 
important for explaining/predicting variations in the unemployment rate but also and 
most importantly in other macroeconomic variables, such as the term structure or 
even money supply. 
it is worth mentioning that this area is of great interest and hasn't been researched 
extensively. These findings can have important implications both empirically and 
theoretically. The strong explanatory ability of credit spreads, especially in the high 
48 Z. Zhang, Corporate Bond Spreads and the Business Cycle, Working Paper, Bank of Canada, 2002 
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yield sector, can help central bankers or other investors to improve different output 
forecasts. More importantly, credit spreads, compared to other market indicators, such 
as equities are much less volatile. Additionally, credit spreads contain information on 
the expected long term credit risks, which is not available in indicators from other 
financial markets. The unique infon-nation content of credit spreads justifies their 
superior /complementary value to the conventional leading indicators used in the 
prediction of output indicators, such as the tenn spread and federal fund rates. 
In the second set of tests (results of which are shown in Table 4.14. ) the direction of 
causation is assumed to flow from macroeconomic factors into spreads. After 
performing regressions of the different macroeconomic factors at time t, (t-4) and (t- 
8) against spreads, it was shown that the macroeconomy affects changes in spreads 
more significantly when it comes to the non- investment grade category. 
Table 4.14. Direction of Causation (Dependent Vanable: Changes in Credit spreads, 
Tnclenendent: Macroeconomic Variables) 
Spreads Total 
Sample 
Investment Grade 
(including BB13 ratings) 
Investment Grade 
(including 1313B ratings) 
I ligh Yield 
SI PI-Cads 4 0.3 2 7.9'!,, 44.4,,,,, 
Spreads (t-4) 18.9% 20.1% 20.1% 20.2% 
Spreads (t-8) 25.4% 20.2% 24.4% 35.9% 
Even though the tests perforrned under this section are not equivalent to proper 
causality tests, they do provide support as to the informational content provided by 
changes and movements of credit spreads in the high yield sector. 
49 A Gertler & C. S. Lown, The Information Content in the High Yield Bond Spread for the Business 
Cycle: Evidence and some implications, National Bureau of Econon-tic Research, Working Paper, 
February 2000. 
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4.4. Concluding Remarks & Comments 
Three issues have been identified and tested under this chapter. The first was the 
relation between macroeconomic variables and credit spreads, with the use of two sets 
of data. The second dealt with differences arising from the effect of macroeconomic 
variables to the different rating categories and maturities and thirdly the direction of 
causation between macroeconomic variables and changes in credit spreads. 
With respect to the first set of tests, results provided by the OLS model, based on time 
series analysis of data, it was shown that the negative relation between changes in 
credit spreads and consumer confidence, trade balance, money supply and the term 
structure of interest rates is strongly supported for all maturities, but only for their 
lagged values. (except the US confidence index which is also statistically and 
economically significant at time t). The expected negative relation wasn't though 
supported for the variables of GDP and industrial production. Results from the OLS 
regressions of investment grade indices, suggest that macroeconomic variables 
explain at best a 17% of the variation in the medium and long term maturities and a 
20.5% of the variation in short term maturing indices, as reflected by their adjusted 
R2S. 
Evidence provided by the constituents of ML indices, supports strongly the consumer 
confidence variable, money supply and trade balance, while again we get the wrong 
sing for the variables of GDP and industrial production. It should be noted that 
relation between the terrn structure and changes in credit spreads is negative for 
investment grade companies (although mixed results are produced for BBB-rated 
bonds), while is positive for the non-investment grade ones. This result is supported 
irrespective of the frequency of the data used or the methodology employed. This 
finding can have important implications in the contingent claims approach and the 
reduced form approach for valuing risky debt. it is also worth mentioning that more of 
the variation in credit spreads is explained by macroeconomic variables in the high 
yield sector rather the investment grade one, as reflected by the 27.9% and 44.4% of 
adjusted R2s respectively (it should be noted that the adjusted R2 increases to 60% for 
high yield companies when we use the lagged values of CPI and money supply). 
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Overall, in both samples, the variables of US consumer confidence, plays by far the 
most important role in explaining the variation in credit spreads, on a consistent basis. 
if we consider that this variable can be explained as a function of other economic 
variables, its intuitive appeal is quite clear. 
With respect to the direction of causation results are a bit mixed, as provided by the 
empirical tests of the times series data. Results obtained from the granger causality 
tests for long term maturity indices generally reject the null hypotheses that 
macroeconomic variables don't granger cause changes in the credit spread indices. In 
other words, results coincide with intuition in the sense that changes in 
macroeconomic variables proceed changes in credit spreads. However, results 
obtained for unemployment in all rating categories aren't statistically sufficient to 
reject the null nor the alternative hypothesis. 
With reference to medium term maturities, the null hypothesis is rejected for the 
macroeconomic variables of consumer confidence, CPI, GDP, money supply and the 
term structure of interest rates. For the rest of the variables, results don't provide 
confidence to reject the null hypotheses. Results reported from bonds of a short term 
maturity profile suggest that for the variables of CPl, Ppl, unemployment and money 
supply we should reject the hypothesis that changes in credit indices don't granger 
cause the aforementioned macroeconomic variables. This doesn't mean that changes 
in credit spreads cause inflation or changes in the money supply but rather that credit 
markets perceive and reflect those changes in a more timely fashion than compared to 
the timing of reporting of the macroeconomic variables. For the rest of the variables 
in short term maturing indices, we can reject the null hypothesis that macroeconomic 
variables don't granger cause changes in credit indices. 
Results provided by the constituents of the ML indices lend support to the higher and 
more significant infori-national content existing in companies of the high yield sector. 
Most importantly, results of the latter set of data, provided evidence about the 
predictive power of credit spreads to leading output indicators, and not only for the 
estimation of unemployment growth, which is a point that should be further 
researched. Again it is worth mentioning that these results don't mean that changes in 
credit spreads cause changes in macroconomic variables or indices. However, since 
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debt market and especially the high yield segment moves and changes on a much 
more frequent basis than the reporting of the macroeconomic variables, investors' 
sentiment and general macroeconomic perceptions are incorporated in credit spreads 
on a timely basis. Hence, changes in credit spreads can be seen as an active 
forecasting tool for investors to improve their macroeconomic forecasts. 
148 
5.0. Credit Spreads and Equity Market Variables 
Numerous studiCS50 have focused on the relationship between stock and bonds returns. 
Some of those have tested the relationship both at the individual firrn level and at the 
portfolio level. However, most of the studies, focus on corporate bond returns or yield 
changes. The distinction between changes in credit spreads and yield changes is very 
important. According to a study by Dufrense, Goldstein and Martin(2001), who are 
looking at the deten-ninants of credit spread changes in a regression context, find that 
while an R2 of 60% is obtained when regressing high grade bond yield changes on 
Treasury yield changes and stock returns, while the R2 falls to 5% when the 
dependent variable is credit spread changes. 
inspired by the limited credit risk literature on the issue, the purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the relation between changes in credit spreads and equity changes. As both 
intuition and literature suggests, equities should be considered as an explanatory 
variable, since they are expected to add significantly to the analysis of credit spreads. 
The rationale behind this is, that since equity markets seem to incorporate more 
quickly financial and other inforination into their prices, they can provide useful 
insight for credit spread movements. All information going into a credit rating 
should be captured in the equity price. Equity markets are thought of as reflecting 
more up-to-date information whereas credit ratings may be revised infrequently and 
with a time lag. 
Section 5.1. provides a literature review relative to credit spreads and equities. Section 
5.2. sets the hypotheses to be tested and provides the rationale behind it, section 5.3. 
explores the relation based on time series data stacked cross-sectionally from Merrill 
Lynch. Section 5.4 tests the same relation but this time based on a different set of 
investment grade data extracted from Bloomberg indices for short, medium and long 
term maturities and is limited to the investment grade category. 
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5.1. Literature Review on the relation between equities and credit spreads 
The relation between credit and equity risk has initially been set in Merton's model 
(1974). According to his theory, the holders of risky bonds can be thought of as 
owners of riskless bonds who have issued put options to the holders of the firm's 
equity. When volatility increases, the value of put options increases, thus benefiting 
equityholders at the expense of bondholders. The volatility that is appropriate for 
corporate debt is total firm volatility, i. e. the one that includes both idiosyncratic and 
systematic (market) volatility. 
Merton's model supports that the market value of a risky bond and effectively the 
value of spread depends on two fundamental factors: 
a. Leverage (i. e. the ratio between the present value (price of debt) and the finn's 
capital (equity)). An increase in the price of equity 
- 
except in the case of a 
speculative bubble - or a capital increase (share issuance) results, in ceteris paribus, a 
reduction in leverage and hence a decline in default risk, leading to a narrowing of 
spreads. Conversely a decline in the share price, or a company share buyback results 
in an increase in leverage and hence an increase in default risk leading in turn to a 
widening in spread. The above assumes that changes in the value of the firm 
measured by changes in its share price actually reflect changes in its fundamental 
value. if this was not the case, this linkage between share prices and default risk 
reflected by the credit spread would cease to be relevant. Therefore, in the case of a 
speculative bubble the narrowing of spreads shouldn't be interpreted as a sign of 
structural decline on the companies' default risk. 
For example, over a period it is common to see a continuous rise in spreads while the 
prices of share rise and then fall. The explanation could be that over the period the 
leverage effect increases regularly firstly due to growing corporate debt (increase in 
the numerator, debt) and secondly to the fall in stock prices (decrease in the 
denominator, the value of equity). 
'0 Fama and French (1989,1993), Campbell and Ammer (I 993)Keim and Stambaugh(l 986) and others. 
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However, there are a number of reasons why the prices of corporate bonds might be 
different from prices of equities. 51 These include the following: 
1. Stock prices will increase if investors are more optimistic about a company's 
future profits. In turn this optimism favours more stocks than bonds, since equity 
holders receive all residual profits, whereas bondholders receive no more than the 
predetermined payments of interest and principal. 
2. The difference may be due to the fact that corporate bonds may be issued by other 
companies than those that dominate the value-weighted equity indices and as a 
result equity prices may seem more volatile than the respective movements in 
credit spreads. 
3. An increase in the liquidity premium on corporate bonds relative to treasury 
bonds, which might drive down corporate prices while not influence equity prices. 
4. Volatility can have opposite effects on the stock and bond prices. An increase in 
volatility given that it increases the risk of default can drive down bond prices 
while have a positive effect on equity prices. 
b. Volatility of the asset value of a firm: If we assume that default occurs at maturity, 
the higher the volatility of the asset value, the greater the likelihood at this date, that 
this value will be lower than that of the firm's debt. Logically the spread, which 
corresponds to the additional yield, increases along with the risk measured here by 
volatility. The problem is that the value of the finn's assets and its volatility cannot be 
directly measured. The solution adopted for testing this type of model consists of 
replacing this volatility by that of the firm's share price which is undeniably easier to 
measure. 
However, this Merton's type model (structural approach) has the following 
limitations: 
The assumption of a log normal distribution of assets prices doesn't make it 
possible to take account for the asymmetry and the thickness of distribution tails 
(kurtosis) 
5' "Equity Volatility and Corporate Bond Yields" J. Y. Campbell and G. B. Taksler, NBER Working 
Paper Series 
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The assumption that default can occur only at maturity is very restrictive, as it 
doesn't allow for a sudden fall in the firm's value and thus estimated default 
probability in the short tenn becomes negligible. 
Consequently, using this modelling technique short-term credit spreads for investment 
grade securities are likely to be almost zero which is contrary to empirical evidence. 
Using jump diffusion approach, yields more realistic results, but the modelling 
technique becomes much more complex. 
Indeed, in the so-called "Reduced form approach" model which doesn't relate the 
default to the firm's value (i. e. doesn't state the exact cause of default and hence it is 
not necessary to estimate the parameters of the value of the finn in order to solve 
these models). Studies tend to favour this type of model because company default 
(bankruptcy) is a complex event for which the exact causes are often inaccurately 
specified, i. e. are either too restrictive or too vague. 
Another major difference is the degree of default predictability. The date of default is 
a random variable and is therefore unpredictable, which is not the case in structural 
models. Lastly, if we assume that the default probability varies over time and depends 
on the level of interest rates, these reduced forrn models reflect two essential 
characteristics of defaults, i. e. the probability of default occurring and the recovery 
rate. 
The advantage of this type of approach is that it provides a priori fairly simple 
valuation model for a risky bond and hence for the yield spread, derived from the 
following data: the price of a risk free bond of the same maturity, the default 
probability and the recovery rate. The price of the risk free bond is observed on the 
market, or interpolated from the term structure of the price of zero coupon bonds and 
the recovery rate can be estimated using historical data for similar bonds, such as 
those provided by the international credit rating agencies. 
The difficulty is focused in estimating the default probability which is not the 
historical default probability but the risk neutral default probability, i. e. the default 
probability adjusted so that the expected yields on all bonds, risky and risk free alike 
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are the same and equal to the risk free interest rate. This probability may be 
interpreted as a probability adjusted for the default risk premium paid to the investor. 
This premium corresponds to the price differential between a risk free bond and a 
risky bond divided by the expected loss. The adjusted probability can then be 
estimated by multiplying the historical probability by this risk premium (Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 1997). 
Reduced form model nevertheless have two main limitations: 
- 
For bonds with specific clauses relating to rating, such as bonds with 
embedded triggers, changes in the rating comes fundamental in valuing their 
prices as these clauses result in changes in the cash flows from these bonds. A 
more complex rating technique is then required. 
- 
These models do not take into account the systematic risk of bond portfolios 
i. e. that the defaults of different firms are correlated and coincide with 
fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Those two approaches provide the framework research in order to further explore the 
relation between spreads and equity. 
A very interesting paper that has been recently published is the one by Campbell and 
Taksler (2002) who explore the relation between corporate bond yields and equity 
volatility. Usually research on the issue, has explored drivers of the variation in 
corporate bond yield spreads but not much focus has been given on the effect of 
equity volatility on the cross sectional variation and long terrn time series behaviour. 
Campbell & Taksler's paper constitutes an effort to fill in this gap in the academic 
literature. 
Data used in Campbell & Taksler's thesis, came from Fixed Investment Securities 
Database (FISD) and National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
transactions data. The sample was restricted to fixed rate US dollar bonds in the 
industrial, financial and utility sectors that are non- callable, non-puttable, non- 
convertible. Additionally, only bonds belonging to the AA, A and BBB rated 
categories were being considered. AAA rated bonds were being excluded since NAIC 
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data for these issues appeared problematic. Also non-investment grade bonds were 
being excluded since insurance companies often limit or prohibit the purchase of these 
issues. 
After running cross sectional regressions on their sample data they concluded with the 
following results: 
Including equity volatility as an independent variable, increases the explanatory 
power of credit spreads and as such it is proven that volatility is an important 
detenninant of corporate bond yields. 
Equity volatility matters at least as much as credit ratings. A regression of yield 
spreads on equity volatility results in higher adjusted R-squared (nearly 2 
percentage points higher) than a regression of spreads on credit ratings (36% and 
34% respectively in percentage figures). 
Equity volatility and credit ratings may be considered on a parallel basis to better 
explain bond spreads. Including both variables in the regression results in R- 
squared of 40.8%, i. e. 5 percentage points higher than volatility alone and 7 
percentage points higher than credit ratings alone. This result implies that credit 
ratings may capture information that is not contained in volatility. 
o Credit ratings explain more of the yield spread than accounting data 
Adding accounting variables on top of credit ratings does not meaningfully raise 
the R-squared over credit ratings alone. 
Furthermore they concluded to the following: 
1. After comparing the average yield spreads reported by S&P and Moody's with a 
panel dataset on corporate bond transactions between 1995 and 1999, they found 
that credit spreads widened in the late 1990s although less in the panel dataset 
than in the spread indices reported by the rating agencies. 
2. It was proven that idiosyncratic equity volatility is directly related to the cost of 
borrowing for corporate issuers. It was suggested that in their sample, volatility 
could explain as much cross sectional variation in yields as could credit ratings 
and that volatility contributes to the explanatory power even in the presence of 
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credit ratings. These findings were robust even after the inclusion of monthly time 
dummies, the time window used to measure volatility and the estimation of a zero 
coupon term structure to control for maturity effects. 
3. Using S&P and Moody's corporate bond yield indices for the period 1963 until 
1999, it was shown that aggregate corporate yield spreads widen during periods of 
higher idiosyncratic risk. 
52 in another paper by Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaurn (2004) the 
relation between individual stock option prices and credit spreads is considered. In 
their paper, implied volatilities of individual options are shown to contain important 
information on credit spreads and improve on both implied volatilities of index 
options and on historical volatilities when explaining the cross sectional and time 
series variation in corporate bond spreads. 
In their study they are attempting to explain credit spreads over time and across 
issuing firms based on implied volatilities skews of the individual options on the 
issuers' equity. The implied volatility of at the money options is a natural proxy for 
the volatility of the issuing firm. They argue that implied volatitily is a better measure 
than historical volatility as used by Campbell and Taksler (2002) since this measure is 
forward looking rather than historical; and implied volatility skew is also considered 
as a second explanatory variable. 
Their analysis is based on individual option prices and US corporate bond prices for 
69 firms for the period 1996-2002. In their benchmark analysis a panel regression of 
the level of credit spreads and a number of explanatory variables is performed. As it 
becomes apparent from their analysis, implied volatilities alone can explain about one 
third of the total variation in credit spreads. The coefficients of at the money implied 
volatility are highly significant both statistically and economically. The implied 
volatility skew also proves to be a significant explanatory variable, although with 
somewhat less economic impact. 
" Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum will be referred as CDMW, for the rest of this chapter. 
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Option prices explain to a much greater extent credit spreads than do credit ratings. 
The explanatory power in a pooled regression of credit spreads is 5-15 percentage 
points higher (depending on bonds maturities) when regressing option based 
information than when using credit ratings as an explanatory variable. Consistently 
with the structural firm value model, it was found that the sensitivity of credit spreads 
to volatility is much larger for non-investment rated debt (BBB+ or worse) than for 
bonds belonging to the investment grade category. 
Additionally, short-term credit spreads are significantly affected by measures of firm- 
specific option market liquidity, whereas longer-term maturity bonds remain 
unaffected. This is quite sensible and consistent with previous studies which have 
shown that the liquidity spread is largest for short maturity bonds (Janosi, Jarrow and 
Yildirim (2002) and Driessen (2003)). The fact that there is some evidence of a 
liquidity spillover effect for short term maturity bonds, but not for longer maturing 
ones is also apparent from the I percentage higher R-squared evident when regressing 
only short term maturity bonds. 
Furthermore it was shown that implied volatilities anticipate downward credit rating 
migrations in a striking way, especially for issuers that already have a low credit 
rating. It was shown that downgrades tend to occur during volatile times, while 
upgrades tend to happen in periods with lower implied volatilities. Issuers that are 
downgraded have higher volatilities than their non-downgraded counterparts. Also the 
fact that the volatility of a finn peaks 2 to 3 weeks before the rating announcement (in 
this case of a downgrade) suggests that option markets anticipate to a large extent that 
downgrade or that most of the information that triggers the downgrade is already 
reflected in the option prices. After the downgrade the volatility of the firm tend to 
decrease but very gradually. 
Lastly it was shown that traded individual options can be used as a hedge against 
credit risk in corporate bonds. 
In a similar fashion, Demchuk and Gibson (2003), have studied the stock market 
performance on the term structure of credit spreads. They built a structural two-factor 
model where the stock market index is one of the stochastic factors. However, they 
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find a weak impact of the volatility of the stock market index returns on credit 
spreads. In particular, it was observed that credit spreads slightly increase with the 
volatility of the stock index. But as explained this weak effect results from the 
modelling assumptions. In particular, the variable introduced, refers to the recent 
performance of the stock market index, whereby high values of that variable would 
imply economic improvements and low values would imply economic slowdowns. In 
other words, it is the volatility of the stock index performance rather than the 
volatility of the index which matters for bond pricing. 53 
Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts(1987) argue that investors fully anticipate rating 
changes and rating changes almost never affect bond returns. From that point of view, 
somebody may view equity as junior debt, where a dividend is paid only when the 
firm doesn't default, equity investors should take into account default probabilities, 
recovery rates and relevant accounting ratios. 
5.2. Hypotheses tested and rationale 
In this section we will proceed with estimating the relation between changes in credit 
spreads and equities and their implied and historical volatilities. This chapter extends 
previous work of Campbell and Taksler's and CDMW, in the following ways: 
a. In our analysis, we are using option adjusted spreads. In that way we avoid the 
problem of comparing two bonds of the same maturity which don't necessarily 
have the same duration (price sensitivity to interest rate changes) nor the same 
convexity (sensitivity to the slope of the yield curve). By using option adjusted 
spreads (OAS) the modified duration of bonds is calculated and option adjusted 
duration for bonds with an embedded option is also considered. 
b. All individual rating categories (investment and non-investment grade) are tested 
at least in the pooled regressions, where data was available. 
c. In the pooled regressions we are using heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors 
but more importantly we have only one bond per issuer in our sample, compared 
to CDMW's sample that includes multiple bonds per issuer, where potential cross 
5' For a more detailed analysis of this result please refer to their paper "Stock Market Performance and 
the Tenn Structure of Credit Spreads, pg. 18, whereby they provide the formulas behind this result. 
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correlations might be ignored. Moreover, the same coefficients are imposed over 
time and on different bonds, compared to Campbell and Taksler's study, who are 
using a fixed effects model. 
d. Equally important is the fact, that in our pooled regressions we are testing the 
relationship between equities and credit spreads on an one 
- 
to-one basis. In other 
words, for a specific bond we have attached its respective equity price. In that 
way, we avoid problems usually faced in other studies, caused by the different 
constituents of bond and equity indices. 
e. We are testing monthly and quarterly data in our sample as opposed to weekly 
data, used in CDMW's study, as this data frequency is more preferable for credit 
risk purposes, as credit quality of an issuer rarely changes within very short time 
intervals (except for non-investment grade companies, where changes are likely to 
occur in short time breaks). 
We will proceed the analysis, by using market based proxies to deten-nine another 
market based proxy. By default, therefore, we should expect to find statistically and 
economically significant results of this relation. Equities are expected to be the 
variable with the most added value in explaining credit spread changes, since it is 
assumed that the stock market provides the most important information for predicting 
a Company's financial status. 
The relation between spreads and equity will be examined with the use of two 
different sets of data. The first set includes OAS spreads provided by ML. Analytical 
description of the data collected has been described in chapter 3. This relation will be 
first explored on a quarterly and monthly basis with the use of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (in section 5.3). The second set of data includes monthly Bloomberg 
credit spread indices for a longer time period, from May 1991 until June 2005 
(section 5-4). 
The hypotheses to be tested under this section are the following: 
Ell- The inverse relation between credit spreads changes and equity changes, As 
equities increase we shall expect credit spreads to tighten and vice versa. Effectively, 
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we are testing the null hypothesis that a change in equity doesn't lead to a 
corresponding but opposite in sign change in credit spreads. 
H2: The relation between credit spread changes and their implied volatitilies. As 
implied volatilities increase credit spreads are expected to widen. In other words, we 
are testing whether we can reject the null hypothesis, stating that a change in implied 
equity volatility isn't directly related to a change in credit spreads. 
H3: The relation between credit spread changes and their historical volatilities. As 
historical volatilities increase, credit spreads are expected to widen. The respective 
null hypothesis state that that a change in historical equity volatility isn't directly 
related to a change in credit spreads. 
H4: Changes in equities (and equity markets) proceed or cause changes in spreads 
(bond markets). Consequently, the null hypothesis tested is that changes in equities 
don't proceed or cause changes in spreads in the different rating categories and 
maturities tested. 
Within the context of testing the above hypotheses data will also be tested, in order to 
find whether changes in equities of previous months or quarters affect monthly 
spreads. In other words, whether there is a particular time, i. e. t, (t-1), (t-2), (t-3), etc, 
where equities seem to explain mostly changes in spreads. 
5.3. Empirical Evidence based on cross sectional analysis of quarterly and 
monthly Merrill Lynch data 
5.3.1. Data used 
Credit Spreads 
Data for spreads was collected from Merrill Lynch (ML). The two indices chosen for 
the purposes of this thesis were the US High Grade Broad Market Index and the US 
High Yield Master 11 Index. Data has been collected from January 1997 until May 
2002. Constituents of these indices have been used as analytically described in section 
3.3.1. 
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Equity Market Variables 
a. Company specific equity prices 
For those bonds (constituents of the Merrill Lynch Indices) that qualified for this 
thesis, their respective equities were collected from Bloomberg. Data on equities was 
collected on monthly and quarterly frequencies. 
b. VIX Index 
The volatility Index (known as the VIX) measures the implied volatility in the prices 
of a basket of options on the S&P 100 Index. (OEX). The index is developed by 
taking the weighted average of implied volatility for the Standard & Poor's 100 Index 
(OEX) calls and puts and measures the volatility of the market. The S&P 100 itself 
contains the largest 100 stocks in the S&P 500 that have options traded on them. The 
VIX covers a relatively narrow group of stocks, but those are among the largest 
companies traded in the United States. This index can be used as a tool for measuring 
investor fear. High readings, mark periods of maximum fear and have marked 
important market bottoms. Low readings, while not as accurate and timely as high 
readings illustrate investor comfort and usually point to market tops. Data on this 
index has also been collected on a monthly and quarterly basis. Indeed, the VIX 
pinpointed tradable market bottoms during the height of the late 1990s super bull 
market and also on other such occasions. 
It should be noted that in the period considered under this section, i. e. from January 
1997 until May 2002 there were three times where equity and consequently bond 
markets faced a crisis. These were: 
The October 1998 market bottom (the long ten-n capital management crisis) 
The September 2001 market bottom (September II Terrorist attacks) 
July 2002 market bottom (insider trading and accounting scandals) 
For the purpose of testing the four hypotheses reported in the previous section, the 
sample data was tested using monthly and quarterly data on spreads, equities and their 
implied volatilities with the use of seemingly unrelated regressions which take into 
account heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across 
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equations. Due to the stationarity exhibited in the credit spread and equity levels (as 
has been described in chapter 3) changes in credit spreads and equities were 
calculated. 
Time series regressions stacked cross sectionally, were run separately for investment 
and non-investment grade bonds, as this would allow for a better understanding of the 
responsiveness of credit spread to stock price changes. 
Intuition would suggest that at least for bonds in the investment grade category and 
assuming that the company is financial healthy, a decrease in the stock price shouldn't 
affect the respective company's spread significantly. The default probability wouldn't 
be expected to increase significantly and as such we shouldn't expect to find 
economically significant results for bonds in the investment grade sample. 
However, when non-investment grade bonds are considered, we should expect to find 
a more significant relation to exist between spreads and equities, since it is expected 
that high yield companies are often in not that good financial shape. 
All the above should hold, once we assume that rating agencies rate companies on a 
consistent and timely basis. This of course could be a whole different subject for 
discussion, since over the past few years the performance of rating agencies has been 
widely debated. Numerous concerns on the timeliness and the predictive accuracy of 
ratings have been expressed world-wide particularly after high profile collapses, such 
as the cases of Enron and WorldCom in the United States. Similar scenarios have 
arisen in Australia too, with HIH Insurance, which had an investment grade rating 
only a few weeks before it became insolvent. 
These concerns have prompted observers to question the value Of rating agencies and 
suggest that their opinions do not contain information beyond what is already 
available to debt and equity market participants. However, according to a recent paper 
by Adam Creighton(2004), it is suggested that rating agencies still perform a useful 
function in financial markets, since as tested at least in the Australian market, credit 
rating changes result in noticeable price movements for both equities and bonds. 
161 
The analysis beyond, is based on the following assumptions: 
9 Rating agencies respond on a timely basis to changes in a company's financial 
structure 
Debt and equity markets are efficient, so that changes in ratings and the 
company's financial position is directly incorporated into companies' share prices. 
In an effort to achieve more accurate and hopefully more reliable results, data was 
tested both on a monthly and a quarterly basis as aforementioned. More importantly, 
monthly observations were considered, in order to test which is the turning point at 
which, changes in equities have the strongest explanatory 
-forecasting power over 
explaining changes in credit spreads. 
5.3.2. Empirical Results based on Monthly Frequencies 
The relation between spreads and equities will be initially tested with the use of 
monthly data for the period from January 1997 until May 2002. As discussed in the 
previous chapter 3 of this study, the time series properties of credit spreads (levels) 
provided strong evidence for non linearities which means that any tests performed on 
credit spread levels would produce not statistically significant results. Therefore we 
will focus on the modelling of credit spread changes. 
The first hypothesis to be tested, is that the change in stock price over the period t to 
(t- I) will be correlated to a corresponding change in spreads but opposite in sign. 
First the results analysed, are based on a cross sectional analysis of monthly data. The 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method, is used, also known as the multivariate 
regression, or Zellner's method, which estimates the parameters of the system, 
accounting for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors 
across equations. 
The equation being tested is of the following form: 
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Equation 5.1. 
ASpreadsil = c+ P I* (AEquity i, t .... t-,, 
)+ P2* (AVIXit) + P3*(AHist. Volit) + Fit 
When all data (investment and non-investment grade) is examined, it was found that 
changes in equity prices alone, nor their lagged values, provided not significant 
results, but when the VIX was introduced in the equation, a highly statistically and 
economically significant coefficient was obtained for the latter variable, but the 
overall adjusted R2 was rather low, as shown in table 5.1. The sample size used 
includes all investment and high yield bonds (i. e. 674 bonds for 65 time series 
observations). However, by default, Eviews uses the largest sample possible in each 
cross-section. An observation will be excluded if any of the explanatory or dependent 
variables for that cross section are unavailable in that period. The total panel 
observations of the following table is 26,072 while the F-stat is 1,863.427(0.00): 
Tshle S. I. Cross Sectional Rearessions based on MI, Con.,; fituente. Mnnthlv Frentiencie... -, 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.019 0.00 4.51 0.00 
Equity 
-0.001 0.00 
-1.69 0.07 
vix 0.262 0.02 10.94 0.00 
, 
R-squared 0.036 
lAdjusted R-squared 0.035 
However, in order to properly test the effects of changes in equities to changes in 
spreads, data should be tested separately for investment and non-investment grade 
bonds. But even for the separate rating categories, regressions run using equity solely, 
as the independent variable although statistically significant in terms of supporting the 
negative relation between credit spreads and equity movements at the 5% level of 
significance, they provided not economically significant results in terins of explaining 
credit spread movements. 
Once the VIX variable was introduced, results were somewhat more significant. The 
results provide strong evidence for the negative relation between equity and credit 
spread performance with highly significant t statistics as shown in the summary table 
5.2. Including equity volatility raises the adjusted R2 by 7% in the investment grade 
companies and by 12% in the high yield sector. This is the same on average as the 
results reported by Campbell and Taksler (2002), who find that the inclusion of 
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historical volatilities raises the adjusted R2 by 6 to 10 percentage points, in explaining 
corporate bond yield spreads. 
'1'2h]e 
-5-2. 
Cross Sectional Re2ressions based on MI Conqfitiu-ni, MtmOilu Fr, -"m, n, -u, c 
Equity VIX R 
Exp. Coeffic t-value p- Stand. Exp 
, 
Coeffic t-value p- Stand 
Sign ient value Error Sign ient value 
Error 
All Ratings 
-0.12 -14.4 0.00 0.00 + 0.18 17.5 0.00 0.00 13.50% 
Investment 
-0.08 -8.87 0.00 0.09 + 0.16 16.5 0.00 0.00 10.60% 
Grade 
- 
including 
BBBs 
Invesment 
-0.02 1.96 0.09 0.01 + 0.15 15.8 0.00 0.01 9.0% 
Grade 
- 
excluding 
BBBs 
Non- 
-0.19 -23.8 0.00 0.00 + 0.24 21.5 0.00 0.00 15.00% 
investment 
Grade I I 
As it can be observed from the table 5.2., results although statistically significant, it 
seems that the overall explanatory power of equities and the volatility index provides 
an adjusted R2 at best of 15% in the non-investment grade categories. Indeed, up to 
this point, results have shown that we can reject the null hypotheses of HI and H2 at 
the 95% confidence level. However, there was no evidence to support that there is 
indeed a defined time lag between equity changes and spread reaction. This was being 
tested by including lagged values of the independent variable (equities) at time t, (t-1), 
(t-2), (t- 10), to see whether they could explain spread movement. 
5.3.3. Empirical Results based on Quarterly Frequencies 
The next step was to check the same data but on a quarterly basis. Once quarterly 
observations were examined, results were somewhat different. In particular, when the 
whole sample was tested (using seemingly unrelated regressions) it was observed that 
an R2 of 24% was obtained only at time t, whereas changes of previous quarters' 
equity prices were not found to explain the credit spread changes pattern. 
Testing the rating categories in groupings of investment, non-investment grade 
(excluding and including BBBs) yielded the following results as shown in table 
5.3. The sample size used refers to all 674 bonds included in the sample for 21 time 
164 
series observations. However, the total panel observations as mentioned above, refer 
to the actual sample used in Eviews by default, i. e. an observation will be excluded if 
any of the explanatory or dependent variables for that cross section are unavailable in 
the period. 
Tnhle 5.3. Cross Sectional Reuressions based on MI. Conoom-nt,, Ow-irfork, 
Equity VIX R2 t, statistic Total 
Panel 
Obs. 
F\p Cocl t-\ aluc 11 L"j) COC I t SI 
Sign \alue 
I 
Sign alu \alu I 
- 
c e 
I I 
All Ratillgs 
- -19.4 0.00 0.0 + 0.34 30.4 0.00 0.00 35.5 2,552,33 8,507 
0.09 % (0.0()) 
Investment 
- -6.23 0.00 0.0 + 0.24 18.8 0.00 0.00 23.6 1,173.13 4,456 
Grade (incl. 0.05 % (0.00) 
B1313s) I 
Invesment 
- -3.54 0.09 0.0 + 0.36 12.7 0.00 0.01 25.0 250.65 1,594 
Grade 0.06 
1 
% (0.00) 
(excl. BBBs) 
II 
Non- 
- -19.8 0.00 0.0 + 0.49 28.9 0.00 0.01 50.3 1,897.07 4,051 
investment 0.20 % (0.00) 
Grade( excl. 
BBBs) 
Non- 
- -25.3 0.00 0.0 + 0.40 27.3 0.00 0.00 37.3 2,156.92 6,813 
investment 0.25 % (0.00) 
Grade (incl. 
131313s) 
As shown above, the inclusion of the volatility index on quarterly OAS spreads data, 
raises significantly the adjusted R2. Quarterly analysis provided more significant 
results particularly in the non-investment grade category and especially when BBB 
bonds are excluded from the sample. It is important to note that all coefficients bring 
the expected sign and are highly statistical and economically significant. The values 
of adjusted R 2S show that in conjunction to our initial expectation changes in equities 
explain more changes in spreads of companies belonging to the high yield sector. 
When the more volatile BBB category was included in the non-investment grade 
category the R2 obtained was at 37.30%. 
As a further step in the analysis, investment and non-investment grade categories have 
been broken down to their respective distinct rating categories, i. e. rating categories 
were tested separately. Working from the AAA rated bonds towards C rated bonds, 
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results were still statistically significant in terms of coefficients but in terms of the 
overall explanatory power the most significant relation was found in the B rating 
category bonds, when equities were the only explanatory variable considered. 
Once we include implied volatilities in the different rating categories, results prove 
that since we move progressively down the rating scale, equities and their implied 
volatilities add gradually to the explanation of changes in spreads. (as shown in Table 
5.4. ) 
This kind of relation coincides with our initial intuition since the additional 
explanatory power of equities seems to become more visible once we move down the 
rating scale reaching its peak for companies belonging to the B rating category with 
an R2 of 52% and falls to 35% for C-rated bonds. The relation between spreads and 
equities belonging to the B rating category is significant even if implied volatilities 
aren't taken into consideration, as apparent from the highly significant t-statistic 
obtained in this category. 
Table 5.4. Cross Section Regressions based on ML Constituents, Individual Rating Categories 
on a Quarterly Basis 
Exp. Coef. Stand. 
Error 
t- 
value 
I p- 
value 
Exp. Sign Coef. Stand. 
Error 
t- 
value 
p- 
value 
-0.04 0.09 -0-01 0.01 + 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 1% 
-0.10 0.09 -1.04 0.02 + 0.18 0.04 6.01 0.00 15.6% 
A 
-0.03 0.01 -2.06 0.03 + 0.37 0.01 20.80 0.00 27.2% 
BBB 
-0.15 0.02 -7.27 0.00 + 0.32 0.01 27.10 0.00 26.8% 
BB 
-0.24 0.02 -10.90 0.00 + 0.40 0.01 25.40 0.00 43.8% 
B 
-0.25 0.01 -14.30 0.00 + 0.44 0.01 29.60 0.00 51.9% 
C 
-0.31 0.02 -14.00 0.00 + 0.36 0.01 12.90, 0.00 35.00%/ol 
it is worth noting from table 3.2 of statistical properties of credit spread changes 
(chapter 3), that B rated bonds is the only rating bucket that exhibits negative 
skewness, i. e. a small probability of a large loss is offset by a large probability of a 
small gain. it would interesting to test bonds belonging to the B rating category in 
greater depth. But given that there is a strong relation in companies belonging to this 
bucket, it would be interesting to test whether any more hindsight could be gained at 
this point with respect to the lag relation between changes in equity returns and the 
respective changes in credit spreads. 
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Running some more regressions of lagged values of equities on credit spreads, it was 
observed, that changes in equities of 9 months before the change in spreads occur 
have the most explanatory power on spreads at time t. If this is true then, that would 
mean that there is a very big time lag between perceived changes in the company's 
financial position, i. e. between equity and bonds holders. 
Testing at the same time this exact time difference in other rating categories yielded 
the same results, i. e. that changes in equities at time (t-3), i. e. 9 months before explain 
mostly spreads at time t. However, if these results are to have any meaningful sense 
for investors, properties of the equities of the companies at time (t-3) should be 
explored further. 
5.3.4. Inclusion of Historical Volatilities in Cross Sectional Regressions 
The next step of the analysis would be to incorporate historical volatilities in the 
equation to be estimated 54 
. 
As a result standard deviations for the respective equities' 
were estimated. Standard deviation is considered a good indication of volatility. 
Although implied volatilities are considered to be more responsive to current market 
conditions (have already been incorporated in the regressions through the inclusion of 
VIX index), the idea is to test whether more hindsight could be added by using 
historical volatilities. 
However, before proceeding with the effect of historical volatilities of equities into 
spreads we should bear in mind that there are two key aspects of standard deviations: 
a) standard deviation scales (increases) in proportion to the square root of time and 
b) since returns are expressed in percentages - key assumption of the random walk 
idea 
- 
returns might be eroded. 
As a result historical volatilities were calculated both for monthly and quarterly 
intervals to compare differences in the results. Those historical volatilities were not 
annualised, since here volatilities are used as an explanatory variable to spreads (and 
54 Campbell and Taksler(2003) report a very strong relationship between the historical volatility of 
equity returns and bond yields. 
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therefore the effect on spreads, would be the same irrespective of whether historical 
volatilities are annualised or not). After calculating standard deviations for equity 
belonging to the different rating categories, a historical volatility index for the 
companies belonging to the different rating buckets was generated. 
5.3.4. (a) Inclusion of Monthly Historical Volatitilies 
Table 5.5 shows the descriptive statistics of these historical volatility indices per 
rating category and table 5.6 the respective correlations, based on monthly data. The 
mean levels of historical volatilities increase with a deterioration in credit quality, 
consistent with the structurals' model theory. 
Tnhle 5.5. Descrintive Statistics of Historical Volatilities. calculated monihiv 
VEAAA* VEAA VEA_ VEBBB VEBB WB VEC 
Mean 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.20 
edian 016 017 099 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.19 
ximurn 0.14 OA3 0.84 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.44 
inimum 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 
-Ttd. Dev. 0.03 012 OAO 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Skewness 0.79 073 7.21 0.57 0.12 1.02 1.14 
Kurtosis 3.26 3.11 55.88 2.83 2.23 4.48 4.69 
Jarque-Bera 6.82 5.75 8012.49 3.60 1.72 16.86 21.40 
Probability 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.42 0.00 0.00 
I 
Observalr'Ons 64 64 1 64 
_ 
64 64 64 64 
* VEAAA. 
- represents the historical volatility inaexjor the AAA rating category, etc 
Tnhle 5.6. Correlation Matrix of'Monthly Historical Volatilities 
VEA VEAA 1 VEAAA VEB VEBB VEBBB VEC 
A 1.00 
VEAA 0.44 1.00 
VEAAA 
-0.06 0.15 1.00 
- - VEB 0.44 0.37 , , 
-u 
1.00 
VEBB 0.15 0.28 0.18 0.77 1.00 
VEBBB 0.22 0.50 0.24 0.74 0.76 1.00 
VEC 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.65 0.49 0.48 1.00- 
Once data including the new independent variable, i. e. the historical volatility was 
tested, SUR regressions were run, firstly for all rating categories and then separately 
for investment and non-investment grade buckets and by excluding BBB rated 
companies respectively. However, the results (as shown in table 5.7), don't provide 
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any proof that the inclusion of the historical volatilities as an index figure compared to 
the implied volatilities presented by the VLX index, add to the explanatory power of 
changes in spreads, but rather the opposite. It should be noted that the t and p-values 
are still significant and the coefficients have the expected sign, but since the scope 
was to check whether they add to explaining credit spread changes only R2s are 
reported here. 
Table 5.7. Cross Sectional Reiaessions based on Eauitics, and 11ionrivnI Volmilitit, 
MONTHLY DATA 
Rating Buckets f-stat Total R' ýo Rating f-stat Total R2 
-f 
Panel per Buckets Panel per 
Obs. Pool Obs. Ratinq 
All Ratings 387.89 26,072 5% AAA 1.85 155 2% 
(0.00) (0.15) 
Investment 107.22 13,822 2% AA 2.31 937 0% 
Grade (including (0-00) (0.09) 
BBB) 
Investment 13.84 4,926 1% A 25.57 4,132 1% 
Grade (0.00) (0.00) 
(excluding BBB) 
Non Investment 299.36 22,287 8% BBB 127.23 8,832 2% 
Grade (0.00) (0.00) 
(including BBB) 
Non Investment 253.05 12,250 7% BB 143.25 5,588 4% 
Grade (0.00) (0.00) 
(excluding BBB) 
B 144.97 4,84 5% 
(0.00) 
C 
. 
22 2,787 12% 
1 )0) 
Comparing tables 5.2 to 5.7, it is clear that reported R2s are significantly lower when 
historical volatilities are compared to the implied ones. Even when rating categories 
are tested individually, the explanatory power of the relation isn't significant. 
5.3.4. (b) Inclusion of Quarterly Historical Volatitilies 
For comparative purposes, the same rationale has been applied when testing quarterly 
data. Table 5.8. shows the descriptive statistics of the quarterly historical volatilities 
per rating bucket in the sample and table 5.9. the respective correlations. 
"( Independent Variables: Equities and Respective Historical Volatilities) 
56 (Independent Variables: Equities and Respective Historical Volatilities) 
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TAIP. 5-9- Descrintive Statistics of Historical Volatilitieq- r-alenlated nnnrti-rIv 
VEAAA VEAA VEA VEBBB VEBB - VEB VEC 
Mean 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.37 
Median 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.35 
Maximum 0.39 0.28 1.12 0.29 0.32 0.48 0.62 
Minimum 0.06 
, 
0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.18 
Std. Dev. 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.13 
Skewness 2.76 4.11 4.04 0.72 
-0.24 -0.02 0.44 
Kurtosis 11.08 18.28 17.92 
_ 
3.04 3.51 2.77 2.19 
ja Mý! ýB eLra 83.81 263.49 251.87 1.79 0.44 0.05 1.27 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.80 0.98 0.53 
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
I'Ale 5.9. Correlation Matrix ol'QuartcrIv Historical Volatilific.,, 
VEA VEAA VEAAA VEB VEBB VEBBB VEC 
VEA 1.00 
VEAA 
-0.04 1.00 VE-AAA 0.16 
- - 
-0.14 1.00 
VEB 0.07 
. 
0.21 
. 
-0.04 1.00 
VEBB 0.35 0.10 0.15 0.71 1.00 
VEBBB 0.25 0.02 0.12 0.66 0.84 1.00 
VEC 0.03 
-0.15 0.06 0.71 0.48 0.45 1.00 
once again, when tables 5.3 and 5.4. are compared to table 5.10., it becomes evident 
that historical volatilities don't add to the explanatory power of the model. The only 
rating bucket that seems to provide a bit more support than the rest on the relation 
between changes in spreads, equities and their historical volatilities is once again 
companies belonging to the B and C rating bucket, as it has also been previously 
shown, with the use of the VIX Index. 
170 
T, qhle 510. Cross Sectional ReLyressions based on Fouifi&; and 14i-, tnri(-. P I VnInti I ifli-c 
QUARTERLY DATA 
Rating Buckets Total F-Stat R-s Per Rating Total F-Stat Rs oer 
Panel (Prob. F- poo, 57 Buckets Panel (Prob. F- Rating5 
Obs. Stat) Obs. Stat) 
All Ratings 8,507 468.33 22% AAA 78 0.04 0%- 
(0.00) (0.95) 
Investment Grade 4,456 77.83 6% AA 341 16.5 6% 
(including BBB) (0.00) (0.00) 
Investment Grade 1,594 21.44 5% A 1,257 48.26 2% 
(excluding BBB) (0.00) (0.00) 
Non Investment 6,913 621.57 31% BBB 2,398 98.50 6% 
Grade(including (0.00) (0.00) 
BBB) 
Non Investment 4,051 495.79 37% BB 1,679 173.34 17% 
Grade(excluding (0.00) (0.00) 
BBB) 
B 1,658 447.93 
(0.00) 
C 714 221.57' 39% 
(0.00 )I 
Overall, in our pooled regressions we found that the VIX index is the most important 
determinant of credit spread changes, irrespective of the data frequency tested, while 
historical volatilities don't add to the explanation of credit spreads, although they are 
statistically significant. The strong explanatory power of historical volatilities 
documented by Campbell and Taksler, isn't supported by our results. Indeed, we can 
argue that volatility index is a superior proxy for the volatility of the issuer, since it is 
forward looking rather than historical in nature. Additionally, to the extent that risk 
volatility matters and is prices, this would be captured by implied volatilities, but not 
by a historical measure. 
57 (independent Variables: Equities and Respective Historical Volatilities) 
58 (independent Variables: Equities and Respective Historical Volatilities) 
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5.4. Evidence based Bloomberg Credit Spread Indices and Time Series Analysis 
The results presented above, are based on a set of monthly and quarterly cross 
sectional data and explore the relation between individual bonds of the Merrill Lynch 
indices together with their accompanying equities and their implied and historical 
volatilities. Due to the limited time period available when running the cross sectional 
regressions, the same relationship was tested on monthly credit spread data, where 
observations were available for a much longer time period, from May 1991 until June 
2005. 
5.4.1. Data Used 
Credit Spread Data: The new set of data includes short, medium and long term 
maturity investment grade industrial bonds (from AAA to BBB-). In particular, eight 
time series (namely AAA, AA, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-) observations have 
been collected for nine maturities, i. e. for years two, three, four, five, seven, eight, 
nine, ten and fifteen. However, not all of the different maturity indices have been 
considered, but rather as proxies for short term medium and long term maturities the 
two year, five and ten years maturity indices were used respectively. It is worth noting 
that the selection of those particular maturities was made in order: 
(a) to include the liquid indices (for example the 15 year index is known not to be a 
very liquid one) and 
(b) to obtain more time series observations (for example the 8 and 9 year credit spread 
indices have available observations from 1996). 
Credit spreads have been calculated after deducting from each time series observation 
the US Dollar Treasury Composite bearing the corresponding maturity. 
Equity Market variables: The equity indices are the S&P 500 index, which is 
dominated by the large cap stocks, the Russell 2000 index which is related mostly to 
small-cap stocks and an index measure of market volatility, the VIX index. These 
equity market variables are also collected on monthly frequencies for the same period. 
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The time series properties of the new set of credit spreads have been discussed in 
chapter 3. In this chapter, we will focus on the relation between the credit spread 
changes and changes in equity indices. Before proceeding with the empirical work, it 
would be interesting to see some of the patterns and descriptive statistics exhibited on 
those indices in the time period under consideration. 
5.4.2. Descriptive Statistics of Equity Variables 
Figures 5.1. and 5.2. provide the pAce levels of the two equity indices (Russell and 
the S&P) and the next provides the implied market volatility during that period, as 
measured by VIX. 
Figure 5.1. 
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There seems to be a rising trend in equity prices from 1992 until 1998, after which 
there is a slowdown, mainly attributed to the Russian crisis. Volatilities also exhibit 
an increasing trend from 1995 to 1999, at which point the index reaches its peak. 
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Equity levels seem to reach their peak in 2001 (as especially depicted by the S&P 
Index) and then there is two-year slowdown before they start picking up again from 
2003 until June 2005. 
For comparative purposes the figures 5.3,5.4 and 5.5. show the patterns of short, 
medium and long term maturity credit spread indices for the corresponding period. 
Figure 5.3. Long Term Credit Spread Indices 
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Figure 5.4. Medium Term Credit Spread Indices 
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Figure 5.5. Short term Credit Spread Indices 
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There seems to be a corresponding pattern both in terms of how the credit spread 
indices moved in the period under consideration but also within the different maturity 
indices. In particular, credit spreads tend to widen in times of increased volatility and 
they tend to tighten as equity prices increase and vice versa. 
The following tables present descriptive statistics for these three variables, both for 
levels and their computed changes. 
Table 5.1 I. DescriDtive Statistic-, for Fouitv Indice- Level-, 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR L EVELS 
S&P RUSSELL vix 
Mean 870.1 382.8 19.4 
Median 916.5 392.3 18.6 
Maximum 1517.7 651.6 44.3 
Minimum 371.2 167.6 10.6 
Std. Dev. 348.2 127.5 6.4 
Skewness 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Kurtosis 1.6 2.0 4.1 
Jarque-Bera 13.6 7.8 36.9 
Probability 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Observations 170 170 170 
Tnhle 5.12. DescriDtive Statistics for Fouilv lndiro, ý Chnnm-, ý 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CHAN GES 
S&P RUSSELL VIX 
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Median 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Maximum 0.11 0.16 0.79 
Minimum 
-0.15 
-0.19 -0.33 
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.05 0.16 
Skewness 
-0.47 
-0.48 1.02 
Kurtosis 3.76 4.09 5.50 
Jarque-Bera 10.28 14.92 73.68 
Probability 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Observations 170 168 170 
As it becomes obvious from the skewness of the equity variables (in level terms) the 
S&P and Russell index seem to be normally distributed, but if we consider their 
kurtosis, it is evident that they are platykurtic. The VIX index is leptokurtic, while it 
presents positive skewness, which means that the distribution has a long right tail. 
With respect to changes in equity variables, it is evident that all three variables are 
leptokurtic, while the S&P and Russell present negative skewness (but close to zero), 
whereas the VIX has a long right tail. 
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In terms of correlations, it was shown that there is no presence of multicollinearity as 
shown by the very small correlation coefficients, between the independent variables 
and the short, medium and long term maturing indices. Correlation matrices for equity 
indices, and correlations among the dependent and independent variables for long, 
medium and short term maturing indices, are provided in tables 5.14-5.16, which are 
shown in Appendix 6. 
5.4.3. Empirical Results based on OLS method 
In this section we will employ an OLS model to estimate the relation between changes 
in credit spreads and equity variables. The regression specification is of the following 
format: 
ASpreadst =c+01* (ARussellt 
.... 
t-1) + 02* (AS&Pt 
.... 
t-, 
) + 03* (AVIXt,... t-n) + Et I 
This model will be employed for testing the parameters across the rating spectrum and 
the short, medium and long-term maturities. 
Numerous regressions were run on credit spread changes, and their lagged values and 
the following general conclusions were drawn: 
(1) The most important equity factor that explains changes credit spread indices is the 
VIX index. In particular, the VIX index was statistically significant at the 10% 
level in all rating categories of short and medium term maturities, although higher 
t-statistics were obtained for medium term maturities. In long-term bond indices, 
the VIX index was statistically significant only for A, BBB and BBB- rated 
indices, at the 5% level of significance. This means that the hypothesis that credit 
spreads tighten as implied volatilities increase, can be rejected at the 10% level of 
significance for short and medium term maturities, while the same hypothesis, 
although statistically significant at the 5% level, in part of the long term rating 
categories, can't be rejected for AAA and AA rated indices. Indeed the sign of the 
coefficient is positive suggesting that an increase in volatility is associated with 
decreasing credit spreads, which is contrary to all Merton-type models. 
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(2) In terms of the S&P index, results vary according to maturity and the rating 
categories, although results provide evidence to reject the positive relationship 
between changes in equities and changes in credit spreads at the 10% level. 
(3) The Russell index wasn't statistically significant at the 5% nor at the 10% level at 
none of the rating categories or the different maturities, hence hasn't been 
reported in the following tables. Lagged values of the Russell Index were also 
considered, but not statistically significant results were obtained either. This 
finding is contrary to results obtained by Huang, Jing-Zhi, Kong and Weipeng 
(2003), who find that the Russell 2000, can explain a significant portion of credit 
spread changes for both investment and non-investment grade series, over the 
period from January 1997 through May 2002. The adjusted R2s ranges from 
9.27% for the AAA-AA 10-15 years series to 38.25% for the BBB-A 15+ year 
series. Adjusted R2s are 41.12%, 47-09% and 39.66% for the BB-, B- and C-rated 
portfolios. 
(4) Short-term and medium credit spread indices are affected more from movement in 
equities than their longer-tenn counter parties. This result is contrary to CDMW's 
study, who although use volatility and skew as independent variables they get a 
larger R2 for long term maturities of almost 28% and approximately half for short 
term maturities. However, it is worth noting that CDMW define short maturity 
bonds (between I and 5 years) and long tenn maturity bonds (at least five years to 
mature). Effectively, their results are more comparable and coincide with our 
medium term maturing indices. 
(5) Overall, the explanatory power of the OLS model progressively increases as we 
move down the rating scale towards the BBB- rated indices, but we can't infer to 
results from the non-investment grade category at this section, since there is no 
data available for non-investment grade indices. 
The results for short, medium and long-tenn maturities are reported in tables 5.16, 
5.17,5.18. 
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5.16. OLS Regressions for Short Term Maturitv Credit Soreads. All Rating Categories 
Short Term Maturity 
Coeff icient t- value P-value Adjusted R 
AAA 
Constant 
-0.05 -0.23 0.08 1% 
Vix 1.12 0.69 0.14 
S&P 
-0.01 -0.17 0.06 
AA 
Constant 
-0.11 -0.72 0.07 7% 
VIX 1.31 1.28 0.12 
S&P 
-0.00 -0.04 0.08 
A 
Constant 
-0.05 -1.01 0.03 16% 
VIX 0.82 2.32 0.02 
S&P 
-0.02 -1-08 0.21 
BBB 
Constant 
-0.06 -1.88 0.16 33% 
Vix 0.73 3.51 0.00 
S&P 
-0.00 -0.62 0.09 
BBB- 
Constant 
-0.10 -3.34 0.00 44% 
VIX 0.91 L 4.42 0.00 
S&P 
-0.01 1 -0.92 0.09 
5.17. OLS Reaessions for Medium'Feri-ri Maturity Credit Soreads. All Ratim, Catewrics 
Medium Term Maturity 
Coefficient t- value P-value Adjusted R' 
Constant 0.00 0.04 0.25 18% 
vix 0.53 0.36 0.17 
S&P 
-0.13 
-2.02 0.05 
Constant 
-0.27 
-1.96 0.05 35% 
VIX 2.99 3.51 0.00 
S&P 
-0.03 
-0.72 0.17 
A 
_ Constant 
-0.05 
-0.85 0.03 15% 
vix 0.86 2.01 0.05 
S&P 
-0.00 
-0.17 0.16 
BIBB 
Constant 
-0.06 
-1.42 0.09 20% 
vix 0.79 2.63 0.01 
S&P 
-0.01 
-0.95 0.14 
BBB- 
Constant 
-0.09 
-2.84 0.00 33% 
vix 0.81 3.78 0.00 
S&P 
-0.03 
-2.48 0.01 
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9. OLS Rearessions for Loniz Term Maturitv Credit Smeads. All Rating Categories, 
Long Term aturity 
Coefficient t- value P-value Adjusted W 
Constant 
-0.04 -0.12 0.19 0% 
Vix 
-0.44 -0.16 0.13 
S&P 
-0.00 -0.08 0.22 
Constant 
-0.11 -0.66 0.10 8% 
VI x 
-1.37 -1.34 0.09 
- S&P 
-0.00 -0.12 0.19 
A 
_ Constant 
-0.08 -1.91 0.08 18% 71-x 0.70 2.52 0.01 
S&P 
-0.01 -0.99 0.17 
BBB 
Constant 
-0.09 -2.76 0.00 37% 
Vix 0.90 4.06 0.00 
S&P 
-0.03 -2.91 0.00 
Constant 
-0.07 -2.76 0.00 26% V-IX 0.55 3.22 0.00 
S&P 
-0.01 -1.69 0.10 
Results provided from the new set of indices are not as statistically significant as 
those obtained from the ML indices. The main reasons for that are: 
(1) the first sample involves analysis of cross sectional data while the second time 
series analysis 
(2) there is an immediate relation among the credit spread and equities used in the 
first sample, since equity prices were collected for the respective bonds. On the 
other hand, here, only indices are considered and since not the same bonds that 
comprise the bond indices are included in the equity indices, the difference arises. 
However, results are still statistically and economically significant and the 
coefficients bear the expected sign. In terms of how maturity levels affect this relation 
there doesn't seem to be a distinct pattern except that short ten-n maturity bonds 
belonging to the BBB- category are more significant than those povided from the 
same category in the medium or long terrn maturity levels. This is contrary to 
empirical results found by Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004) and 
the structural model approach by Huang and Huang (2003) who propose that short 
maturity bonds are typically harder to explain and empirically provide less significant 
results compared to those provided from the longer maturity profiles. 
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5.4.4. Causality Tests 
In order to test the fourth hypothesis of whether equity variables cause changes in 
spreads, causality tests were performed, in the different rating categories for the 
volatility and S&P index. The Russell index was not considered, since no statistically 
significant relation was established in the OLS regressions. 
The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see how 
much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether 
adding lagged values of x can improve the explanation. Y is said to be Granger- 
caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the 
lagged x's are statistically significant. Note that two-way causation is frequently the 
case; x Granger causes y and y Granger causes x. 
It is important to note that the statement "x Granger causes y" does not imply that y is 
the effect or the result of x. Granger causality measures precedence and information 
content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term. 
The statistical results observed from the Granger tests for causality, are somewhat 
mixed. In particular, the hypothesis tested for the S&P Index, can't be rejected with a 
great degree of confidence. More specifically, the hypothesis that S&P doesn't 
granger cause credit spreads can only be rejected for long terin AA and for short term 
A indices. Indeed results obtained from the long term BBB index suggest that the 
alternative hypothesis should be rejected. For the rest of rating categories and 
maturities no statistically significant results were attained. In conjunction to the 
regression results obtained in section 5.4.3., it seems that there is not a significant case 
for rejecting the hypothesis that S&P doesn't granger cause changes in credit spreads. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that the VIX index doesn't granger cause credit 
spreads can be rejected at the 10% level Of significance, for all rating categories, for 
short and medium maturities, while not statistically significant were obtained for long 
term maturing bonds. This effectively means, that the VIX index can be used as an 
adequate measure to draw conclusions on expectations of short and medium term 
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indices, (corresponding to two and five years maturities) while for long term 
maturities, (bonds maturing in ten years) not significant conclusions can be drawn. 
Analytical description of those results is provided in tables 5.19,5.20 and 5.21. 
Table 5.19. Oranger Causality I ests tor Long Term Maturities 
S&P does not Granger Cause AAA 168 1.11617 0.3300 
AAA does not Granger Cause S&P 0.06188 0.9400 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause AA 168 2.82994 0.0619 
AA does not Granger Cause S&P 0.88242 . 0.4157 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
not Granger Cause A 168 0.65941 0.5185 
A does not Granger Cause S&P 1.97884 0.1415 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic frobability 
S&P does not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.02189 0.9783 
BBB does not Granger Cause S&P 1 2.6058 1 0.0769 
ull Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.81705 0.4435 
AAA does not Granaer Cause VIX 014962 n mil 
VIX does not Granger Cause AA 168 2.70148 0.1101 
, 
E, A does-not Granger Cause VIX 0.30704 0.7360 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause A 168 1.76283 0.1748 
7 does-not Granger Cause VIX 1.1946 0.3054 
Wull Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic JProbability 
VIX does not Granger Cause BBB 168 1.00603 10.3679 
VIX 1 1.17573 10.3112 
Rejected at the I% signi icance level, Rejected at the 5% significance level, * Rejectc d at the 
ý, significance levelNot stalistically significant 
'Fable 5.20. Uranger Causality I CSIS lor NICCIIUM I crm Maturities 
I MEDIUM TERM MATURITIES 
[ Null Hypothesis: jObs r-F-Statistic jProbability 
I S&P does not Granqer Cause AAA 1168 10.16177 10.8507 
AA does not Uranger cause b6a, 
- - 
0.94821 0.4625 
-Wull -Hypothesis: d bs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause A 168 0.67971 0.5081 
_Tdoes not Granger Cause S&P 2.48102 0.1168 
-Wu-ll -Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause BBB 166 3.33891 0,1178 
R13B does not Granger Cause S&P 
- 
1.60384 0.1759 
Ob S F-Statistic frobability 
VIX does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.30183 0.0987* 
vix 0.48364 0.6174 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
V IX does not Granger Cause AA F 168 10.39266 1 0.0758* 
A does not Granqer Cause VIA A 1 0.15251 1 08-586 
6.01594 
VIX does not Granqer Cause BBB 1168 ---F4.47335 10.0128- 
Vix 
_L_ 
10.63688 10.5302 
D,;,, tod tit thp /OX %ziorni cance level-** PPiP, t, d ýf th, if)/ý I 
...... 
I 
I o%-siýnifzcance level, Not statistically significant 
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Table 5.21. Granizer Causality Tests for Short Term Maturitie. q 
SHORT TERM MATURITIES 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause AAA 168 0.47021 0.6257 
AAA does not Granger Cause S&P 0.86898 0.4213 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause AA 168 0.53225 0.5880 
AA does not Granger Cause S&P 0.69604 0.5000 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause A 165 4.11083 0.00156*** 
A does not Granger Cause S&P 0.7175 0.61121 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
S&P does not Granger Cause BBB 168 0.21924 0.80337 
BBE3 does not Granger Cause S&P 3.17492 0.4439 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause AAA 166 0.51217 0.0726* 
AAA does not Granger Cause VIX 2.14048 0.7831 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause AA 168 8.10146 0.0085*** 
AA does not Granger Cause VIX 0.56935 0.5670 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statiatic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause A 169 11.0317 0.0011 
A do ýs not Granger Cause VIX 1 1 0.1165 
. 
7332 
Null Hypothesis: Obs I F-Statistic Probability 
VIX does not Granger Cause BBB 
- 
1681 9.44023 0.00013*** 
not Granger Cause VIX Bý_B does 1 0.97056 0.38105 
***Rejected at the]% signfcance level, ** Rejected at the 5% significance level, * Rejected at the 
10% significance level, Not statistically significant 
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5.6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this section was to test the relation between changes in credit spreads 
and their respective changes in equities. The main hypothesis tested was that changes 
in equities should prove significant for changes in spreads. Intuition would suggest 
that this relation should be more strongly supported by data of companies belonging 
to the non-investment grade categorieS59. Indeed, what has been shown from the 
regressions tested, was that this relation holds mainly for companies belonging to the 
B rating bucket and once implied volatilities were included as depicted by the VIX 
index, Historical volatilities didn't provide any further support for the hypothesis 
tested although statistically significant. In particular, adjusted R 2S we get from our 
pooled regression sample when we use as independent variables equity and the 
implied volatility index are 25% and 50.3% for investment and high yield companies 
respectively. When implied volatilities are substituted for the historical ones, adjusted 
R 2S fell to 6% and 28% for the investment and non-investment grade samples 
respectively. 
In terms of the relation between different maturity credit spread indices and equity 
variables, results strongly support the negative relation amongst them for short and 
medium tenn maturing indices, while the null hypothesis couldn't be rejected for long 
term maturities. Results we get from the OLS regressions, suggest that equity 
variables explain at best a 44% for short term maturing indices, and 35% and 37% for 
medium and long term maturing indices as reflected by the adjusted R 2S. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that the VIX index doesn't granger cause credit spreads 
can be rejected at the 10% level of significance, for all rating categories, for short and 
medium maturities, while not statistically significant were obtained for long term 
maturing bonds. 
Part of the results reported under this chapter support both theoretical and empirical 
evidence as to the importance for including on the one hand implied volatilities while 
5 9 The fact that low-grade bonds are more sensitive to stock returns is documented by Kwan (1996), 
Blume, Keim and Patel(1991), Cornell and Green (1991), who investigated the relation among equities 
and yield changes or corporate bond returns. 
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excluding historical ones, as well as to the fact that the inclusion of equities add 
significant explanatory power to the modelling of non-investment grade companies. 
There are three points that should be further tested or considered: 
a. It would be interesting to elaborate further on bonds belonging to the B rating 
class as results provided, irrespective of time attributions (data frequencies 
checked) have been mostly significant. 
b. With respect to the time lag between changes in equities and the respective 
changes in credit spreads, results provided only by option adjusted spreads support 
the nine month time lag. Further evidence should therefore be tested and evaluated 
accordingly. 
c. Lastly, with respect to the index maturities, it should be noted that based on the 
current set, short term maturity bonds seemed to be better modelled by changes in 
equities than their longer term counterparts. Although this argument verifies that 
bond market aren't that far behind from equity markets, we should expect this 
relation to hold also for longer term maturities and therefore should be further 
explored. 
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6.0. Credit Spreads and Accounting variables 
Past studies that have dealt with the relation between accounting ratios and credit 
ratings, have used ratios as independent variables in an effort to estimate a default 
prediction model. Only limited literature has focused on accounting variables and 
spreads changes within the context of credit spread changes as opposed to yield 
changes.. The purpose of this section is to establish a relation between accounting 
ratios and credit spread changes (which are used as a proxy for ratings) and is not 
limited to a default and non-default status of the firm. Within the context of this 
thesis, accounting ratios are used as independent variables, in order to estimate 
changes in the rating or intra-rating categories and the assumed direction of the 
financial position of a company (as those are reflected in their respective credit 
spreads). Of course, there is the implicit assumption that companies whose financial 
ratios deteriorate significantly will ultimately be led to default. 
Additionally, as it is going to be described below after careful consideration of 
financial ratios that have been used in other studies, this thesis will not include the 
most popular financial ratios academic wise, but those ratios that tend to influence 
mostly credit spreads, based on empirical evidence. Additionally, since the dependent 
variable considered here are the medium to long term credit spreads, the independent 
variables should also point to the same time frame and as such the data used are 
financial ratios determining the long term financial standing of a company (i. e. longer 
term liquidity and leverage ratios are mostly considered, etc). 
However, it is worth noting that during the last years, the way companies report their 
financials has come under increased scrutiny due to different accounting scandals 
related to big company names such as Enron, Tyco to name a few. In the first case of 
Enron, investors could have been warned of the deteriorating profile of the company 
by closely looking at ratios such as its debt to capital employed ratio which rose from 
46% to 50% in 2000 and by its interest cover ratio which in the three years leading to 
2001, has fallen below the magic level of I Ox. This would imply an inability of the 
company to cover interest expense from operating profits and could lead to limited or 
no access to working capital. On the other hand in the case of Tyco, the reasons for its 
severe downgrades was mainly due to accounting transparency issues. In that case, it 
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wasn't that easy for investors to be alerted of the company's deteriorating profile, by 
solely looking at their fundamentals. 
Bearing these two examples in mind, the following analysis, between ratios and credit 
spreads can only provide accurate results assuming that there is reasonable accounting 
transparency in a company's annual reports. Otherwise, incomplete accounting 
information can lead to serious concerns for investors and effectively a deteriorating 
confidence on a company's credit profile, which although may be reflected in its 
credit spreads it won't be supported by a ratio analysis. 
6.1. Literature Review 
- 
Credit Spreads & Accounting Ratios 
There has been a series of research and literature that deals with the use of financial 
ratios in the determination of a company's long term credit standing. Generally 
speaking, the main reason of financial ratios is to serve as measures of the financial 
position of business and other entities. In particular, the main uses of financial ratios 
are: 
a. The estimation of a functional relation for the purpose of prediction. For example 
an investment analyst seeking to predict a company's profits or to predict a 
company's financial distress, etc. 
b. To serve as size deflators, since regular accounting data suffer a size effect, 
(absolute values). 
The basic assumption of ratio analysis is that of proportional itY60, i. e. that a 
proportionate relation should exist between the two variables whose ratio is being 
calculated. However, in an empirical relation between a pair of accounting variables, 
two of the conditions necessary for proportionality are likely to be violated. Firstl 
there may be a constant term in the relation, i. e. an element of the finn's profit may be 
unrelated to a sales element, so that the profit /sales ratio isn't an adequate description 
of the relation between profit and sales. Secondl 
, 
the functional form of the relation 
may be non-linear, i. e. a firm which is in a saturated market might not be expected to 
" Some basic properties of Accounting Ratios, Geoffrey Whittington, Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 7,2 (1980) 
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yield a constant increment to profit for each unit of revenue added to sales. In the case 
that these two conditions are violated, regression analysis provides a much more 
powerful and flexible tool in estimating a functional relation between the two pairs of 
variables. 
Most of academic work and research that has been published up to date, refers to the 
use of financial ratios as estimators of a functional relation between accounting 
variables and default. Default prediction models as those developed by Beaver (1967, 
1968) and Altman (1968) have set the background for further work. Altman used 
discriminant analysis to rank firms on the basis of a weighted combination of five 
ratios. His results were 95% effective in selecting future bankruptcy companies in the 
year prior to bankruptcy. The firms examined in Altman's study went bankrupt on 
average seven and a half months after the close of the last fiscal year for which reports 
were prepared. However, the model's predictive ability fell rapidly, once previous 
years were considered. For example in the years two to five prior to default the 
discriminant model led to more misclassifications than Beaver's dichotomous model. 
Beaver has studied liquid versus non-liquid assets, in order to determine default. The 
non-liquid ratios examined were the cash flow to debt, net income to total assets and 
total debt to total assets. Those ratios are regarded as measures of long term solvency 
whereas the liquid ratios are regarded as shorter-term predictors. According to 
Beaver's interpretation, liquid asset ratios are expected to predict failure better than 
non liquid ratios, one and two years prior to default, while non-liquid ones are 
expected to be better predictors four and five years before failure. However, liquid 
assets and in particular current assets have received quite some criticism in the 
following respects: 
The inclusion of inventory impairs the measure's usefulness. Inventory is not 
considered to be liquid asset since it must be sold before it can be converted into 
cash or receivables. Even though this criticism could be overcome with the use of 
the quick asset ratio, still another issue arises in the fon-n of 
2. Window dressing, which involves the temporary repayment of current debt just 
prior to the financial statement date, which results in spurious improvement in the 
current ratio. 
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After analysing and testing the data with the dichotomous classification test, Beaver's 
study concluded the following: 
- 
non liquid assets measures predict failure better than the liquid asset measures 
even in the years immediately before failure 
failed firms tend to have lower rather than higher inventory balances 
less frequently advocated liquid asset measures outperform the more frequently 
used ones. 
As a result, Beaver's research showed that none of his findings were previously 
anticipated by the priori arguments in the literature. Deakin 61 (1976) has replicated 
Beaver's (1967-68) study, using the same set of ratios and concluded that the use of 
statistical techniques, particularly discriminant analysis, can be used to predict 
business failure from accounting data almost three years before bankruptcy actually 
occurs, with a high degree of accuracy. However, it must be clarified that the model 
was derived from a rather small population and while the results are encouraging, it 
should only be used as a tool for providing probability of failure rather than an 
absolute proof of failure. 
Studies which document the relation between yield spreads and default risk include 
Fisher (1959) who uses a set of financial ratios and finds a positive relation between 
default risk and yield spreads. West (1973), Ederington et al (1987) and Reiter and 
Ziebart (1991) conclude that both bond ratings and financial ratios play an important 
role in the determination of yield spreads. 
Another group of research has focused on the distributional properties of financial 
ratios (Bird and McHugh 1977, Bougen and Drury 1980, Deakin 1976, Horrigan 
1965, Mecimore 1968, O'Connor 1973, Pinches et al 1973). The findings are that, in 
general financial ratios are not normally distributed and that skewness exists. In Paul 
Barnes' paper 62, it was shown that where financial ratios are non-normally distributed, 
the comparison of a financial ratio with some industry norm, is likely to misinform. 
61A discrin-ýinant analysis of predictors of business failure, Edward, D. Deakin 
- 
Research Report 
188 
However, since financial ratios in the context of the aforementioned studies and also 
in the present thesis, are used as inputs to certain statistical models (regression 
analysis and multiple discriminant analysis) normality is irrelevant. According to 
Barnes' paper, a financial ratio is composed of two variables and it is the behaviour of 
these and their relation with one another, that governs the behaviour of the financial 
ratio which they make up. The critical assumption when using financial ratios is 
proportionality, i. e. the relation between two variables is linear and the constant is 
zero (Whittington 1980). In Barnes' paper it was shown that violation of this 
assumption accounts for non-normal distributions. Also it was argued that 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals in the original data is to be expected if they are 
cross sectional. But given the likely form of heteroscedasticity, this will tend to be 
cancelled out by the ratio transformation. In other words, as argued by Bames, 
residuals in the cross sectional data are likely to be heteroscedastic tending to make 
the residuals in the ratios homoscedastic. 
Some other issues concerning financial ratios are the following: 
1. Financial ratios tend to be highly correlated with each other. This collinearity 
means that careful selection must be carried out when determining which financial 
ratios should be used in the analysis. 
2. Distributions of financial ratios tend to be significantly correlated over time. This 
means that ratios are not likely to be efficient predictors of dependent variables 
which shift in a random pattern over time, such as stock market prices. 
Generally, the use of financial ratios as predictors of corporate bankruptcy has been 
researched quite substantially in the past (in approximately 53 studieS)63 
. 
However, 
only recently a paper 64 has been published which provides a fonnal ranking of the 
popularity of financial ratios in modelling corporate collapse. According to the 
" Methodological Implications of non-normally distributed financial ratios 63 Key papers used are: "Altman, E. I. (1983b), Why business fail, Journal of Business Strategy, 
Vol. 4, p36" 
, 
"Poston, K. M. and Harmon, W. K. (1994) A test of financial ratios as predictors of 
turnaround versus failure among financially distressed firms, Journal of Applied Business Research, 
Vol. 10, p4l", "OhIson J. A. (1980), Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 18. plO9", "Frecka, T. J. and Lee, C. F. (1983), Generalised 
Financial Ratio Adjustment Processes and their Implications, Joumal of Accounting Research, Vol. 2 1, 
p308", "Gentry, J. A., Newbold P. and Whitford, D. T. (1987), Funds Flow Components, Financial 
Ratios and Bankruptcy, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol, 14, p. 595". 64 "A comprehensive formal ranking of the popularity of financial ratios in multivariate modeling of 
corporate collapse", Hossari & Raliman, The Journal of American Academy of Business, Cambridge, 
March 2005 
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following table, whereby financial ratios are broadly defined, the most popular 
financial ratios used in past studies are exhibited in table 6.1. 
T, ihlc, 61 
- 
PODLI]aritv of Financial Ratios 
e popula of 48 rinancial ratios across 53 studies 
Ratio Rank Ratio Rank Ratio Rank 
NUTA 431,1/,, NI/TE 131VO AIUNV 41% 
CA/CL 42% EBIT/I 11% C+MS/CL 4% 
TUTA 40% TE/TA 9% C+MS/TA 4% 
WC/TA 34% fNV/S 9% CF/CL 4% 
EBIT/TA 30% QA/S 9% CF/S 4% 
CF/TL 23% WC/S 9% CUTA 4% 
TUTE 23% QA/TA 8% CUTE 4% 
RE/TA 21% S/FA 8% DIV/Nl 4% 
S/TA 21% TE/TL 8% EBT/TA 4% 
C/TA 19% C/CL 6% EXP/S 4% 
CA/S 17% C/S 6% fNV/WC 4% 
CA/TA 17% EBIT/S 6% LTUTE 4% 
MVE/TL 15% EBIT/TE 6% OpEx/TA 4% 
QA/TL 15% FA/TA 6% S/fNV 4% 
CF/TA 13% 
JF /TE 
6% S/TE 4% 
NI/S 13% LTUTA 1 6% TE/LTL 4% 
Sourc 
.-A comprehensiveformal ranking of the popularity of Financial Ratios in Multivariate Modelling 
of Corporate Collapse, The Journal ofAmerican Academy ofBusiness, Cambridge, March 2005 
it should be noted however, that the calculation for the derivation of those ratios 
might not be common across the 53 studies, but potentially there are some 
adjustments. But even if these adjustments are made, this can't alter significantly the 
results. As it becomes obvious only 5 out of the 48 financial ratios depicted have been 
useful to more than 25% of the studies that have been identified. Those are the Net 
Income to Total Assets, Current Assets to Current Liabilities, Total Liabilities to Total 
Assets, Working Capital to Total Assets and Ebit to Total Assets, with rankings of 
43%, 42%, 40%, 34% and 30% respectively. From the table it becomes obvious that 
many ratios have the same ranking and only about 5 of them were popular amongst 
more than one quarter of the relevant literature. 
Within the context of the literature which involves the exploration of the relation 
between accounting ratios and credit ratings or credit spreads, an important issue, is 
the quality of raw information that is provided by companies. In particular, a topic 
that has gained a lot of attention lately, particularly after collapses of big company 
names, is the quality of financial disclosures provided to the market and investors 
alike. 
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This last topic, i. e. the importance of accounting transparency and corporate 
disclosures on credit spreads, has received quite a lot of attention from academics. As 
a result, even if it is beyond the scope of the current section, I would believe it would 
be useful to mention briefly some of the most important findings of some of this 
research work. 
A particularly interesting paper was that of Fan Yu 65 
, 
who investigated the relation 
and the effects of a firm's informational disclosure on the term structure of its 
corporate bond yield spreads. To the extent that the lack of transparency may signal 
hidden bad news about a company, the quality of accounting infon-nation may have an 
impact on its costs of debt offering yields. Using AIMR (Association for Investment 
and Management Research) rankings and cross sectional regressions, it was shown 
that firms with higher AIMR disclosure rankings tend to have lower credit spreads, a 
relation that is particularly strong for short term bonds. These findings are consistent 
with the theory of discretionary disclosure as well as the incomplete accounting 
information model of Duffle and Lando(2001). 
The empirical evidence on the relation between firm performance and disclosure, has 
been mixed. Some research on management earnings forecasts ( Patel, 1976, Penman, 
1980, and Lev and Penman, 1990) suggests that firms tend to disclose more 
frequently when they are experiencing good earnings results and their earnings 
forecasts are associated with positive returnS66 
- 
Research focused on later time periods 
(Ajinkya and Gift, 1984, and McNichols, 1989), indicates that firms are as likely to 
issue good news forecasts as bad news forecasts. In another paper, by McNichols, 
1988, who incorporates other measures of voluntary disclosure, concludes that based 
on the negative skewness of returns of earnings announcements dates, that good news 
is disclosed prior to earnings announcements while bad news is disclosed through 
announced earnings. 
65 "Accounting Transparency and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads", Draft Doc, University of 
California, Irvine 
66,, Cross-sectional determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures", Mark Lang & Russell 
Lundholm, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 3 1, No 2, Autumn 1993 
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The reason for the incorporation of some conclusions reached by research focusing on 
corporate disclosure and accounting transparency, is that although intuition would 
suggest that accounting factors are expected to be mostly significant in the 
determination of a company's spread, there are a number of difficulties caused by 
informational asymmetries and other issues, which may not lead to the expected 
results. A clear illustration of the implications of imperfect accounting data is 
provided by Leland (1994). He assumed that outside investors cannot observe the 
issuer's credit quality directly and receive only periodic and imperfect accounting 
reports. A numerical illustration is implemented and the theoretical shape of the term 
structure of credit spreads is compared for finns of various credit qualities and various 
levels of precision of accounting data. It emerges that in the presence of perfect 
accounting data, credit spreads go to zero as maturity goes to zero, regardless of the 
level of assets. For lower credit quality firms, credit spreads would widen sharply 
with maturity and then typically decline. However, with imperfect accounting 
information, the model implies that credit spreads remain bounded away from zero as 
maturity goes to zero. 
Moreover, Leland, plots the term structure for various lagged accounting reports. 
With perfect accounting information the previous accounting report would have no 
impact, given the current report. Hence the shape of the term structure may provide 
some indication of the quality of information assumed by investors. 
6.2. Evidence based on current data and Rationale 
In this section the relation between spreads and accounting variables is going to be 
investigated. Typical ratios (such as profitability, leverage, liquidity, etc. ) which are 
used to predict the financial status of a company are going to be explored. The 
rationale behind this is based on the assumption that a company's financials account 
for more than 45% of the weight given to the overall rating of a company (as per 
research provided by the largest and most recognised rating agencies internationally, 
such as Moody's, S&P, Fitch, to name the most important). The remaining 55% is 
usually a function of macroeconomic and market factors, the nature of the firm's 
industry, its competitive position, as well as subjective factors relative to the 
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company's management and its risk tolerance, its ownership influence etc, which are 
rather difficult to model. Effectively it could be argued that by default, financial ratios 
are expected to explain at a maximum half of the variation in credit spreads (which in 
turn are largely based on the ratings assigned by the rating agencies) 
Assuming that rating agencies take into consideration changes in a company's 
financial position on a timely basis, then any changes should be reflected in the 
company's spreads. Furthermore, assuming that markets price correctly bonds, any 
change in the company's financial position should be reflected in the respective's 
company's spreads on or sometimes before a rating announcement (upgrade, 
downgrade, or no change). In this thesis since we don't have information on the 
timing of rating announcements, it is going to be assumed that spreads are adjusted 
according to rating announcements provided by the rating agencies. 
Consequently, option adjusted spreads provided by Merrill Lynch are going to be the 
dependent variable and accounting variables are going to be the independent variables 
in the equation estimated. The analysis based solely on quarterly data, since most of 
US companies publish updates of their financial position on a quarterly basis. There is 
a concern, however, with respect to the data tested since credit spreads reflect a 
continuous variables, while, by default, accounting ratios are considered to be more 
static or discrete. 
The overall hypothesis tested under this chapter is that changes in credit spreads at 
time t, are affected and explained by changes in the respective company's financial 
information at time t, (t-1), (including the company's current market capitalisation 
and ratios such as cash flow to debt, earnings before interest and tax to interest 
expense, debt to capital employed, etc) 
In particular, the null hypotheses tested under this chapter are the following: 
Ho: Profitability ratios don't explain changes in credit spreads and aren't negatively 
related to them. 
Ho: Leverage ratios don't explain changes in credit spreads and aren't positively 
related to them. 
Ho: Liquidity ratios don't explain changes in credit spreads and aren't negatively 
related to them. 
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Ho: Current Market Capitalisation doesn't explain changes in credit spreads and isn't 
negatively related to them. 
6.2.1. Data and Methodology 
6.2.2. Data Collected 
Data on Spreads 
Under this chapter, data collected on credit spreads include the constituents of the ML 
US High Grade Broad Market index and the US High Yield Master II Index. The 
period covered is from January 1997 until May 2002. Analytical description of the 
qualifying data and the elimination process used is provided in Chapter 3, section 
3.3.1. 
Data on Accounting Factors 
For those companies that made up the constituents of the ML Index, the respective 
Bloomberg tickers were collected and the respective companies' accounting 
information was gathered. This data was taken from Bloomberg and since most of the 
companies report on a quarterly basis, that was the frequency of the data collected. 
For the rest of the thesis when it comes to accounting indicators the following 
abbreviations are going to be used: 
Accounting Factors Abbreviations 
Cash Flow to Debt CFD 
Current Market Capitalisation 
EBIT to Interest Expense 
CMT 
EBIT 
EBIT to total interest expense EBTI 
EBfT-DA to total interest expense EBITDIN 
EBITDA Rer revenue EBDAR 
Return on capital ROC 
Return on common Equity ROE 
Return on Invested Capital ROIC 
Total Debt to EBITDA TDEBDA 
Total Debt to Total Capital DBCP 
The definitions for the ratios used are provide below: 
(a) Cash Flow to Debt, where: 
(Net I Icome) + (Depreciation & Amortisation) + LCh-ange in working capital)+( non cash adiustments 
(Long Tenn debt) + (Current portion of LT debt) + (Newly issued Debt) 
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(b) Current Market capitalisation 
(c ) EBIT to Interest expense, where: 
Eaminjzs before interest & taxes 
Interest Expense 
(d) EBITDA to Interest Expense, where: 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
Interest expense 
(e) EBITDA per revenue, where: 
Eamings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
Sales 
(f) Return on Capital, where: 
Net Income 
(Total Assets) 
- 
(Liabilities) 
(g) Return on Equity, where: 
(Net profit margin) * (asset turnover) (asset /equity) = 
i. e. (net income/sales) * (sales/assets) (assets/equity) 
(h) Return on Invested Capital 
Net Income 
Total Capital (Minority Interest + Share Capital & Premium+Reserves) 
(i) Total Debt to EBITDA, where: 
(Long Term debt) + (Current portion of LT debt) + (Newly issued Debt) 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortisation 
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0) Total Debt to Capital Employed, where: 
(Long Term debt) + (Current portion of LT debt) + (Newly issued Debt) 
Total Capital (Minority Interest + Share Capital & Premium+Reserves) 
Given the academic literature on financial ratios, the intuition would lead to different 
selection of ratios than the one that has been chosen for the purpose of this thesis. The 
rationale behind choosing the above financial ratios instead, has been based on the 
following four points: 
1. The purpose of this thesis is not the use of financial ratios to predict a company's 
failure, but to estimate a functional relation between long-term credit spreads and 
accounting information. 
2. Given recent collapses of big company names (2001 
-2003) it became apparent 
that the most important reasons behind those companies' collapse were the high 
leverage and to another extent, issues relating to their accounting transparency. 
3. This sample contains a number of firms belonging to the non-investment sector. 
Usually companies that are categorised as "high-yield" tend to be smaller 
companies, that are in a growth stage and that tend to have higher capital 
expenditures than their investment grade counterparts. As a result their 
depreciation & amortisation expenses should be taken into consideration seriously 
when trying to estimate this relation, as it hasn't been considered by past studies, 
since none of them has used financial ratios adjusted for depreciation and 
amortisation expenses. 
4. A very important accounting and market variable, that of the company's current 
market capitalisation, has been included in this thesis, as it hasn't been done 
previously. Hopefully, the inclusion of this variable, will be able to capture more 
subtle and fast moving changes in a borrower's conditions. 
6.2.3. Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Variables 
Before proceeding with the required estimation of the relation between credit spreads 
and accounting variables, descriptive statistics of the accounting variables are 
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provided. First descriptive statistics of the ratios used for the analysis are presented 
for the seven rating categories on an individual basis. Tables 6.2 to 6.8. provide 
descriptive statistics for all accounting variables used and for each credit rating 
category. 
As evident, financial ratios are far from being normally distributed as evident from 
their kurtosis, the skewness of distribution and the Jarque bera statistic. In terms of 
volatility of the accounting variables, it is worth noting the following: 
a. The large values of standard deviation associated to the variable of current market 
capitalisation compared to the rest of the accounting variables, is because CMT is 
expressed in actual figures, while we are using ratios for all the other variables. 
b. Another thing worth mentioning is that the volatility of profitability ratios is 
higher, overall in the investment grade categories than the leverage ratios while 
liquidity depicted here by the ratio Of CFD tends to be the less volatile of all. 
c. An unanticipated result is that although we should expect the volatility of the 
majority of ratios to increase with a deterioration in the credit quality, the standard 
deviations don't support this. Instead, we see higher volatiliy in most of the 
variables in the investment grade categories, which tends to decrease in the non- 
investment grade sector, while in some instances there is a significant rise in the c- 
rating category. 
However, the mean values of the respective ratios follow the anticipated pattern per 
rating category. In particular, the mean values of liquidity, profitability ratios and the 
company's current market capitalisation tend to decrease as the credit rating category 
deteriorates. Huge declines in mean values are depicted for the "C" rating category. In 
contrast the mean values for leverage ratios tend to increase as the ratings move from 
investment to non-investment grade, as presented by their total debt to ebitda and debt 
to capital employed ratios. It is worth noting that the mean value of the total debt to 
ebitda ratio instead of increasing in the "C" rating category, it declines, which is 
possibly attributed to the fact that companies assigned a credit rating of "C" face 
difficulties in raising financing from the debt markets, hence the decrease. 
Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Vanables 
- 
AAA Rating, levels 
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A A-Rating 
CFD CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT I EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBD 
A 
Mean 1.20 223,339 39.4,4 42 4 1. ' 2 33.02 41.32 18.84 32.27 8.97 2.29 
Median 1.03 180,141 27.23 21-06 38.69 51-36 38.69 22.33 27.40 9.94 0.69 
Maximum 3.19 572,273 79.72 34.59 152.14 200.47 152.14 30.99 51.78 12.81 8.64 
Minimum 0.10 18,570 10.30 6.64 3.11 4.98 3.11 1 5.15 17.21 1 4.16 0.29 
Std. Dev. 0.94 139,297 28.35 7.68 31-04 40.50 31.04 8.81 9.86 2.73 2.91 
Skewness 0.43 0.43 0.47 
-0.26 1.42 1.48 1.42 
-0.35 0.98 -0.37 1.31 
Kurtosis 2.05 2.58 1.39 2.35 5.99 6.32 5.99 1.77 2.50 1.71 2.97 
jarque-Bera 7 4 14 3 69 81 69 8. 17 9 28 
Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98J 98 98 98 98 
Cro s sections 5 5 5 5 51 5_ 5 5 5 
Table 6.3. Descriptive Statistics ot'Accountinu, Variables 
- 
AA RatinL,. levels 
A-Rating 
CFD CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBD 
A 
Mean 0.89 4o, 294 40.43 24.59 26.45 31 ý)-, 2o. 22 16.20 25.11,1) 11 11 1.65 
Median 0.56 72,953 37.71 2198 11.33 15.64 11.25 14.93 25.99 8.90 1.34 
Maximum 4.75 572,273 84.21 50.02 892.74 1112.18 892.74 41.98 208.06 48.87 56.64 
minimum 
, 
0.00 3,240 6.49 
. 
-7.82 -3.37 -1.13 -3.13 
. 
-12.06 -35.02 -1.81 -60.07 
Std. Dev. 0.93 105,272 18.43 11.87 80.30 99.10 80.33 8.74 16.12 9.87 7.22 
Skewness 2.42 2.51 0.31 0.13 9.31 9.57 9.30 0.16 2.96 3.03 
-1.27 
Kurtosis 8.55 9.61 2.63 2.72 98.32 101.52 98.23 3.96 42.37 11.87 62.84 
jarque-Bera 946 1,201 9 3 164,660 
1 
75,741 
164,367 
18 
27,669 
2,014 62,631 
Probability 0 01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 
419 419 419 419 419 419 
419 
419 
419 
419 419 
Cross 
sections 22 22 22 22 
22 22 
22 22 22 22 22 
'Fable 6.4. f)cscrit)ti\e Stati, ýIics ofAccountim! Variables 
-A RatinL,. levels 
-Rating I 
CFD CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT I EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBD 
A 
Mean 0,710 31,1(, 4 41 So 21 
_74 6 1-, q0 SAI lo"I 0.00 1(,. o4 2.17; T4 
cdm 
-n 
- 
0.3(1 13,710 4 18 5 19 0t) 5.58 8.2-5 5.35 11.07 6.35 16.79 1.80 
Kfa  
ximwn 2.83 208,371 81.29 83.88 115-00 188.00 115.00 113.95 16.96 46.50 37.68 
Nurumum 
1 -0.02 
0 0.25 
. 
-8.00 -19.87 -1.99 -19.87 -18.19 -2.48 -24.74 0.21 
Std. Dev. 0.42 40,713 14.48 13.63 12.24 17.01 11.96 9.11 3.18 12.10 2.25 
Skewness 2.72 2.17 
-0.30 1.71 3.93 5.78 4.07 3.40 0.42 
-0.07 15.85 
Kurtosis 1271 7.35 3.51 7.92 26.11 49.70 28.11 44.79 3.27 3.44 164.79 
jarque-Bera 
(in '000s) 5.8 1.8 0.029 1.7 28.7 111.6 33.6 86.4 0.037 0.010 1,285 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
_ _0.00 
0.00 
1 0. oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 
1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 
1,158 1,158 
1,158 
1,158 
Eross 
sections 54 '54 54 '54 
54 54 
154 54 54 
-54 54 
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Table 6.5. DescriDtive Statistics of Accountine Variables 
- 
BBR Ratinc, Ievek 
B B-Rating 
CFD CMT DHCP EBDAR EBIT EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBD 
A 
Mcall 038 13,149 47.63 2o. 31 5.31 8.15 4.84 8AS 7,, (, 2 12.0-1 _ 310 
-ýiedian 0.25 6,278 45.88 15.17 3.49 5.69 3.39 7.82 4.88 11.63 2.52 
Maximum 3.20 120,147 95.19 79.99 133.93 162.13 90.50 42.18 23.63 69.16 68.64 
Minimum 
-0.44 354 0.07 -29.09 -18.34 -8.12 -18.34 -17.50. -7.21 
. 
-62.86 -89.16 
Std. Dev. 0.40 19,486 
116.11 
16.34 8.62 10.15 6.96 7.08 3.54 14.81 5.18 
Skewness 2.51 3.04 0.55 1.45 6.86 7.62 5.26 0.28 1.11 
-0.37 -2.95 
Kurtosis 12.25 13.29 3.54 5.32 82.01 91.74 52.36 4.55 5.76 6.89 161.71 
jarque-Bera 
(in '000s) 1 11.4 14.8 0.155 , 1.430 667.2 841.1 264.2 0.281 1.3 1.7 2,616 
Probabilitv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 
, 
0.00 0.00 
Observations 
2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 249 2490 2 90 2490 
Cross 
sections 
118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
'Fable 6.6. Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Variables 
- 
BB Ratinu. levels 
B-Rating 
CFD CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBD 
A 
o. 24 4,288 53.62 18.22 4.42 4.83 2.73 5.34 4. 
-15 6.87, 
- 3.91 
Kiedian 0.17 1,725 53.40 13.50 2.24 3.48 2.13 6.20 4.02 7.00 3.44 
Kiaximum 2.95 198,462 99.35 80.66 98.84 46.15 36.72 51.24 26.70 607.27 150.24 
Minimum 
-0.44 118 6.08 1 -68.57 -84.00 -79.20 -84.00, -142.80 -21.63 , -262.50 -60.07 
Std. Dev. 0.33 9,663 16.62 17.23 11.49 7.20 6.62 1 10.83 3.61 39.81 8.18 
Skewness 3.61 10 
-0.40 1.35 2.97 
-1.04 -3.66 -3.85 0.77 6.89 9.89 
Kurtosis 22.99 173 3.42 6.51 33.37 44.35 68.65 49.03 11.53 115.73 196.46 
jarqUe-Bera 
(in '000s) 31.3 2,040 0.057 
1.3 
66.3 1 118.7 302.3 
150.9 
5.2 893.7 2,620 
Proý 0.00 0.00 0.00 
. 
0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o. 00 
- 
Observations 
1663 1663 1663 1663 1663 1663 
I 
1663 1663 1663 1663 1663 
ross 
sections 
112 112 112 112 112 112 1 112 112 112 112 - 112 
Table 6.7.1)cscripti\, c Statistics of Accounting Variables 13 Rating, levels 
B-R ting 
CFD 
- 
CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT 
- 
EBITDIN EBTI ROC ROE IZOIC TDEBDA' 
Mean F)21 1,567 61.31) 20.147 39 3.34 1.77 5.02 4.06 2.0-1 7.89 
Median 0.13 587 61.82 15-99 1.52 2.71 1.49 5.06 3.90 3.44 4.09 
Maximum 3.37 189,888 99.13 88.25 161.47 48.88 34.65 70.21 29.48 137.20 500.98 
Minimum 
-0.89 5 13.08 -195.10 -26.27 
1 
-22.81 -25.34 -72.18 -88.22 - 
186.47 
-30.88 
-Dev. 0.36 7,953 15.63 24.02 9.04 4.67 
- 
3.75 11.53 4.88 33.47 35.90 
Skewness 5.22 20 
-0.25 -0.91 11-50 378 1.39 
-0.68 -9-44 -0-64 -26.24 Zu-rtosis 40.37 459 3.05 14-96 175.07 36.15 26.22 12.14 187.95 8.49 689.33 
jarque- 
Bera( 000s 
130.1 18.1 0.021 12.6 2.6 100.4 47.2 7.3 2.9 2.7 40.9 
Ilrobability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observatio 
ns 
2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 2074 
Cross 
sections 
127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
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Tshle 6-R. Descrintive Statistics of Accounting Variahles 
-C Rnfincr levek. 
C-Rating CFD CMT DBCP EBDAR EBIT J EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC TDEBDA 
Mean 0.06 1,706 6-5.28 
-10.7 -0.23 1.18 -0.22 -3.12 -1.45 -29.45 4.4, S 
Median 0.06 199 65.68 9.61 0.05 1.21 0.05 
-1.08 1.51 -14.34 5.63 Kia-ximum 0.93 36,837 98.68 86.28 9.00 9.71 7.09 99.05 12.49 148.15 180.07- 
Minimum 
-0.66 11 24.66 1 450 -7.03 -5.22 1 -6.95 -65.58 1 -125.48 -264.44 1 -174.21 
Std. Dev. 0.17 5,948 17.11 7240.07 1.88 1.79 1 1.80 13.09 18.00 49.87 31.99 
Skewness 0.75 5 
-0.25 -15-02 -0.45 0.26 
-0.63 0.89 -5.76 -0.93 0.18 
Kurtosis 7.87 24 2.56 226.98 6.91 6.02 5.64 21-06 36.80 6.48 17.32 
Jarque- 
Bera 
745 15090 13 1466154 461 270 245 9451 36609 
I 
448 5889 
I 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observatio 
LS 
689-00 689.00 689.00 689-00 689-00 689.00 689.00 689.00 689.00 689.00 689.00 
- Cross 
pections I 
45.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 45-00 
I 
45.00 I 45.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 
6.2.4. Methodology 
once analytical description of data has been provided, the next step was to test the 
variables for correlations. Firstly we tested which of the independent variables tend to 
be more correlated with credit spreads (dependent) in order to get an initial idea of 
which are the variables expected to explain mostly changes in credit spreads. 
Table 6.8. presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables considered. As 
evident, current market capitalisation is the most highly correlated variable with credit 
spreads with a strong negative relation. Then follows the return on capital employed 
and the EBIT coverage ratios, which are both negatively related to credit spreads. 
Leverage ratios on the other hand are positively correlated to changes in credit 
spreads, consistent with the structural approach. 
Tnhh- 6 R- Correlation amone Chanizes in Credit qnrendý, A7 Aooniintina VnrýnWýc 
- 
SPREADS 
0- S 1 
CFD 
-0.004 
CMT 
-0.171 
DBCP 0.003 
EBDAR 
-0.004 
EBIT 
-0.005 
TDEBDA 0.004 
EBITniN 
-0.005 
EBTI 
-0.004 
ROC 
-0.012 
ROE 
-0.004 
ROIC 
-0.013 
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The next level of correlation tested was between independent variables. Financial 
ratios tend to be highly intercorrelated with each other. This means of course that 
careful selection must be carried out when deten-nining which financial ratios should 
be used in the analysis. Table 6.9. shows the correlations between the independent 
variables. 
T. qhle, 6 9- Correlation among the Indenendent 
- 
Clinncr. 
-c in 
EBDAR EBIT EBITDI 
N 
EBTI ROC ROE ROIC CFD CMT TDEBD 
A 
DBCP 
EBDAR 1.00 
EBIT 
- 
0.00 1.00 
CBITDIN 0.73 0.00 1.00 
EBTI 0.01 1.001 0.01 1.001 
ROC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ROE 0.96 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.00 1.00 
ROIC 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.02 0.00 1.00 
CFD 
-- -- 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.01 
-0.01 0.00 1.00 FM T 0.00 0.01 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
ITDEBDAI 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.001 0,001 0.001 1.00 - 
I DBCP 1 0.021 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.00, 0.011 0-011 o-oo- T 0.001 0.00 
When testing for correlations amongst the independent (accounting) variables, it was 
observed that the variables of EBITDIN & EBDAR 
, 
ROE & EBDAR 
, 
ROE & 
EBITDIN, EBTI & EBIT should not be regressed on a parallel basis against changes 
in credit spreads since they exhibit correlations of 0.73,0.96 
, 
0.73 and 1.00 
respectively. 
In the cases of multicollinearity being present, (in this instance the above accounting 
variables have values of above +0.70) the usual remedy is to drop one of the 
independent variables that are strongly correlated and recompute the regression 
equation. In this instance it means that when running the regressions the combination 
of the above variables will provide spurious results and therefore regressions 
including the above variables should only be run on an individual basis. 
It should be noted that the size of the firm was being introduced in this study by 
including the variable of the company's current market capitalisation. 
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Once changes in spreads and accounting ratios have been computed, the effort is 
focused in estimating the coefficients of the following regression: 
Equation 6.1. 
ASpreads, = 
c +P, "(AProfitabifityit 
... 
t-j +P, "(ALiquidityi,..., t. j +P3*(ACMTi4,... t. j +P, *(ALeveragej,... j 
+6it 
Where Aspreads is the changes in credit spreads from time (t-1) to time t, 
AProfitability represent the change in profitability ratios from time (t-1) to t, 
ALiquidity represent the change in liquidity ratios from time (t-1) to t, ACMT 
Represnet the change in the current market capitalisation from time (t-1) to time t and 
ALeverage is the change in the leverage ratios from time (t-1) to t. A constant term in 
the relation is being introduced, since there are factors not included in the independent 
variables that possible influence the dependent variables. This intercept is assumed to 
be constant for all pool members, cit =c 
Data has been arranged in the following way. Firstly, pool objects have been created, 
with each pool including as cross sectional identifiers the respective rating category's 
companies. Next ratios have been classified in three classes, namely profitability 
(including Ebitda ratios, ROE, ROIC, etc), leverage ratios (including debt to capital 
employed and total debt to Ebitda), long term liquidity ratios (cash flow to debt) and 
the current market capitalisation which was used as a proxy for the company's size. 
A number of cross sectional regressions have been performed in order to estimate the 
coefficients of the equation 6.1. Firstly, cross sectional regressions of the different 
ratio categories (profitability, liquidity, leverage, size) were run both for investment 
and non-investment grade categories, and then changes of the most influential ratios 
against changes in spreads were tested. 
Firstly the different ratio categories were examined against the different rating 
categories, i. e. separate groups including profitability, liquidity, leverage ratios and 
the current market capitalisation were being created in Eviews and each category was 
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being regressed against pool groups which contained credit spreads of the different 
rating categories. 
Before proceeding with the regression results it should be noted that the classical 
regression model can't be used, due to the cross sectional nature of data. Therefore, 
we will proceed by estimating the coefficients using two different methods for 
estimating the weights of the coefficients, since we have heteroscedasticity of 
unknown form, i. e. the GLS and the SUR method and then compare the results. 
(Analytical description of the calculation of the weighted versions of our pooled 
regressions is provided in Appendix 4A) 
Before proceeding, it should also be made clear, that when estimating the coefficients 
for the relations with the use of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, subsets of the 
initial data were tested, since a prerequisite for using the SUR methodology, is that 
the number of time series is equal to the number of cross sections used. Eviews may 
be unable to compute estimates for the model when there is a large number of cross 
sections or a small number of time periods. The average number of periods used in 
estimation must be at least as large as the number of cross section units. Even if there 
is a sufficient number of observations, the estimated residual correlation matrix must 
also be non-singular. If either condition is violated then we get an error message 67 
. 
Clearly, this condition is violated since in our data sample we have a limited number 
of time series observations and a large number of cross sections identifiers per pool. 
Consequently, data has been tested on two levels. 
a. based on the total sample of data, using a common constant for all pool members 
and the cross section weights methodology whites correction for 
hetersocedasticity and 
b. based on a sub group of the initial data estimated with the use of both GLS and 
SLJR methodologies. 
67 Please refer to "Help Topics in Eviews 4,1 " and the accompanying Technical Discussion 
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6.2.5. Empirical results based on different group of ratios and univariate analysis 
In this section, ratios have been categorised under three groups and cross sectional 
regressions are run on the those different groups. The hypothesis tested is that there is 
a negative relation between profitability ratios and credit spread changes. More 
specifically, 
(a) Group A includes profitability ratios. More specifically the ratios included and 
hypotheses tested are: 
Ebitda 
-per 
Revenue: when the ratio increases (usually costs decrease and therefore 
earnings at the ebitda level increase) spreads are expected to tighten hence the 
negative expected sign. 
Ebit to Interest Expense : when the ratio increases (either earnings increase or the cost 
of debt decreases) spreads are also expected to narrow. In other words, when interest 
payments are better covered by the level of profits, creditworthiness improves, and 
credit spreads tighten. 
Ebit to Total Interest Expense: this ratio is slightly differentiated than the previous 
one in that it also considers interest revenue (i. e. total interest expense = interest 
income 
- 
interest expense). Once again the overall effect to credit spread is the same, 
when the ratio increases spreads are expected to come in. 
Ebitda to total Interest ExRense: the only differentiation of this ratio compared to the 
previous one, is that it contemplates depreciation and amortisation expense to ebit, 
expenses which are particularly important once non-investment grade companies are 
looked at. Once again, its influence on credit spreads is the same, i. e. when this ratio 
increases, which means that the company's profitability improve, spreads are 
expected to tighten. 
i. e. the ratio of a company's profit as a percentage of the capital 
employed. it is usually one of the most frequently used ratios for assessing the 
performance of organisations. An increase in this ratio signifies an improvement in 
the company's profitability and consequently credit spreads are expected to tighten. 
Return on invested Caital: a company's income as a percentage of its invested 
capital. The expected sign of this ratio coefficient relative to credit spreads is also 
expected to be negative. 
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Return on EgIdIL i. e. the ratio of a company's net income as a percentage of its 
equity capital. Again there is an inverse relation between this ratio and credit spreads, 
which explains the negative sign of the coefficient. 
Due to multicollineriry problems, as described in section 6.2.4., when looking at 
profitability ratios on a parallel basis only EBDAR, EBIT and ROC will be considered 
for the different rating categories: 
Table 6.10 presents regression results based on cross sectional regressions using a 
common intercept and the GLS method. Results reported in the following table are 
based on the total sample of 674 companies, where the dependent variable are the 
changes in credit spreads. 
l', ihie 6.10. lrot-itabilitý Ratios 
Profitability All Rating Categories 
Ratios 
Exp. Coef p- Stand F-Stat Total R-' 
Sign value value Error Panel 
Obs. 
EBITDA per 
- -1.02 0.09 0.00 5.89(0.09) 7,456 0.01- 
Revenue (EBDAR) 0.03 
TB-IT to Interest 
- -0.15 1 0.17 0.00 
Expense (EBIT) 0.00 
-'Feturn on Capital 
- -1-56 0.15 0.00 
(IMC) 2.1-1 
Profitability -- Investment Grade Including B13B 
Ratios 
Exp. Coef t- p- Stand. F-Stat Total W, 
Sign value value Error Panel 
Obs. 
EBITDA per 
- -0.45 0.08 0.00 1.65 2,981 0.0 1 
Revenue (EBDAR) 0.00 (0.17) 
EBIT to Interest 
- -2.35 0.00 
Expense (EBIT) 0.01 
Return on Capital 
- -0.37 0.09 0.00 
(ROC) 0.00 
Profitability Investment Grade Excluding 111311 
Ratios 
LxP COct t- p- Stand. I. 
-Stat I Otal R., Sign value value Error Panel 
Obs 
EBITDA per 
- -0.45 0.08 0.00 1.58 1,179 0.02 
Revenue (EBDAR) 0.00 (0.18) 
EBIT to Interest 
- -2.35 0.01 0.00 
Expense (EBIT) 0.01 
Return on Capital - -0.37 0.08 0.00 
(ROC) 0.00 
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Profitability Non 
- 
Investment Grade Including BBB 
Ratios 
FXp COct' t- p- Stand. I-Stat I Otal R, 
Sign value value Error Panel 
Obs 
EBITDA per 
- -0.47 0.11 0.00 3.29(0.07) 4,776 0.01 
Revenue (EBDAR) 0.00 
- 
_ EBIT to Interest 0.00 1.34 0.09 0.00 
Expense (EBIT) 
Return on Capital 
- -0.24 0.12 0.00 
(ROC) 0.00 
Profitability Non 
- 
Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
Ratios 
1, Xp Coct, t- p- stal)(11"I I Or F-Stat I Otal IZ2 
Sign value value Panel 
Obs 
EBITDA per 
- -0.48 0.06 0.00 1.25(0.05) 2,980 0.01 
Revenue (EBDAR) 0.00 
-FBIT to Interest 0.02 1.98 0.04 0.01 
Expense (EBIT) 
-'Fetum 
on Capital 
- -0.17 0.06 0.00 
(ROC) 6. 23 
When all data was tested, the negative relation between accounting ratios and credit 
spreads is supported at the 90% confidence level, with the most significant 
coefficients presented for the Ebit to interest expense ratio, supported by the relatively 
higher t-statistics for the investment grade sample. The negative relation Of EBIT to 
interest expense ratio to credit spreads was not supported given the result presented 
from non-investment grade companies. This is either due to the fact that credit spreads 
for non-investment grade companies aren't driven by the particular ratio or that non- 
investment grade companies' financials present peculiarities which can't be depicted 
with the use of that ratio. 
Due to problems that arose with the sign of the EBIT ratio and credit spreads and the 
zero R2 obtained from the regressions between profitability ratios and credit spread 
changes, the same hypotheses have been tested on a fraction of the original set of 
data. Tables 6.11 
- 
6.13, present results based on a much smaller number of randomly 
selected companies, based on the cross section weights and the SUR methodology. In 
these tests lagged values of the profitability ratios are also considered, whose results 
are provided in the following tables. It should be noted though, that values of the 
same ratios have been regressed at time t, but since the lagged values of the 
profitability ratios provided most statistically significant results, we only report the 
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latter ones. It should also be made clear that when we are referring to (minus I lag) 
we effectively mean one quarter before, and so on. For accounting variables, it makes 
sense to use previous quarter's information, since credit spreads may not adjust 
promptly to the new information provided by a company's financial accounts. 
Tnhle 6.11. Profitabilitv Ratios (sub-arour) of initial data) 
t] os All Rating Categories 
Cross Section Weights SUR 
Exp 
Sign 
Coef t- 
value 
p- 
value 
f-stat 
_ 
R2 Exp 
Si n 
Coef I t- 
value 
p- 
value 
f-stat R2 
Constant 0.071 5.52 0.00 1.22 _ 0.01% 0.066 3.38 0.00 1.18 0.00% 
EBDAR 
(- 1) - 
- 
0.004 
-2.45 0.01 
(0.00) 
- - 
0.003 
-1.76 
Fq- 0. (0.00) 
-TB--I T(- 2) 
- 
0,002 
-2.29 0.02 - 
0.004 
-1.35 
1 
0.06 
Q- 11) 
ý7- 
- - 
0.004 
-3.14 0.001 - - 
0.003 
2.0 0.75 
'rnklt- 0 11 llrol-itabilitv Ratios (sub-ý-Yroup ofinitial data) 
Ratios Investment Grade 
Cross Section Weights SIIR 
- 
- Exp - 
- 
value p- f-stat 2 R Exp Coef t- p- f-stat R-' 
. 
Sig 
7 
valu valu valu 
n e Sig c c 
n 
-'Fo-nstant 0.07 6.35 0.0 2.85 0.02% 0.07 4.57 0.0 1.63 0.01% 
6 (0.00) (0.0()) 
EBDAR(- 
- -7.64 0.0 -0.00 - 0.0 
0 0 
.0 3.94 5 
-TB- -IT(- 2) 
- -2.71 0.0 -0.011 - 0,0 
0 
.01 2.76 
1 
7 
- - OC(- 0.00 3.73 0.0 
r 
0.001 2.08 1 0.03 
6 11 Profitabilitv Ratios (sub-izrout) of initial data) 
Ratios Non-investment Grade 
Cross Section Weights 
_ 
SUR 
Exp. Coef t- P- T; ý Exp. Coef t- P- f-stat R 
Sign value value 
ý 
Sign value value 
0.0 69 2.66 0.00 165.4 3% 0.072 2.266 0.02 2.87 0.007/0- 
(0.00) (0.00) 
EBDAR 
- - 
- 
1.45 0.08 
- - 
0.033 
LL 0.020 0.013 1.096 
_ 
_ EBIT(- 
- 
-8.70 0.00 1 1 0.068 
2) 0.00 0.000 1.411 
1 
- 
1 
-3-18 0.00 1 1- I- T_ 1 0.093 
0.00 I 1- 1 0 0. 0 1 07; .  1 
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The results provided from the subset of data, support the negative relation between 
profitability ratios and credit spreads both in investment and non-investment grade 
bands. However, not all of the results are significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Coefficients estimated by the cross section weights method are significant at the 95% 
confidence level compared to those estimated by the SUR method, which are 
significant at the 90% level. In particular, there is a negative relation between credit 
spreads and the profit margin ratio, as defined by the Ebdar ratio. The ratio of Ebit to 
interest expense, which is one of the most important ratios for determining a 
company's credit profile is negatively related to changes in credit spreads. So is the 
Return on Capital ratio. Statistical results provided though, don't give any more 
insight on whether changes in profitability ratios affect mostly non-investment grade 
companies, nor do they have any power as explanatory variables. (R 2s are almost 0). 
The fact that similar results are reported from both methods of cross sectional 
analysis, provides more confidence as to the fact that the low R2s are likely due to a 
systematic effect rather than noisy data. 
From one point of view, the low explanatory power of profitability variables on credit 
spread changes make sense, since bond holders are not that interested in the 
profitability of a company as they are in its leverage. On the other hand it can also be 
argued that increased profitability increases the interest coverage ability of a 
company, and therefore should make bond investors more confident. However, results 
don't affirm this second argument. 
(b) Next Group B, was tested, which included long term leverage ratios. A positive 
relation is expected to exist among leverage ratios and changes in credit spreads, as 
depicted by the positive expected sign. Consistent with the structural framework, 
default is triggered when the leverage ratio approaches unity. Hence, it is clear that 
credit spreads are expected to increase with leverage. In particular, the hypotheses 
tested are: 
Debt to capital employed: as this ratio increases (the respective's company debt 
increases or capital decreases) spreads are expected to widen. 
Total )ebt to Ebitda: as this ratio increase (or the company's debt increases or 
EBITDA decreases), credit spreads are expected to widen. 
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T, qhle 6.14. Leveraize Ratios based on GLS 
Leverage All Rating Categories 
FXP 
Sign 
Coet, t-x alUe P- 
value 
S. F. R-, I, 
-stat No of' 
Obs 
Constant 0.05 19.29 0.00 0.05, - 1% 9.88 
(0.00) 
5,485 
Debt to Capital Employed + 0.02 1.55 0.11 1 0.01 
Total Debt to LBITDA 1 
.51 18.96 0.00 1 0.00 
Leverage Investment Grade Including BB B 
Exp 
Sign 
coet, t-value p-value S. E. R f-stat No of 
Obs 
Constant 0.05 9.7 0.00 0.00 0% 0.16 
0 02 
2,956 
Debt to Capital Employed + 0.01 1.39 0.09 
11 
0.00 
( 
. 
) 
-Total Debt to EBITDA + 1 0.031 
. 
2.67 1 0.00 1 0.0-d 
Leverage Investment Grade Excludi g BB B 
Exp 
Sign 
Coef t-value p-value Stan 
d. 
Error 
R2 I-stat No of' 
Obs 
Constant 0.05 7.98 0.00 0.00 0% 0.21 
(0.25) 
1,863 
Debt to Capital Employed + 0.00 0.59 0.09 1 0.00 
Total Debt to Ebitda + 0.00 0.3 8- F 0.13 1 0.01 1 
Leverage Non 
- 
Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
I- Xp 
Sign 
Coct, t-ValUe I)-% ALIC S. 11". R, 1-slat No of' 
Obs 
onstant 0.05 11.6 0.00 0.00 0% 0.13 
(0.04) 
2,960 
Debt to Capital Employed + 0.02 0.95 1 0.33 1 0.01 
Total Debt to EBITDA t 1.55 1 1.3 1 0.00 1 0.00 
Leverage Non 
- 
Investment Grad e Incl ding BBB 
Exp 
Sign 
Coef t-\ alue p-value S. E. R-, t-stat No of 
Obs 
Constant 0.05 13.4 0.00 0.00 0% 0.28 
(0 00 
4,237 
Debt to Capital Employed + 0.03 
- 
1.19 0 
. 
20 0.01 . 
) 
Total Debt to EBITDA 7 7 
. 
56 11.5 0.00 1 0.00 
As presented in table 6.14., when all companies from the broad rating categories are 
examined, the positive relation between leverage ratios and credit spreads is 
confirmed for both debt to capital employed and total debt to ebitda. The most 
significant coefficients are those estimated for the non-investment grade category for 
the total debt to ebitda ratio with highly significant t- values, while the debt to capital 
employed ratio is not statistically significant in the non-investment grade category 
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with p-value of 0.33 and 0.20 for high yield companies excluding and including BBB 
respectively 
. 
It is worth noting that the fact that depreciation and amortisation was 
also considered for the calculation of the total debt to ebitda ratio explains the fact 
that more significant coefficients were obtained for the non-investment grade category 
compared to the investment grade one. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
depreciation and amortisation expenses tend to be highly significant for companies 
which are in a growth stage (usually companies rated below BBB). 
Due to the significantly high t-statistics obtained when regressions are assessed with 
the GLS method using estimated cross sectional residual variances, regression 
coefficients have been re-estimated with the SUR method (i. e. using estimated cross- 
section residual covariance matrix), in order to compare results and draw more 
accurate conclusions on the relation we are estimating. 
Using a subset of the original data, more regressions were run, whose results are 
presented in tables 6.15-6.17. Although the positive relation between the leverage 
ratio and credit spreads is consistent with the findings based on the cross section 
weights method, it seems that the coefficient of debt to capital employed is more 
significant. This is not to say that the coefficient of the total debt to ebitda ratio isn't 
important as supported by the following results. It is worth noting though, that the t- 
value of the debt to capital employed ratio is very significant for the investment grade 
category, compared to the second leverage ratio that considers depreciation and 
amortisation expenses. 
Tnhle 6.15. Leverage Ratios (sub group of data) 
Ratios All Rating Categories 
SUR 
- Exp 
Sign 
Coýf t-value p-value W f-stat Total 
Panel Obs 
Constant 0.051 2.995 0.002 1 IYO 15.54 869 
Debt to Capital 
Em loyed 
+ 
- 
0.327 
- 
6.560 
II 
0.000 (0.00) 
-Total Debt to EBITDA + 
ýO 
0 45 1 3.856 1 0.000  
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Table 6.16. Leverage Ratios(sub group of data) 
Ratios Investment Grade 
SUR 
Expecte 
d Sign 
Coeffici 
ent 
t-value p-value R2 f-stat I Total 
Panel Obs 
Constant 0.088 6.721 0.000 2% 1.76 574 
Debt to Capital 
Employed 
+ 
I 
0.812 17.15 
I 
0.000 
I 
---- 
(0.00) 
otal Debt to EBITDA +1 0.096 1 4.245 
I 
1 0.000 
Table 6.17. Levcrage Ratios(sub group of data) 
Ratios Non Investment Grade 
SUR 
Exp 
Sign 
Coeff 
icient 
t-value p-value R2 f-stat Total 
Panel 
Obs 
Constant 0.077 3.770 0.000 60% 89.5 994 
Debt to Capital 
Employed 
+ 0.089 6.523 0.000 (0.00) 
Totýl ýebt to EBITDA + 0.075 1 3.989 1 0.000 
(c) Group C, involves looking at how the liquidity position of the company, as this is 
reflected in its cash flow to debt ratio affects credit spreads. The company's liquidity 
position here, is reflected by the Cash Flow to Debt ratio. As this ratio increases 
(either the company's cash flow increases or debt decreases) spreads are expected to 
tighten. 
Table 6.1 S. Liquidity Ratio 
LT All Rating Categories 
Liquidity 
Exp Coef t- p- StandError I 
-stat No of' R2 
Sign value value Obs 
Cash Flow to 
-0.03 -0.32 0.09 0.00 89.70 6,260 0.01 
Debt I , I I 
LT Investment Grade Including BBB 
LiQuidity 
FXp Coetticient t- p- Stand. No of' 7 R 
Sign value value Error Obs 
Cash Flow to 0.00 
-0.53 0.08 0.00 0.45 3.753 0.00 
Debt 
LT Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
Liquidity 
E xp Coef t- p- Stand. I-stat No of R- 
Sign value value Error Obs 
Cash Flow to 
-0.08 -0.58 0.106 0.00 0.31 1.424 0.00 
Debt I I 1 
(0.00) 
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LT Non 
- 
Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
Liquidity__ 
Exp Coet, t- p- Stand. f-stat No of' R2 
Sign value value Error Obs 
Cash Flow to 
-0.03 -0.08 0.09 0.00 0.87 3.441 0.00 
Debt 1 (0.00) 
LT Non 
- 
Investment Grade Including BBB 
Liquidity 
Exp Coef t- p- Stand. f-stat No of' R2 
Sign value value Error Obs 
Cash Flow to 
-0.05 -0.35 0.08 0.00 0.92 5.987 ()0 
. 
0  
Debt (0.00) 
Results provided in table 6.18, are based on the total number of data and the cross 
section weight method, confirm the negative relation between credit spreads and the 
cash flow to debt ratio. Coefficients of cash flow to debt are not significantly different 
from zero, although statistically significant at the 90% level of significance. Financial 
wise, this is not an anticipated result, as this ratio is presenting the company's 
liquidity position and we would expect more significant coefficients. The cash flow to 
debt ratio was also regressed against changes in credit spreads, under the SUR 
method, on a sub-set of the original data. Results are presented in table 6.19. 
(-, I () I muiditv Ratio (subLyroUD of data) SUR McIllod 
Ratios All Rating Cate gories 
Exp 
Sign 
I Coefficient t-value p-valuc I-stat No ofobs R 
Cons wnt 0.074 4.975 0.000 0.15(0.00) 729 0% 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.000 -3.424 0.000 
Investment Grade 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value p-valuc I. 
-slat No ofobs 
IZ2 
Constant 0.081 5.319 0.000 0.08(0.00) 395 00/o 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.027 -5.097 0.000 
Non- Investment Grade 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value p-value f-stat No ofobs R 
Constant 0.065 2.398 0.01 0.25(0.00) 486 01YO 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.021 -1.890 0.05 
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Coefficients are more significant than those estimated with the method of cross 
section weights and are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Higher t- 
statistics were obtained for investment grade companies compared to the high yield 
ones. But even if results obtained are statistically significant, economic wise 
contradict theory and intuition. As proposed by other studieS18 the performance of 
cash (as reflected in the cash flow) is expected to be a better predictor than traditional 
liquidity ratios such as the current or the quick ratio, but results don't support this. 
(d) The last variable tested, was the current market capitalisation, which was used as a 
proxy for firm size. The estimated sign is negative, since it is expected that when a 
company's market capitalisation increases, changes in credit spreads are expected to 
tighten. An increase in a company's size is usually a good sign from the credit risk 
analysis point of view, especially if it is organically driven. The only time that an 
increase in a company's market capitalisation can be positively related to credit 
spreads is if it is the outcome of a debt financed acquisition or a merger, which in 
many instances won't be well perceived by bond investors. 
Results presented in table 6.20., are based on GLS method for estimating the 
coefficients. Compared to results from the previous three groups of accounting ratios, 
the variable of a company's current market capitalisation doesn't only support 
strongly the negative relation between changes in spreads and a company's 
capitalisation but also explains one third of the variation in credit spreads in the non- 
investment grade band. All results are statistically and economically significant, at the 
95% level of significance. 
Table 6.20. CUtTent Market Capitallsation 
TM--T All R ting Categ ries 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value p-value Stand. Error f-stat No ofObs R 
CMT 
-0.27 700.70(0.00) 3,607 10. Yý,, 
Investment Grade Including BBB 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient I t-value P-\ I I-Stat No ofObs R I 
CMT 
- -0.13 -8.23 
1 0.00 0.01 74.43(0.00) 1,629 49/o 
68 W. H. Beaver, "Alternative Accounting Measures as predictors of failure", The Accounting Review, 
1968 
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Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value I p-value I Stand. Error I f-stat I No ofObs I R 
-FN-l T 
-0.16 -4. S9 1 0.0(, ) 1 0.03 1 4 1.80 (0.00) 1 565 6'Xý 
Non 
- 
Investment Grade Including BBB 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-value P-value I Stand. Error I f-stat II No of Obs I 1ý7 
C "1 
-0.28 -18.90 1 OMO 1 0.01 1 657.54(0.00) 1 3,042 171), ý. 
Non 
- 
Investment Grade Excluding BBB 
Exp 
Sign 
Coefficient t-valuc P-\alLlc Stand. Frim, I t. 
-Stal No ot'Obs 
Mm7ýT7 
- 
-0.36 -21.90 0.00 1 0.01 1,172(0.00) 1,978 
Table 6.21, presents the results from the regressions between the variable of the 
current market capitalisation and credit spreads based on the SUR method of 
estimating coefficients. Strongly statistically and economically significant results are 
also reported for the variable of the company's current market capitalisation. The 
negative relation is supported for all rating categories with very significant 
coefficients assigned to all rating levels. Coefficients based on the SUR method 
although statistically significant financial wise are not as significant compared to the 
method of cross section weights which yields higher coefficients and accompanying t- 
values. 
Tnblo 6.2 1. Current Market capital Isat)011(SL'b-w-ouo ot'data), St IR nictliod 
Ratios All Rating Categories 
kXP. 
Sign 
oc I'l ICicIIt 1-\ alue P-vahlc I, 
-slat No ot'Obs R 
Constant 0.044 9.22 0.00 18.48 5% 
CMT 
-0.651 -13.25 0.00 (0.00) 582 
Investment Grade 
Constant 
Exp. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
0.018 
t-vaILIC 
2.055 
p-value 
0.00 
f-stat 
9.24 
No ofObs 
294 
R2 
3% 
CMT 
-0.566 -8.745 0.00 
Non- Investment Grade 
Exp. 
Sign 
Coct , 11clent t-\ UILIC P-vallie I-slat No of Obs R 
- Constant 0.058 3.667 0.00 15.33 347 9% 
CMT 
-0.586 -8.980 0.00 (0.00) 
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From the results presented above, one can easily derive that the most statistically and 
economically significant coefficient is that of the current market capitalisation and the 
leverage ratios. The variable of the current market capitalisation, hasn't been 
considered in other studies, although apparently is one of the most significant variable 
in explaining changes in credit spreads, probably because as aforementioned is 
considered to be more comparable to credit spreads, in the sense that is considered 
more like a continuous variable. 
It should be noted that the adjusted R 2S obtained have been surprisingly low, but this 
is rather rational since: 
a. Financial ratios have been regressed on an individual basis, which by default isn't 
expected to provide much support for explaining the credit spread movements, 
and 
b. If we consider that other studies, that try to predict credit ratings with the use of 
accounting ratios, can explain at best no more than half of the variation in credit 
ratings, it explains why is even harder to explain this variation when modelling 
credit spreads, i. e. modelling a continuous variable with the use of a discrete 
variable. 
6.2.6. Results based on different group of ratios against individual rating 
categories 
Results presented above, are not only based on ratio groups but also on rating groups. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to consider the relevance of the different ratio 
groups, once the broad rating categories are broken down to their constituents. In 
other words, a set of cross sectional regressions were performed, for the seven distinct 
rating categories. Table 6.22. shows the results of these regressions based on the 
method of cross section weights. For simplicity reasons, only the adjusted R2s are 
presented in the table. The statistical significance of the results is also provided. 
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Table 6.22. Results based on GLS Method 
eported R 
2S Profitability 
Ratios 
Current Market 
Capitalisation 
Leverage Ratios CFD ratio 
(1, iquidity) 
AAA 2", o*_ 
__ 
131, l, '0** 21ýý, * 
AA 1 %* 17%*** 
A 0%* 5%*** 
BBB 0%* 5%*** 0%* 00/0* 
BB 1%* 1()0/, *** 00/, ** 00/, ** 
B 
-0%* 990/, *** 1%* 0 0/. * 
c 7%* 61%*** 14.5%* 7%*** 
***Rejected at the I Yosignyicance level 
Rejected at the 5% significance levell 
Rejected at the 10% significance level 
Results provide explicit evidence as to the financial and statistical significance of the 
current market capitalisation variable in explaining credit spread changes in all rating 
categories, but particularly important are the results provided for the "B" and "C" 
rating bands. In the "B" rating category alone, almost all of the variation in credit 
spreads is explained by the changes in that variable. Profitability ratios and the Cash 
Flow to Debt ratio provide very limited, almost insignificant support in explaining 
changes in credit spreads. Although, financially wise this could be explained by the 
fact that generally firms can survive an accounting loss, and although this might have 
a number of effects in a company's credit profile it is not really affecting their credit 
spread levels. But still we would expect more significant results from the CFD ratio. 
6.2.7. Results based on aggregate regressions & multivariate analysis 
Having tested the relation between different pools of rated companies and individual 
ratio groups, the next step would be to test the most important set of independent 
variables, provided by the analysis supplied above, against the investment and non- 
investment grade pool of companies. In other words, pool objects containing the 
different rating classes would be kept the same but all ratios (those not correlated 
amongst them) are going to be tested on a parallel basis within the different rating 
bands. Coefficients for those aggregate regressions will be estimated firstly by the 
method of cross section weights and whites correction for heteroscedasticity 
(presented in table 6.22. ). 
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Table 6.23 All Data ( Investment & Non-Investment Grade) 
INVESTMENT & NON-INVESTMENT GRADE 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Adlusted R 
C 0.01 0.00 
-3.6 0.00 16.0"/to 
CFD(- 1) 
-0.00 0.00 
-1.0 0.08 
CNIT 
-0.25 0.01 
-25.1 0.00 
DBCP(-I) 0.02 0.01 1.5 0.09 
ROC(- 1) 
-0.00 0.00 
-3.0 0.00 
TDEBDA 1) 0.00 0.00 9.0 0.00 
EBDAR 
-0.00 0.00 
-2.7 0.01 
INVESTMEN T GRADE INCLUDING BB B 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Ad usted R2 
C 
-0.01 0.00 
_S. 08 0.00 7.0'V,, 
CFD (4) 
-0.01 0.00 
-3.38 0.00 
CMT 
-0.12 0.01 
_ 
-11.89 0.00 
DBCP(-I) 0.03 0.01 1.5 0.08 
EBITDIN(-I) 
-0.01 0.00 
-0.73 0.09 
TDtq2ALD 0-01 0-01 1.16 0.08 
ROC(- 1) 
-0.01 0.00 
-3.02 0.00 
INVESTMEN T GRADE EX CLUDING BB B 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Adjusted R 
C 0.00 
-9.91 0.00 19.2%, 
CFD(- 1) 
-0.00 0.00 
-0.68 0.09 
CmT 
-0.12 0.03 
-3.50 0.00 
EBDAR(-I) 
-0.00 0.01 
-0.46 0.12 
DBCP(-I) 0.02 0.03 0.68 0.09 
TDEBDA(-I) 0.02 0.01 2.22 0.03 
ROQ- 1) 
-0.02 0.01 
-3.14 0.00 
N ON INVESTM ENT GRADE EXCLUDING BBB 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Adjusted R' 
C 0.08 TO 0 10.15 0.00 03.5%, 
CFD(- 1) 
-0.00 0.00 
-4.75 0.00 
CNIT 
-0.50 0.01 
-19.60 0.00 
DBCP(-I) 0.25 0.05 4.85 0.00 
TDEBDA, 
-I) 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.11 
ROE(-I) 
-0.00 0.00 
-1.42 0.12 
ROQ- 1) 
-0.00 0.00 
-4.97 0.00 NON INVESTM ENTGRADE INCLUDING BBB 
Variable 
- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.04 0.00 17.34 0.00 26.7% 
CFD(- 1) 
-0.01 0.00 
-1.33 0.11 
cMT 
-0.35 0.01 
-17.65 0.00 
DBCP(-I) 0.18 0.03 6.98 0.00 
0.01 0.00 1.09 0.12 
-0,00 0.00 
-0.13 0.09 
ROC(-]) 
-0.00 0.00 
-0.55 0.09 
Generally, results show that the accounting information has the greatest impact on 
non 
-investment grade companies. These results affinn our initial intuition that 
changes in company specific variables should mainly affect high yield companies. 
The rationale is that companies which belong to the high yield category usually aren't 
in a good financial shape and therefore a change, even a small one in the company's 
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financial position could greatly affect their ratings and consequently their spreads. 
Since low rated companies tend to be very volatile in nature, their financial standing 
is the most important factor considered when rating them. This should and is reflected 
into their ratios. It should also be noted, that except of the variable of current market 
capitalisation that was important and statistically significant at time t, results of the 
rest of the accounting ratios are referring to the lagged values (one quarter before) 
suggesting a lag relationhip to exist between the announcement of a company's 
figures and the respective change in credit spreads. This is not to say, that the rest of 
the accounting ratios weren't significant at time t, but rather that their lagged values 
provided better support for explaining the variation in credit spread changes. (For 
example in the high yield category, excluding BBB rated bonds, the adjusted R2 for 
values at time t, was 51 %). 
The highest adjusted R2s have been obtained for non-investment grade companies and 
once BBB rated companies are being excluded. Results also affirm that BBB band is 
very volatile and companies' data can vary substantially. Overall, when that category 
is added either to the investment or non-investment grades sample, reduces 
significantly the explanatory power of the model. 
The results presented above are based on large number of cross sections and the 
coefficients have been estimated with the method of cross section weights. For 
comparative and illustrative purposes, results have been re-estimated on a randomly 
selected set of data while the only criterion set, was that a proportionate number of 
cross section identifiers would be selected from each rating pool. Coefficients are 
both estimated with the method of cross section weights but also with the SUR 
method on the randomly selected companies. The regression results from the new set 
of data are presented in tables 6.23,6.24 & 6.25. 
Estimated coefficients based on the randomly selected data and calculated by both 
GLS and SUR method, provide similar results to those mentioned above. The 
accounting ratios tend to explain more of the variation in credit spreads in the non- 
investment grade sample, while the variables of current market capitalisation and 
leverage ratios seem to be the most important variables statistically and economically 
in explaining the relation in all rating bands. 
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Overall, the coefficients of the ratio of debt to capital employed and those Of CMT are 
the most statistically significant variables, supported by both methods of estimation 
and evident both from investment and non-investment rated companies' results. On a 
multivariate context, the fact that lagged values of the independent variables were 
considered, implies a time lag, of one quarter from the reporting date and the 
corresponding changes in credit spreads. This is not to say, that they weren't 
significant at time t, but rather that their lagged values provided better support for 
explaining the variation in credit spread changes. 
TnhIf- 624. Cross Sectional RcLrressions 
- 
All Rnfiml Cq1t, onriec 
All Rating Categories ( Investment & Non Investment grade) 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) FMethod: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
-CollsislentSlandard Errors Lt. Col'anall(t, 
Variable Coefficient t-Stat Prob. Coefficient t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.07 11.92 0.00 0.06 4.42 0.00 
EBDAR(-I) 
-0.01 -10.09 0.00 
-0.01 -5.46 0.00 
CFD(-I) 
-0.00 -3.66 
, 
0.00 
-0.00 -3.49 0.00 
DBCP(-I) 0.21 3.65_ 0.00 0.41 7.47 0.00 
TDEBDA(-I) 0.02 2.73 0.01 0.04 5.51 0.00 
CMT 
-0.29 -2.98 0.00 
-0.20 -4.10 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.154 
A 48 
Unweighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R7sýý 0.09 J R-squared 0.09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 1 Adjusted R- 
squared 
0.08 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.21 I Durbin-Watson 
stat 
2.21 
'rýw, (, '75 Cross Sectional Rei! ressions Inveoniont Gnu], 
- 
Cni, mytirioc 
Investment Grade 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 'N"" L-mingly Unrelated Regression 
ji'llitc llctcroskeda. s tit itv- Consistent Standard Errors 
Variable Coefficient t-Stat Prob. Coefficient t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.01 1.08 0.02 0.08 6.23 0.00 
E i-I 
-1) -0.11 -5.44 0.00 -0.01 -5.42 0.00 
CFD(-I) 
-0.00 
_ _ 
-0.27 0.09 
-0.02 -3.39 0.00 
D_ 
TDEBDA(-I) 
0.22 
0.05 
2.33 
1.11 
0,02 
0.00 
0.79 
0.12 
13.27 
4.29 
0.00 
0.00 
CMT 
-0.32 -3.85 -0.20 -4.60 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
a 
R- 134 
_ Aýjýýuared 0.129 1 i 
Unweig Ued Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R- 0.06 R-squared 0.07 
Adjusted R-squared - 0.04 Adjusted R- 
squ red 
0.05 
Furb-in-Watson stat 2.27 Durbin-Watson 2.26 
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T. qhle 626. Cross Sectional Reuressions 
- 
Non 
- 
Inve4stment Grade Cqtt-. anr1e..,. 
Non-Investment Grade 
M ýt-h, 'ross Section Weights) IMethod: Seen-tingly Unrelated Regression 
White lletcl-oske(l(istit-iti, 
-Colisistelit Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficie 
nt 
t-Stat Prob. I Coefficient t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.03 1.45 0.06 0.05 4.90 0.00 
CMT 
-0.43 -3.82 0.00 -0.58 -13.05 0.00 
EBDAR(-I) 
-0.07 -1.94 0.06 -0.04 -1.90 0.08 
CFD(- 1) 
-0.06 -1.85 0.07 
-0.05 -3.22 0.00 
DBCP(-l) 
-0.20 -6.20 0.00 -0.15 -2.59 0.01 
TDEBDA(-I) 0.05 1.48 0.14 0.03 1.12 0.17 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 
Unweighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.29 J R-squared 0.32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 Adjusted R-squared 0.26 
S. E. of regression 0.33 S. E. of regression 0.33 
urbin-Watson stat 2.44 Durbin-Watson stat 2.09 
Results provided by the randomly selected sample of companies, don't only provide 
support for the same accounting variables that are useful in explaining changes in 
credit spreads, but also are able to explain a third of a variation in spreads in the high 
yield category although less than 10% in the total and investment grade samples. If 
we consider previous studies 69 that predict corporate collapse or credit ratings, which 
are able to explain over half of the changes in bond ratings, by using other dummy 
variables, makes our results, which are based solely on accounting ratios, more 
significant. 
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6.3. Conclusions 
Under this chapter the relation between a company's financials and credit spread 
changes was examined. This section has been inspired by the limited literature 
provided in using accounting ratios to predict changes in credit spreads. The reason is 
that changes in credit spreads can partially be considered as a stochastic variable, and 
as such, they can't be explained to a great extent by changes in the financials of a 
company, which are considered to be more static. 
This explains why on an individual basis, accounting variables are very weak in 
explaining credit-spread changes, with the exception of a company's current market 
capitalisation. This has been the most significant variable, statistically and financially 
wise, when tested in all rating categories, irrespective of the statistical model 
employed, since it is considered to be more of a "continuous" rather than a "static" 
variable. However, results do provide support as to the nature and the structure of the 
relation between each variable and credit spreads, and to the value of accounting 
ratios as determinants of credit spread changes, particularly in the non-investment 
grade category. In particular, we reject the null hypothesis of a positive relation 
between changes in credit spreads and profitability, liquidity ratios and the company's 
current market capitalisation, although we don't reject the second part of the same 
hypothesis with respect to the information content of those ratios on an individual 
basis in explaining changes in credit spreads. The null hypothesis of the negative 
relation between leverage ratios and changes in credit spreads is rejected. 
However, on a multivariate basis, we find that 63.5% of the variation in high yield 
credit spreads is explained by the changes in the aforementioned ratios, as reflected by 
the adjusted R2, compared to an adjusted R2 of 19.2% for investment grade 
companies. Particularly significant coefficients are obtained for leverage ratios and 
the current market capitalisation. Another reason for the high explanatory power of 
accounting variables in the high yield sector, is that we have used ratios reflecting 
depreciation and amortisation expenses, which are usually very high for non- 
investment grade companies and which hasn't been considered in previous studies. 
" W. Horrigan, "The detennination of Long 
-term credit standing with Financial Ratios", 1965. 
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If we assume that there is perfect accounting transparency and complete accurate and 
timely accounting information to investors, these would explain about one third of the 
variation in credit spreads, as provided by a randomly selected sample of high yield 
companies. This effectively supports the idea that traditional accounting credit risk 
modelling can still be pursued, and can provide some significant insight to credit/bond 
analysts. 
Of course, traditional credit risk analysis can't be used on an individual basis to 
explain changes in credit spreads, since even at the best case scenario, it can explain 
only a limited part of the variation in credit spreads. This coincides with intuition and 
previous literature, in the sense that there are other issues that drive credit prices and 
generally credit risk, which can range from technical issues to market or 
macroeconomic infon-nation, or more importantly as explained above, analysts' 
subjective judgements, which can't be quantified or modelled not even within the 
context of the most sophisticated credit risk model. 
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7.0. Estimating & back testing the final credit risk model 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: 
a. To develop a model that integrates the three sets of variables into a unique 
framework, and 
b. To find the model with the strongest predictive ability, for forecasting credit 
spread changes one and two years ahead. 
The purpose of the analysis so far, has been to estimate and establish a relation on an 
individual basis, between changes in credit spreads, equity, accounting and 
macroeconomic factors. Also and most importantly, the overall significance of the 
combination of aggregate and firm specific factors hasn't been determined yet. Nor 
the time sensitivity and validity of the estimated coefficients has been tested. As a 
result, the focus of this chapter is the assessment of the validity and sensitivity of the 
estimated coefficients when tested upon different time frames and on randomly 
selected samples. In other words, the accuracy of predicting credit spreads 12,24 and 
35 months ahead will be tested, using previously estimated coefficients. 
To revise, the relation we are forecasting under this section is the following: 
Equation 7.1. 
ASpreads it+,,... =f ftrF (, 81 *(ýXjd) +(, 82 *(5Fid) + (, 83 *(bEid) + &I] 
Where: 
i=1,2,... n and 
A Spreads: denotes the change in spread on corporate bonds i. e. the change in the 
extra yield offered to compensate investors for a variety of risks.. 
8XIt: denotes the change in a set of US macro-economic variables including GDP 
growth, inflation, consumer confidence, money supply, the term structure of interest 
rates, etc. 
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8Fit: denotes the change in a set of factors composing the company's financial 
performance, i. e. ratios such as ROA, ROE, Debt to capital, cash flow to debt, etc. 
Hit: denotes the change in the respective companies' equity prices. As an additional 
explanatory variable the implied volatilities are being used, as those are being 
provided by the VIX index and lastly the companies' historical volatilities have been 
calculated and used to explain changes in credit spreads 
The forecasts of credit spreads will be estimated using two different methods for 
estimating coefficients. In particular, section 7.1. depicts dynamic credit spread 
forecasts estimated with the GLS method, adjusted for heteroscedasticity while 
Section 7.2. provides dynamic credit spread forecasts under the SUR method. 
Estimated credit spreads will be forecasted and evaluated based on the dynamic 
solution method. 
7.1. Results & Forecasts based the GLS method 
7.1.1. Review of results based on individual regressions 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the results based on the aggregate regressions, 
we should summarise some of the main findings, when individual regressions were 
perforined, across the investment and non-investment grade samples, based on the 
GLS method. In particular, the main findings could be summarised to the following: 
The variable with the highest explanatory power is the VIX index. Changes in 
individual equity values is the next most significant explanatory variable and then 
follow the term structure of interest rates, US consumer confidence levels and current 
market capitalisation. Results obtained for the total sample (investment and non- 
investment grade) are estimated through the GLS method, and are similar irrespective 
of whether we use common coefficients (i. e. there is an identical intercept for all pool 
members ait = a) or "fixed effects" whereby different intercepts are estimated from 
each pool member, i. e. ait = aj, E(a, Eit) #0. 
The final independent variables which are going to be included in the cross sectional 
regressions are those that have the highest correlation with credit spreads and those 
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that seem to have the strongest explanatory power (on an individual basis) to credit 
spread changes across the rating categories. As has been mentioned above these will 
only include a sub-group of the above explicitly described factors while those, which 
are correlated amongst them, are going to be excluded. 
7.1.2. Aggregate Regressions 
- 
GLS method 
As a first step, the variables and weights for the total period are going to be estimated 
and then credit spread changes are going to be determined with the use of the 
following explanatory variables, i. e. VIX index, US Consumer Confidence levels, 
term structure of interest rates, equity, current market capitalisation and cash flow to 
debt, total debt to ebitda and lastly debt to capital employed. Running the cross 
sectional regressions yielded the results provided in table 7.1.: 
T. 9ble 7.1. ALYP-regated Rearessions on Investment k, Non-lnvt-. ýtmont m-:, ilo mmit. 
Investment & Non-Investment Grade 
ariable Coef. t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.04 _ 18.8 0.00 
- Vix 
. 
0.44 13.3 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.54 
-15.4 0.00 
Current Market 
Capitalisation 
-0.02 
-2.07 0.00 
CONF 
-0.74 
-10.6 0.00 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.05 
-3.23 0.00 
Equity 
-0.21 
-14.5 0.00 
_ Total Debt to Ebitda 0.04 1.84 0.02 
Weig ited Statistics* 
R-squared 0.95 
AdjusteJ R-squared 0.95 
, 
qE ssion oLre re s. L. 0.09 
_ Durbin-Watson stat 2.34 
Unweighted Statistics" 
0.52 
0.49 
s. f. of regression 0.10 
, 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.44 
* CiL,! j using estimatea cross-section resiaual variances 
**All observations are given equal weight 
As it becomes apparent, the proposed variables are very significant both in economic 
and statistical terms. Highly significant t-statiStiCS70 are reported for the ten-n structure 
of interest rates, the VIX index, equity and consumer confidence index, while 
adjusted R-squares are particularly significant as part of the weighted statistics, while 
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when all observations in the cross sections are given equal weights, at the best case 
scenario they seem to explain half of the variation in credit spreads. 
Running additional regressions on a sub-set of the investment and non-investment 
grade sample, i. e. including fewer time series observations (to test for the time 
sensitivity of the results), we conclude that although results reported by unweighted 
statistics aren't that much different (R 2 range from 42%-54%), the output from the 
weighted statistic range from R2 60% 
- 
95%, which still is very high in explaining 
credit spread changes. 
As a second step in the analysis, regressions are run separately for investment and 
non-investment grade bonds. Results provided by those regressions are presented in 
tables 7.2. and 7.3 respectively. As it is observed, overall the significance of results is 
reduced once the above regressions are run separately for the investment and non- 
investment grade bands, but still results are statistically and economically significant. 
Tnhle 7 2- AL: YffeLzate RepTessions on Investment Grade ! ý. qmnlt- 
Investment Grade 
Variable Coef. t-Stat Prob. 
C 
_-0.02 -9.36 
0.00 
vix 
. 
0.40 18.9 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.06 
-10.8 0.00 
Current Market 
Capitali 3ation 
-0.03 
-5.54 0.00 
CONF 
-0.93 
-15.9 0.00 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.06 
-2.34 0.00 
Eqýýýýý 
-0.11 
-7.75 0.00 
Total Debt to Ebitda 0.04 6.66 0.00 
stics 
R-squared 0.35 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 
S. E. oLreqrLession 2 
, 
0.10 
_ _ Durbin-Watson stat 2.23 
Unweighted Statistics 
0.28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 
S. E. of regression 0.09 
IDurbin-Watson stat 2.45 77 
70 It is important to note that all t-statistics are calculated with the White test for heteroscedasticity and 
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Table 7.3. Aizereeate Rearessions on Non-InVe-, tmt-. nt Cýrnti, - 
Non 
- 
Investment Grade 
Variable Coef. t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.07 2.94 0.00 
Vix 0.75 17.02 0.00 
Term Structure 0.02 14.6 0.00 
Current Market 
Capitalisation 
-0.01 
-4.85 0.00 
CONF 
-0.87 
-12.08 0.00 
Cash Flow to Debt 
-0.07 
-4.43 0.00 
Equity 
-0.24 
-12.8 0.00 
Total Debt to Ebitda 0.08 3.97 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 
S. E. of regression 0.08 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.34 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 
S. E. of regression 0.07 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.33 
Results provided above, are consistent with regression results provided in previous 
chapters and prove the higher explanatory power of these variables on non-investment 
grade bonds. 
Results provided from the aggregate regressions, compare similarly to those reported 
by Huang, Jing-Zhi, Kong, Weipeng (2003 )71, which is the only other study that looks 
at option adjusted spreads. Although they use a different methodology and different 
set of explanatory variables, they also report that the eight factors considered in their 
model can explain more than 40% of credit spread changes for investment grade bond 
indices, and 67.68% and 60-82% of credit spread changes for the B and BB rated 
indices. 
Once we have determined the most influential factors in determining credit spread 
changes, both from a statistical and economic standpoint the sample is divided in two 
sub periods, whereby the effort is focused on estimating the required credit risk model 
from coefficients estimated from the period of January 1997 until June 2000 and 
proceed with credit spread forecasts for five data points ahead, with no less than 
autocoff elation consistent covariance matrix. 
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2,500 degrees of freedom, depending on the sub-sample used (investment or non 
investment grade), i. e.: 
-I quarter ahead 
-2 quarters ahead 
I year ahead 
2 years ahead 
2 and three quarters ahead. 
it is worth recalling from section 3.4 based on the table of descriptive statistics 
reported by average mean spread levels by year, that the standard deviation increased, 
with volatility levels being extremely high on average in the fall of 2000,2001 and 
2002. This makes the forecasting work a bit harder since we will be trying to estimate 
the credit spread levels for the last two years. On the other hand, if a robust model is 
found for forecasting credit spreads in years 2001 and 2002, which exhibit such high 
volatility, this will make results more reliable and rigorous. 
The data that will be used in order to back test and calibrate the credit risk model is 
quarterly data. In particular, cross sectional regressions were run from observations I 
to 15 corresponding to the relevant quarters for the period January 1997 until June 
2000. The independent variables used in order to estimate the model were those 
provided in tables 7.2-7.3. 
7.1.3. Forecasts and Evaluation methodology 
As a third step in the analysis, using the independent variables described above, we 
run pooled regressions for the individual rating categories based on data from January 
1997 until June 2000 (forecasted results of those regressions are provided in section 
7.1.4. ). In order to proceed with the credit spreads forecasts, we created a model in 
"Eviews", that solves for the independent variable, i. e. changes in credit spreads for 
the period to be forecasted, i. e. from July 2000 until May 2002. Equations are 
automatically generated for each particular company within the group we are trying to 
71 The factors they consider are the Russell 2000 index, the Conference Board composite leading and 
coincident economic indicators, the interest rate level, the historical interest rate volatility, the yield 
curve slope and a high minus low factor. 
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forecast. Once equations are automatically processed, then we are proceeding with a 
dynamic solution for the required model. Specifically, 
7.1.3. (a) Description of the Dynamic Solution Method 
The initial observation in the forecast sample will use the actual value of lagged Y 
(i. e. change in spread). Thus if S is the first observation in the forecast sample then 
the model will compute: 
Ys = c(l) + C(2)X, +c(3)Z, + c(4)Y 
-I 
Where Ys-I is the value of the lagged endogenous variable in the period prior to the 
start of the forecast sample. This is the one step ahead forecast. 
Forecasts for subsequent observations will use the previous forecasted values of Y, 
i. e. 
Y s+k = c(l) + C(2)X s+k +c(3)Z s+k + c(4)YS s+k 
-1 
These forecasts may differ significantly from the one step ahead forecasts. If there are 
additional lags of Y in the estimated equation, the above algorithm is modified to 
account of the non-availability of lagged forecasted values in the additional period. 
For example if there are three lags of Y in the equation: 
(1) The first observation uses the actual values for all three lags, Y 
-,, 
Y 
-,, 
Ys-I 
(2) The second observation (S+I) uses actual values for Y S-2 and Y, 
-, 
and the 
forecasted value of the first lag Ys 
(3) The third observation (S+2) will use the actual values for Ys-I and forecasted 
values for the first and second lags Ys and Y,, 
(4) All subsequent observations will use the forecasted values of all lags 
As a result the start of the forecast sample is very important for dynamic forecasting. 
The dynamic forecasts are true multi step forecasts (from the start of the forecast 
sample) since they recursively compute forecast of the lagged value of the dependent 
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variable. These forecasts may be interpreted as forecasts for subsequent periods that 
would be computed using information available at the start of the forecast sample. 
in order to perform dynamic forecasts, data for the exogenous variables should be 
available for every observation in the forecast sample and values of the dependent 
variables should be observed at the start of the forecast sample. 
7.1.3. (b) Forecasts Evaluation 
The statistical package used in this study doesn't provide forecast evaluations for 
coefficients estimated using pool objects and cross sectional regressions. As a result, 
forecast evaluations based on cross sectional estimation of coefficients will be 
calculated manually. 
Many studies have been conducted to identify which method will provide the most 
accurate forecasts for a given class of time series. However, there has been no 
literature identifying the most accurate forecasting method in terrns of cross sectional 
data. 
Generally, comparisons of errors across series can be very complex, and as a result a 
single error measure is desirable. However, the choice of an error measure can vary 
according to the situation. For example, the choice of an error measure can vary 
according to the scale across series, the amount of change that occurs over the 
forecast horizon and the presence of extreme forecast errors (outliers). One of the 
main properties for an error measure is that it should be unit free. 
This is something that hasn't be widely appreciated in the early 1980s according to a 
research made by Carbone and Armstrong (1982). They asked 145 forecasting experts 
which was the preferable error measure when looking at the accuracy of different 
forecasting methods. Most practitioners have selected the Root Mean Square Error 
(RMSE) and academicians had an even stronger preference for the same measure 
although it is not unit free. 
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The RMSE has been frequently used to draw conclusions about forecasting methods. 
For example, Zellner (1986) claimed that the Bayesian method was the most accurate 
method in the M-competition data, because its RMSE was the lowest. However, 
Chatfield (1988) in a re-examination of the M-competition data, showed that five of 
the 1001 series dominated the RMSE rankings. The remaining 996 series had little 
impact on the RMSE rankings of the forecasting methods. 
Lately, there seems to be increased preference for unit-free measures for comparing 
methods. One such measure is the percentage of forecasts for which a given method is 
more accurate than the random walk (Percent better). Another way to control for scale 
is to calculate the error as a percentage of the actual value. The most widely used unit 
free measure is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). A disadvantage of 
MAPE is that it is relevant only for ratio scaled data (data with a meaningful zero). 
Another disadvantage of the MAPE is that it puts a heavier penalty on forecasts that 
exceed the actual values than on those that are less than the actual. For example the 
MAPE is bounded on the low side by an error of 100% but there is no bound on the 
high side. 
Interestingly enough, there is no error measure that is 100% better than another in 
absolute terms. In a paper by Annstrong and Collopy (1992), they analysed 90 annual 
and 101 quarterly economic time series and judged error measures on reliability, 
validity, sensitivity to small changes, protection against outliers and their relation to 
the decision making process. Based on their empirical results (for reliability and 
construct validity) and subjective judgment they rated each error measure as good, 
fair or poor with respect to different criteria. The ratings are shown in the following 
table: 
Error Measure Reliability Construct 
Validity 
Outlier 
Protection 
Sensitivity Relationhip to 
decisions 
RMSE Poor Fair Poor Good Good 
Percent Better Good Fair Good Poor Pooý- 
MAPE Fair Good Poor Good Fair 
MdAPE Fair Good Good Poor Fair 
GNIRAE Fair Good Fair Good Poor 
MdRAE Fair Good Good Poor Poor 
Where: Hm, )L. ' KOO[ Mean aquuru r-irur, rercenr getter: percentage Oj jorecasts jor which a given 
method is better than the random walk, MAPE: Mean Absolute Percentage Error, MdAp : Median 
Absolute Percentage Error, GMRAE: Geometric Mean of the Relative Absolute Error, MdRA 
. 
-Median 
Relative Absolute Error 
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As presented in the table above there is no error measure that performs well in all the 
criteria tested. This means that the choice of the error measure is somewhat 
subjective. In addition, it should be noted that these conclusions are derived for 
comparisons across multiple time series. The conclusions do not necessarily apply to 
the examination of a single time series, or when comparing times series of cross 
sectional data. Nevertheless they can provide some guidance as to the choice of the 
error measure. 
In this study we will employ dynamic forecasting as mentioned above, and we will be 
using the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and the Root mean squared error 
(RMSE) to evaluate our forecasts. The RMSE depends on the scale of the dependent 
variable. The MAPE is scale invariant. These two measures are defined as follows: 
Root Mean Squared Error: 
-I 
lS +hA 
h+ y)2 t= S 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 
h+1 
A 
Once the RMSEs and the MAPEs have been calculated for each time series and each 
cross section, they have been averaged across the sections used to give an average for 
each pool. Various measures of central tendency can be used to summarize the errors 
across each pool. Here, we will be using arithmetic means to summarize the errors for 
each pool. Medians have also been calculated and compared against the means, as a 
way to detect the outliers in the forecasts. Using medians is an extreme way to trim 
outliers as it removes all values higher and lower than the middle value. 
Given that we are using the same dynamic method for forecasting credit spread 
changes, based on the error measures we can only draw conclusions on whether the 
model forecasts better in the investment or non investment grade companies, or 
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perforin better in the one or two years horizon. As a result a better forecast is defined 
when both the RMSE and the MAPE are smaller. The results are provided below. 
7.1.4. Empirical Results on Credit Spread Forecasts based on the GLS method 
Table 7.4. Investmcnt Gradc Forecast F. rrors 
Pool AAA Pool AA Pool A Pool BBB 
Avg Av 
RMSEI MAPE 
A v,, g Avg 
RMSE MAPE 
Avg Avg 
RMSE MAP E 
Avg Avg 
RMSE MAPE 
I quarter ahead 
forecast 
0.19 0.10 0.20 0.45 0.04 
-0.65 0.18 0.19 
2 quarters ahead 
forecast 
0.11 
-0.46 0.18 
-0.06 0.02 
-0.35 0.20 0.06 
I year forecast 0.11 
-0.04 0.32 0.69 0.09 
-0.05 0.40 0.10 
2 years forecast 0.22 -2.25 0.24 -0.20 0.06 
-0.02 0.17 -0.32 
2 years &3 
Iquarters ahead 
I 0.24 
-0.28 0.51 0.61 0.11 
-0.01 0.36 -0.25 
Tahle 7.5. Non-Investment Grade Forecast FiTors 
Pool BB Pool B Pool C 
A\, g A\, g Avg Avg Avg Avg 
RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE 
I quarter ahead 0.33 0.33 0.31 
-2.8 0.36 0.22 
forecast 
2 quarters 0.34 1.16 0.27 
-1.6 0.47 -1.99 
ahead forecast 
I year forecast 0.32 46.6 0.28 
-0.73 0.78 
-1.64 
2 years 0.35 0.78 0,28 
-0.60 0.21 4.76 
forecast 
2 years &3 0.54 17.1 0.38 
-0.80 0.64 3.21 
quarters ahead I I I 
Average RMSEs are relative low in the investment grade category and higher on 
average in the non-investment grade. Overall, errors are less than one third within one 
and two year horizons with the exception of the pool C and pool B (for 2 years and 3 
quarters ahead forecasts). 
In order to depict the forecasted changes in Credit spreads in real spread values, we 
worked backwards in order to calculate their respective spread levels. In particular, 
having as a starting point the level of spread from January 1997 and using the 
estimated forecasted changes in spreads, the levels of the forecasted credit spreads 
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have been calculated. Then the mean values have been calculated for the respective 
observations for each particular company both for actual spread levels as well as the 
forecasted ones. These mean values have then been averaged to obtain an average 
spread for each rating category. 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7., provide the average forecasted spreads per rating category and 
per quarter we are forecasting. Intuitively, we should expect forecasts to be more 
accurate for bonds in the investment grade category (due to lower volatility compared 
to the non-investment grade bonds) and for the immediate quarter's forecasts rather 
than the latter ones. 
7-6. Investment Grade Forecasted Valucs based on the GI. S inciliod 
Pool AAA Pool AA Pool A Pool BBB 
A%e ra 
-(-, e era ge CI ag C , 'ývci age , \\ Clage crage \% C1 age CI ag Actual Forecaste Actual Forecaste Actual Forecaste Actual e 
Spread d Spread Spread d Spread Spread d Spread Spread Forecas 
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level ted 
Spread 
Level 
I quarter 97.75 97.98 107.57 105.32 118.90 130.27 182.22 205.56 
ahead forecast 
2 quarters 93.50 100.03 89.85 101.78 106.40 126.38 175.44 194.38 
ahead forecast 
-- - 2 quarters ahead 95.63 99.01 98.71 103.55 112.65 128.32 178.83 199.97 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
- - - i year forecast 112.81 114.59 119.71 119.02 
- 
129.31 132.39 214.22 - 214.75 
2 years forecast 
i23.06 148.34 126.89 155 34 141.94 166.21 239.05 279.14 
2 years forecast 123.06 148.34 123.30 139.46 135.63 149.30 226.63 246.94 
Lum ulative2 
- - - - - - 2 years &3 99.18 123.2 1 11391 
i 3 9.4 5 - 138.7-3 159.05 220.57 256.65 
uarters ahead 
- 
2 years &3 106.93 1 130.31 1170 2 131.27 133.05 36.92 218.26 
quarters ahead 
(cumulative) I 
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7.7. Non-Investment Grade Forecasted Values based on the GLS methnd 
Poo l BB Pool B Pool C 
Average Average Average Avciage Average Average 
Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Forecasted 
Level Spread Level Level Spread Spread Spread 
Level Level Level 
1 quarter ahead 232.0 296.49 318.2 364.55 608 526.05 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 203.8 277.32 326 353.40 646.57 2,052.56 
forecast 
2 quarters aheTd 217.9 286.91 322.1 358.98 627.28 1,289.35 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
I year forecast 242.9 293.46 370.2 378.03 833.5 1,063.89 
2 years forecast 350.7 376.38 591.75 663.21 1,598.33 1,738.54 
2 years forecast 296.8 334.89 480.97 520.62 1,215.94 1,401.22 
(cumulative) 
2 years &3 350.08 373.10 562.71 626.80 1,720.24 1,795.42 
Quarters ahea 
2 years &3 311.07 344.12 492.70 536.34 1,397.79 1,521.49 
quarters ahead 
I I 
(cumulative) 
To make comparisons easier, the respective figures will be presented graphically in 
the tables that follow. 
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The tables and graphs above show the actual versus forecasted credit spread levels per 
credit rating category. Forecasted values in all rating categories tend to be larger 
(credit spread levels are overestimated) than the actual ones. The time points on the x- 
axis represent the respective forecasted quarters shown in tables 7.6 & 7.7. For 
example, point I corresponds to the one quarter ahead forecast, point 2 to the two 
quarters ahead forecasts, point 3 to the cumulative two quarters ahead forecast and so 
on. It should be noted that points 3,6 and 8 correspond to cumulative two quarters, 
two years and 2 years and three quarters ahead forecasts where the difference between 
the actual and forecasted value tend to be thin. It is also worth noting that the 
forecasts in the investment and non-investment grade rated companies, tend to follow 
the trend of the actual spread levels, and tend to move very closely together at least up 
until point 4, which corresponds to the one year forecast. The only rating category, 
where forecasted values don't follow the actual ones, even in the short-term forecasts 
is the C rating category. It is quite obvious though, why bonds in this category don't 
confonn to the rest of the rating bands, since in this category, there are many bonds 
that default and numerous outliers, which makes the dynamic forecasting very hard. 
This coincides with the average RMSEs calculated per each rating category, which 
although in the investment grade categories, and even in the BB and B rating bands 
are below 0.50, they are higher for bonds belonging to the C rating category. 
As evident from the above graphs, the GLS method for estimating coefficients 
together with the dynamic solution method, can provide very satisfying and reliable 
results especially in the short term both in investment and high yield sample. It is also 
very important to note that most levels of credit spread forecasts are overestimating 
actual credit spread levels, which effectively means that they are more conservative. 
For specific statistics, on the average forecasting ability in percentage terms, of the 
seven credit rating pools, refer to Table I of Appendix 7A. This shows the percentage 
of mean actual spread divided by mean forecasted spread, for all rating categories and 
all quarter forecasts ahead, where it is obvious that the only time when forecasted 
spread is overestimated in the I quarter ahead horizon is for the AA and C-rated 
category ( 102% and 115 % respectively). 
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It should be mentioned though, that the estimated coefficients used in the above 
forecasts have been estimated separately for the investment and non-investment grade 
sample. This means that although forecasts, may be robust in terms of out of sample 
forecasting, in the sense that coefficients have been estimated from another period 
than the one forecasted, we haven't tested whether robust forecasts can be produced 
by pools which would include different rated companies, both investment and non 
investment grade ones. 
Consequently, three pools of companies have been created, each of which includes a 
randomly selected sample of companies belonging in the seven broad rating 
categories. The only restriction in these pools is, that the selection is proportionate to 
the number of companies in each rating band, so that the sample and results won't be 
biased. i. e. in the selection process, we had to satisfy the condition that not all bonds 
would come from the AAA rating band, nor that most would belong to the investment 
rating categories. The results of those randomly selected pools are shown below: 
Tnhh-, 7 9- Forecasted Values based on the GIS nwilind 
Pool A Pool B Pool C 
Average Average Avemi-, e , \\ci-ai,, c Aý-ciagc Avemi-! c 
Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Forecalicki 
Level Spread Level Level Spread Spread Spread 
Level Level Level 
I quarter ahead 223.72 261.18 225.41 239.04 204.92 218.27 
forecast 1 
2 quarters ahead 220.77 261.79 249.33 247.05 203.76 237.81 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 222.25 261.49 237.37 243.04 204.34 228.04 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
- --- 257.90 250.2ý 489.07 451.20 232.53 239.86 
2 ears forecast 456.30 500.00 564.03 392.62 265.05 308.50 
2 years forecast 357.10 375.07 307.17 327.91 248.79 274.18 
Locumulative) 
. 2 years &3 497.84 455.20 333.79 391.50 260.29 286.29 
quarters ahead 
2 years &3 410.59 380.69 316.15 344.85 250.20 269.40 
quarters ahead 
1 1 
Lcumulative 2__ 
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Results provided by the randomly selected pools of companies, provide very strong 
forecasts. In particular, in the one quarter ahead forecasts, the model can accurately 
predict 85%, 94% and 94% of the variation in credit spreads for the respective pools. 
In the second quarter, the percentage accurately forecasts is 84%, 101% and 85% 
while for one year ahead, it is 103%, 108% and 97% respectively. (For an analytical 
description of the forecasting ability in percentage terms of the three randomly 
selected samples, refer to Table 2, Appendix 7A). It should be noted though, that in 
two out of the three randomly selected Pools, after the forecast of I quarter ahead, 
forecasted values of credit spreads are lower than the actual ones, while in Pool C, all 
forecasted values are higher than the actual ones. This underestimation of credit 
spreads, after the I quarter can be rather dangerous. In other words, a model that 
would provide us credit spread forecasts higher than the actual ones, is acceptable, 
given the current variables, in the sense that this would make forecasts more 
conservative. What though can be greatly misleading is a model that would provide 
more optimistic credit spreads forecasts than the actual ones. In other words, in the 
finance world, a credit risk model is much more preferable when it predicts a 
company's default, even if default doesn't occur, rather than a model that predicts 
good returns and the company goes into default. 
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7.2. Results & Forecasts based on data subsets and the SUR methodology 
The results reported previously are based on the GLS method of estimating 
coefficients. As a next step in the analysis, credit spread forecasts will be based on the 
SUR method of estimating coefficients. (Analytical description of the calculation of 
the weighted versions of our pooled regressions is provided in Appendix 4A) In order 
to employ the SUR methodology, subsets of the original data are defined in new pools 
that include a smaller number of cross sectional observations equal to the number of 
time series observations. This is a prerequisite in order to perform time series 
regressions stacked cross sectionally based on the SUR methodology. 
In order to test the model's validity in forecasting credit spreads, the independent 
variables employed will be those that have been identified to have the strongest 
impact in determining credit spread changes. Although this time they are regressed 
against different time intervals and different pools of companies. In particular, 
forecasted credit spreads based on the SUR method will be computed for: 
(a) Seven pools, equal to the number of credit rating bands, which will include a 
random selection of companies in each rating pool. 
(b) Three different Pools, (pool a, pool b, pool c) each of which will include a 
randomly selected, proportionate number of companies relative to the number of 
companies that exist in each rating category, 
7.2.1. (a) Regression Results based on the SUR methodology 
The next set of tests is focused in examining whether more reliable forecasts could be 
observed for the seven credit rating pools under the SUR methodology. Following the 
same rationale, as described under the GLS method, we estimate the regression 
coefficients for the period 1997 until June 2000, for the seven pools, corresponding to 
the seven rating categories (tables 7.12 and 7.13), then we are calculating the average 
RMSEs and MAPEs for investment and non-investment grade companies (tables 7.14 
and 7.15) and then working backwards, as described in section 7.1.4, we are 
calculating the mean credit spread levels per rating bands and pools. The results of the 
average actual and forecasted credit spreads are shown in the tables 7.16 and 7.17. 
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TnhIp 71?. Croce, Sectional Revres. 
-; lon Rf-. -, iilt,. hnci-d nn 0,1 ITý f--A- 
Pool AAA Pool Pool A Pool BBB 
Variable Coef t- 
Stat. 
Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob. I Coet'. t-Stat. Prob. Coel'. t-stat. 11101), I 
C 0.11 5.03 0.00 0.00 
-0.03 0.08 0.12 7.95 0.00 0.14 13.30 0.00 
vix 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.22 1.33 0.19 0.56 7.05 0.00 0.40 11.80 0.00 
Term 
Structure 
-0.02 -1.70 0.06 -0.11 -5.4 0.00 -0.07 -8.90 
I 
0.00 
-0.07 
I 
-1.84 0.00 
Current 
Market 
Canitalisation 
-0.04 -1.76 0.06 -0.03 -1.89 0.06 
-0.09 -7.88 0.00 -0.01 1 -0.89 0.00 
Lcla! ýv 
-0.01 -0.081 0.09 -1.16 -5.72 0.00 -0.05- -0.58 0.08 -0.28 -4.43 0.00 Cash Flow 
to Debt 
0.08 1.83 0.08 1.49 5.97 
I 
0.00 0.06 1.64 
I 
0.09 0.00 4.01 0.00 
CONF 
-4.36 -8.58 0.00 -0.61 -0.36 0.07 -3.11 -3.58 0.00 -2.04 -6.29 0.00 
EBIT 
-0.19 -2.94 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.08 0.05 4.71 0.00 0.01 3.09 0.00 
GDP 
-0.19 -4.85. 0.00 -0.30 -2.46 0.02 -0.06 -1.47 0.09 -0.06 -2.96 0.00 
DBCP 
-0.16 -3.101 0.01 1.86 7.61 0.00 -0.60 -3.40 0.00 -0.14 -1.84 0.07 
E: ýý 0.81 0.14 0.83 0.61 
Adjusted R- 
ýE ýred 
- 
0.75 0.01 0.79 0.56 
S. E. of 
regression 
0.13 1.01 0.17 0.21 
I rbin- Du 
L 
Watson 
1.84 1.96 F 2.14 2.27 
-rýwp -7 11 Crn. -, -, Sectinnal Rearession Re.,, ultg ba., ýPcl nn 1,1 1R T\ji%vi- I Tix, oti, tit (--1, 
Pool B B Pool B Pool C 
VariabFe Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coet'. t-Stat. 111.0b. Coef. t-s(at. 1,101). ýF_ 0.16 12.97 0.00 0.09 1 3.81 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.05 
Ix 0.64 12.73 0.00 0.41 5.27 0.00 0.27 4.16 0.01 
E uit -0.13 -2.94 0.01 -0.23 -2.82 0.01 -1.04 -3.84 0.02 
Term Structure 0.14 5.60 0.00 0.19 7.83 0.00 0.17 9.51 0.00 
CMT 
-0.45 -7.80 0.00 -0.62 -8.1 0.00 -0.44 -6.99 0.00 0.04 3.11 0.00 
-0.05 -1.94 0.06 -0.08 2.05 0.00 
CONF 
-2.59 -5.52 0.00 -3.43 -4.09 0.00 
-1.39 -3.94 0.02 
EBIT 0.07 6.00 0.00 0.06 1.69 0.10 0.04 1.27 0.10 
GDP 
-0.15 -5.07 0.00 -0.20 -6.09 0.00 
-0.13 -4.95 0.00 
DBCP 0.51 3.40 0.00 
-0.66 -2.03 0.05 1.07 7.86 0.00 
R-s uare 0.66 0.70 0.93 
Ad*usted R-squared 0.58 0.63 0.85 ýof 
re 
ýrý 0.24 0.22 0.22- 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.97 2.28 1.95 
Results presented in the tables above provide confidence as to the significance of the 
particular variables in explaining the variation in credit spreads, confirming results 
reported previously. 72 It is also important to note that the combination of the 
explanatory variables used under this study, together with the careful elimination 
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process used and the assignment of firrn specific information to companies' credit 
spreads, has been able to explain the largest part of the variation in credit spread 
changes, contrary to findings of Defrense, Goldstein and Martin (2001). It is worth 
noting that although some of the coefficients are more important in one pool 
compared to the other, we can draw comfort for their momentumeness for two 
reasons: 
a. Results reported in previous chapters, based on different sets of data, support the 
same variables 
b. These variables tend to be very important on a consistent basis, i. e. are time 
invariant. 
Also it is important to note, that in this multi variate context, it is the only time that 
we get the right negative sign for the coefficient of GDP, compared to previous 
chapters. 
Once we gained confidence in the estimated coefficients, we'll proceed with the 
forecast of credit spreads changes, one and two years ahead with the dynamic solution 
method described in the previous section. 
Forecasts & evaluation based on the SUR Method 
7 1,1 Fnrec-gsied Errors based on the IM JR n-i, -thc), i 
Poo l AAA Pool AA Pool A Pool BBB 
Avg 
RMSE 
Avg 
MAPE 
Avg 
RMSE 
Avg 
MAPE 
-- 
Avg 
RMSE 
Avg MAN--' A\g 
RMSE 
AýgW%1q;. 
I quarter ahea 
forecast 
0.26 
-0.43 0.55 
j. 05 0.30 0.77 0.43 - 0.21 
2 quarters ahead 
forecast 
0.12 
-0.6 0.36 
6.65 Cý2 5 
-0.28 0.47 0.06 
I year forecast 0.11 1.9 0.50 0.97 0.21 0.08 0.39 0.08 
2 years forecast 0.23 2.3 0.35 
- 
0.11 
-- 
0.22 
-2.12 0.17 
-0.44 
2 years &3 
_qýý 
0.25 
- 
0.50 0.64 605 0-32 --2.25 (6 -5 ---70-. 34 
72 It should be noted that we get similar results for the lagged values of the above variables, although 
242 
Table 7.15. Forecasted Errors based on the SUR method- Non- Tnvectment Cirndf- 
Pool BB Pool B Pool C 
Avg 
RMSE 
Avg 
MAPE 
Avg 
RMSE 
AvgMAI'F' AvgRMSF' jAvgN1API' 
I quarter ahead 
forecast 
0.55 0.67 0.39 
-2.4 1.09 0.36 
2 quarters ahead 
forecast 
0.55 0.08 
- 
0.34 
-1.9 1.5 
-0.11 
I year forecast 0.34 0.8T 0.28 
-0.48 0.52 0.88 2 years forecast 0.34 0.50 0.29 
-0.56 0.28 0.95 2 years &3 Iquarters ahead I 
0.60 0.04 
I 
0.37 
-0.80 0.50 0.97 
Table 7.16. Forecasted Values based on the SUR method- fnvoý, tynent (imile 
Pool AAA Pool AA 
-------- --- 
Pool A Pool BBB 
Average Average Average Average Average Average Average A%cjav 
Actual Forecaste Actual Forecaste Actual Forecaste Actual e Spread d Spread Spread d Spread Spread d Spread Spread Forecas 
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level ted 
Spread 
Level 
I quarter ahead 93.50 99.27 107.54 85,17 147.14 149.54 187.6 196.7 
forecast 
- - 2 quarters ahead 128.75 95.60 89.85 T6 3-2 -123.1-4 139.77 176 187.88 
forecast 
- -- - 2 quarters ahead 111.12 97.50 98.71 - ý 5.73 -1-3- 4 571- - 142,87 181.8 190.2 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
I year forecast 121.68 127.33 119.71 
-- 
119.47 - 145.21 --- - 150.99 213.3 225.75 -- 
2 years forecast 115.31 147.85 12649 148.01 142.07 -148.05 229.97 233.48 
2 years forecast 118.50 137.59 123.30 133.7 4 1, 43.64 160.70 221.63 230.55 
(cumulative) 
-- - -- 2 years &3 99.17 122.24 113.91 123.85 - 149.65 163.90 - 214.44 218.78 
quarters ahead 
2 years &3 107.36 124.09 116.02 f 148.04 158.89 214.02 219.55 
quarters ahead 
j 7 
1(cumulative) 6. 
- 
not reported herein. 
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Table 7.17. Forecasted Values based on the SUR methnd Nnn-Tnvpqtmpnt 
Poo l BB Pool B Pool C 
AveraL, e A\'erage Avci-age I Aý-ciagc 
Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Forecasted 
Level Spread Level Level Spread Spread Spread 
Level Level Level 
I quarter ahead 232.00 310.05 318.2 364.11 874.5 1,422.47 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 203.00 281.75 326.00 355.96 650.05 916.72 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 217.90 295.11 322.1 360.04 762.25 1,170.73 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
I year forecast 242.9 278.95 370.2 379.68 771.62 923.65 
2 years forecast 350.7 380.89 591.75 666.14 988.75 566.08 
2 years forecast 296.8 329.93 480.97 522.91 880.17 744.86 
(cumulative) 
2 years &3 350.01 379.80 562.71 627.76 1,205.24 924.46 
quarters ahead 
2 years &3 311.07 343.13 492.70 537.55 1,047.54 924.17 
quarters ahead 
. 
(cumulative) 
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Credit spread forecasts provided from coefficients estimated through the SUR 
method, are interesting. As evident from the graphs above, there is a high degree of 
forecast accuracy in the A, BBB, BB and B rating categories, while spread forecasts 
in the AAA, AA and C pools aren't that robust. It is worth noting that although 
RMSEs obtained from the SUR method of estimating coefficients are lower compared 
to the GLS method, at a first glance the GLS method is preferred since it provides 
more conservative forecasts. In the cases of AAA forecasts are robust only for the 
first quarter ahead whereas in the AA rating band the best forecast is obtained for the 
second quarter. Forecasts for C rated bonds, are not close to the observed credit 
spreads not even in the short term, nor do they seem to follow the trend observed in 
the actual credit spreads. Even more worrying is the fact that forecasts obtained from 
the SUR method provide tighter spread forecasts than the actual ones. This effectively 
means that the model is biased towards assuming that there will be a credit spread 
tightening, which would potentially lead to an upgrade. This is more troublesome than 
a more conservative credit spread forecast with a higher RMSE or even a higher 
deviation between the actual and forecasted credit spread value, as it would provide to 
bond investors, for example, more confidence than what they should have. This will 
result in a chain of adverse perceived events which might end up in severe losses for 
bond and other investors. A detailed analysis, in percentage terms of the actual versus 
forecasted credit spreads for the seven rating pools is provided in Table I of Appendix 
7B. 
7.2.1. (b) Regression Results based on the SUR methodology 
After running numerous regressions based on the SUR methodology and the White 
test for heteroscedasticity, we ended up with the following estimated outputs, which 
present the most significant variables for explaining the variation in credit spreads 
both in statistical and economic tenns. Results of those variables for each pool, a, b 
and c are shown in table 7.9. 
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Tnhlf- 7-9-Cross Sectional Reg-ression Re-, iilt. -, hqqf-. ri nn qI TP 
Pool A Pool B Pool C 
Variable Coef. t-stat Prob. Coef. I t-Stat Prob. Coef. t-Stat Prob. 
C 0.13 27.53 0.00 0.10 110.15 0.00- 0.12 11.22 0.00 
vix 28.40 0.00 0.40 110.92 0.00 0.54 12.45 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.02 
_ 
-14.6 0.00 -0.04 -11.2 0.00 
-0.03 -10.9 0.00 
Current Market 
Capitalisation 
-0.01 -0.85 0.08 -0.08 -1.55 
i 
0.07 
-0.05 -3.70 0.00 
Equity 
-0.23 -15.55 0.00 -0.06 -1.60 0.11 
-0.29 1 -4.94 0.00 1 Cash F_Iow to 
Debt 
-0.04 -7.69 0.00 -0-03 -5.98 0.00 
-0.02 1 -6.10 0.00 
CONF 
-2.96 -15.26 0.00 -2.38 -6.16 0.00 
-3.85 1 -9.14 0.00 
EBIT 
-0.00 -6.71 0.00 -0.02 -2.06. 0.04 
-0.06 -2.36 0.02 
GDP 
-0.09 -7.54 0.00 -0.06 -2.861 0.01 
-0.04 -5.55 0.00 
DBCP 0.19 12.39 0.00 0.14 1.58 1 0.12 0.29 5.35 0.00 
ýared E- sg 0.73 0.68 0.65 
. _ Adjusted R- 
squared 
0.71 0.65 0.62 
S. E. of re ression 0.20 0: 16 0.26 
Durbin-Watson Istat 2.34 
9 
2.2 1 
I 
2.29 
Results presented in this table provide confidence as to the significance of the 
particular variables in explaining the variation in credit spreads, confirming results 
reported previously. Therefore, we proceed with the forecast of credit spreads 
changes, one and two years ahead with the dynamic solution method described in the 
previous section. 
Forecasts & evaluation based on the SUR Method 
The tables below provide the error measures for the credit-spread forecasts for the 
three randomly selected pools. Two error measures have been calculated in order to 
evaluate the results from the credit spread forecasts. 
The Root Mean Square Error and the mean absolute percentage error. Forecasted 
credit spreads have been evaluated for results one year ahead, two years ahead and 2 
years and three quarters ahead. The results are shown below: 
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The forecast evaluations provided below are indeed poor. 
Table 7.10. Forecast Errors 
Pool A 
Average RMSF, Avcragc MAPF' 
I quarter ahead forecast 0.41 0.72 
2 quarters ahead forecast 0.41 0.42 
1 year forecast 0.25 0.39 
2 years forecast 0.19 0.85 
2 years &3 quarters ahead 0.30 2.98 
Pool B 
Average RMSE Average MAPE 
I quarter ahead forecast 0.42 0.14 
2 quarters ahead forecast 0.37 0.11 
I year forecast 0.30 0.29 
2 years forecast 0.22 0.94 
2 years &3 quarters ahead 0.34 0.47 
Pool C 
Average RMSE Average MAPE 
I quarter ahead forecast 0.35 
-0.44 
2 quarters ahead forecast 0.23 
-1.74 
1 year forecast 0.18 0.64 
2 years forecast 0.17 1.47 
2 years &3 quarters ahead 0.28 1.14 
Following the same rationale as described in section 7.1.4., we are calculating the 
credit spread levels for the three groups of randomly selected companies. 
Table 7.11. Forecastcd Values based on SUR for t)ools A. B &C 
Pool A Poo lB P001 C 
Avviage Avcrage Average Averagc A\ cl-age Average 
Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Spread Forecasted Actual Forecasted 
Level Spread Level Level Spread Spread Spread 
Level Level Level 
I quarter ahead 223.72 258.71 225.41 238.77 190.28 190.13 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 220.77 263.14 249.33 248.33 189.21 229.59 
forecast 
2 quarters ahead 222.25 260.93 -- - ---- 237.37 ---- 243.55 189.75 209.86 
forecast 
(cumulative) 
I year forecast 257.90 
- 249.01 --- ---- 489.07 
- - 
456.01 215.92 243.74 
2 years forecast 456.30 471.26 5Z 4 
. 
03 
- 
6-74.53 246.12 338.31 
2 years forecast 357.10 360.13 3C7. 15 -329.74- 231.02 291.02 
(cumula Ive) 
2 years &3 497.84 694.622 333.79 391.14 251.77 323.18 
quarters ahead_ 
2 years &3 410.59 442.13 316.15 345.64 238.74 294.29 
quarters ahead 
(cumularive) 
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Results obtained from the three randomly selected group of bonds, are similar (if not 
marginally better at least for forecasts one quarter ahead) to those obtained under the 
GLS method. In particular, the forecasting accuracy one quarter ahead is 86%, 94% 
and 100% for the three respective pools. The model's forecasting accuracy two 
quarters ahead is 83%, 100%, and 84% while for one year ahead, the percentages are 
103%, 107% and 88% respectively. For an analytical description of the forecasting 
ability of the model under the SUR method and for the three randomly selected group 
of companies are provided in Appendix 713, Table 2. 
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7.3. Conclusions 
This chapter of the thesis has identified a rather robust model for predicting future 
movements in credit spreads. Although initially it was expected that a prediction of 
credit spread changes would be rather hard, due to the nature and properties of credit 
spreads as well as due to the period under examination (1998 financial crisis is 
included in the in sample estimation of coefficients), it was shown that due to the fact 
that this model entails company specific market variables, credit spread forecasts have 
been close to traded values. Variables incorporated in the model, such a company' 
market capitalisation or the cash flow to debt ratio, have increased the predictive 
power of the model significantly, while they haven't been included in other studies. 
The model performs well especially within the first twelve months and even more so 
for investment grade companies. It is worth mentioning that although we should 
expect the predictive ability of the model to be more accurate in the high yield bond 
spreads, due to the higher explanatory power of the regressions obtained from that 
pool of companies, results obtained confirm the opposite, which is mainly attributed 
to the higher link of bonds belonging to this category to default risk, and the cyclical 
behaviour in this sector. This effectively means that although the information content 
of those bonds is highly significant for predicting output variables, the opposite 
doesn't hold. This is probably due to the extreme movements in prices exhibited in 
high yield companies, caused most of the times by drastic/unexpected changes in 
issuers' creditworthiness, which effectively makes it harder to model. 
Forecasts have been based on the dynamic solution method but estimated coefficients 
that entered the equations were accounted both under the GLS and the SUR method. 
Results obtained under the SUR method are similar to those provided by the GLS 
method applied to the randomly selected pool of companies, where the predictive 
accuracy of the model doesn't fall below 85% at least for credit spread forecasts 
within the first year (although there is a tendency for underestimation of forecasted 
credit spreads after the first quarter under both methods). However, RMSEs 
calculated for the SUR method are lower on average than those obtained from the 
GLS method, but we shall prefer forecasts based on GLS estimated coefficients, since 
they both follow the actual observed trend, but also they provide consistently more 
conservative forecasts. Results provided from the GLS method, contradict Jones, 
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Mason and Ronesfeld (1984) findings and more recently, Huang and Huang (2003), 
show that credit spreads predicted by the structural models are significantly below the 
observed levels, especially for high grade bonds. Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004), 
also find that these models to varying degrees tend to underestimate credit spreads for 
high quality bonds but overestimate those for junk debt. 
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8.0. Concluding Remarks 
The core objective of this thesis has been the modelling and prediction of credit 
spread changes, with the use of market continuous variables but also specific, discrete 
variables. Specifically the main purpose has been to explore the impact of macro, 
equity and accounting infonnation on credit spreads changes. 
We start this thesis by outlining the motivation, objectives and hypotheses tested. The 
second chapter focuses on an examination of the credit risk literature and credit risk 
models developed by large international banks while chapter 3, describes the data 
used in this thesis and the statistical properties of credit spreads and the rest of our 
data. Chapters 4,5 and 6 have focused on establishing a relation between 
macroeconomic, equity variables, accounting data and credit spreads respectively. 
Chapter 7 has examined the relation between the determinants of credit spreads and 
all the variables examined in the previous chapters, on an aggregate basis and has 
employed a dynamic solution method for forecasting credit spreads one and two years 
ahead. 
More specifically, Chater 3 has specified the proposed credit risk model which 
shares some of the assumptions and variables proposed by the KMV and McKinsey's 
macroportfolio view models, while incorporates other variables that seem to be 
important based on traditional credit risk analysis. A descriptive statistical analysis of 
the two sets of credit spread indices employed under this thesis has also been 
provided, where results coincided with our anticipation that standard deviations of 
bonds tend to increase as credit rating categories deteriorate, and that the levels of 
credit spreads increase as an issuer's credit quality worsens. This is like assuming that 
an investor requires a higher return for higher risk. Results reported from Bloomberg 
indices, share some of the same properties to those reported from the ML data, with a 
higher volatility pattern observed from long term maturing bond indices. Results 
obtained from the ADF tests for both sets of data, provide confidence as to the 
stationarity and mean reverting properties of credit spread changes compared to credit 
spread levels that follow a unit root. 
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Chapter 4 explores the relation between macroeconomic variables and changes in 
credit spreads. Three issues have been identified and tested under this chapter. The 
first was the relation between macroeconomic variables and credit spreads, with the 
use of two sets of data. The second dealt with differences arising on the effect of 
macroeconomic variables to the different rating categories and maturities and thirdly 
the direction of causation between macroeconomic variables and changes in credit 
spreads. 
With respect to the first set of tests, results provided by the OLS model, based on time 
series analysis, support the negative relation between changes in credit spreads and 
consumer confidence, trade balance money supply and the term structure of interest 
rates for all maturities, but only for their lagged values. (except the US confidence 
index which is also important at time t). The expected negative relation wasn't though 
supported for the variables of GDP and industrial production. 
Evidence provided by the constituents of ML indices, supports strongly the consumer 
confidence variable, money supply and trade balance, while again we get the wrong 
sing for the variables of GDP and industrial production. It should be noted that 
relation between the terin structure and changes in credit spreads is negative for 
investment grade companies, while is positive for the non-investment grade ones. 
This result is supported irrespective of the frequency of the data (monthly or 
quarterly) used or the methodology employed. This finding can have important 
implications in the contingent claims approach and the reduced form approach for 
valuing risky debt. It is also worth mentioning that macroeconomic variables explain 
more of the variation in credit spread changes of the high yield sector rather the 
investment grade one. Results from the OLS regressions suggest that macroeconomic 
variables alone, can explain at best a 17% of the variation in medium and long term 
maturing indices, and a 20.5% in short term indices. Findings from cross sectional 
regressions suggest that aggregate factors alone can explain 27.9% of the variation in 
credit spreads for investment grade bonds and a 44.4% for high yield ones. 
With respect to the direction of causation results are a bit mixed, as provided by the 
empirical tests of the times series data. Results obtained from the granger causality 
tests for long term maturity indices generally reject the null hypotheses that 
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macroeconomic variables don't granger cause changes in credit spread indices. 
However, results for unemployment in all rating categories aren't statistically 
sufficient to reject the null nor the alternative hypothesis. With reference to medium 
term maturities, the null hypothesis is rejected for the macroeconomic variables of 
consumer confidence, CPI, GDP, money supply and the slope of the interest rates. For 
the rest of the variables, results don't provide confidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
Short term maturity indices' results, suggest that for the variables of CPI, PPI and 
money supply we reject the alternate hypothesis that changes in credit indices don't 
granger cause the aforementioned macroeconomic variables. For the rest of the 
variables in short terni maturing indices, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
macroeconomic variables don't granger cause changes in credit indices. Even though 
similar tests couldn't be performed for the constituents of the ML indices, due to the 
nature of the second set of data, results lend support, as to the higher and more 
significant informational content existing in companies of the high yield sector. This 
finding can have important implications both empirically and theoretically, in the 
sense that it can improve different macroeconomic output forecasts. 
Chgpter 5 has tested the relation between changes in credit spreads and their 
respective changes in equities. The main hypothesis tested was that changes in 
equities should prove significant for changes in spreads. intuition would suggest that 
this relation should be more strongly supported for the non-investment grade 
category. Indeed, results provided by pooled regressions affirm our intuition, with 
highly statistically and economically significant results obtained for companies 
belonging to the B rating bucket and once implied volatilities were introduced as 
depicted by the VIX index. Historical volatilities didn't provide any further support 
for the hypothesis tested. In particular, results from pooled regressions suggest that 
when implied volatilities are substituted for the historical ones, adjusted R 2S fell to 6% 
and 28% for the investment and non-investment grade samples respectively (from 
25% and 50.3% for investment and non-investment grade companies, when implied 
volatilities are considered). 
In terms of the relation between different maturity credit spread indices and equity 
variables, results strongly support the negative relation amongst them for short and 
medium term maturing indices. Findings from OLS regressions, suggest that equity 
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variables explain at best a 44% for short term maturing indices, and 35% and 37% for 
medium and long term maturing indices as reflected by the adjusted R 2S. 
Furthen-nore, the hypothesis that the VIX index doesn't granger cause credit spreads 
can be rejected at the 10% level of significance, for all rating categories, for short and 
medium maturities, while not statistically significant results were obtained for long 
term maturing bonds. 
In Chater 6 the relation between a company's financials and its corporate bond 
spreads was examined. This section has been inspired by the limited literature 
provided in using accounting ratios to predict changes in credit spreads. The reason is 
that changes in credit spreads can partially be considered as a stochastic variable, and 
as such they can't be explained to a great extent by changes in the financials of a 
company which are considered to be more static. This explains why on an individual 
basis, accounting variables are very weak in explaining credit-spread changes, with 
the exception of the variable of the company's current market capitalisation. This has 
been the most significant variable, statistically and financially wise, when tested in all 
rating categories, irrespective of the statistical method employed, since it is 
considered to be more of a "continuous" rather than a "static" variable. However. 
results do provide statistical support as to the nature and the structure of the relation 
between each variable and credit spreads, and to the value of accounting ratios as 
determinants of credit spread changes, particularly in the non-investment grade 
category. 
The last chapter of the thesis has identified a rather robust model for predicting future 
movements in credit spreads, by using variables which proved throughout this thesis 
to be the most statistically and economically important in explaining credit spreads. 
The independent variables considered are both market and firm specific variables, and 
their combination has provided a very meaningful combination in explaining the 
changes in credit spreads. Also of significant importance was the selection process 
used for bonds to qualify for this thesis and their immediate link to their respective 
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firrn specific factors extracted from Bloomberg. Although initially it was expected 
that a prediction of credit spread changes would be rather hard, on an individual basis, 
and even more so for the period we are trying to predict which exhibited high 
volatility, it was shown that due to the fact that this model entails both company 
specific and market variables, credit spread forecasts have been close to traded 
values. The model performs well especially within the first twelve months and even 
more so for investment grade companies. 
8.1. Limitations of the current thesis & Further Research 
When considering credit risk it is always very important to bear in mind that lack of 
data is the most important restriction to the formulation and implementation of any 
credit risk model. Also it is very important to consider that the line between a credit 
risk model's sophistication and its implementation is very thin. There is always this 
trade-off between the new and more sophisticated credit risk models and the 
simplicity and accuracy which is always worth pursuing. 
This thesis has been based on data which is mostly available and by using fairly 
simple statistical techniques has provided a rather robust model for predicting credit 
spread changes. It can be argued of course that other independent variables might be 
more closely linked to credit spreads, than those proposed here, or that the 
methodology employed can be improved further. It is also important to mention that 
this model doesn't consider factors such as liquidity, temporary supply and demand 
imbalances or tax effects. 
There are several issues to point out when considering the effect of macroeconomic 
variables on credit spread changes. Results provided have been a bit mixed with 
respect to the different maturity and rating categories. It is important to note that 
results reported under quarterly frequencies are not the same to those reported by 
monthly frequencies. The fact that we have derived monthly frequencies from 
quarterly reported figures of GDP and others, as a way to test their effects on monthly 
credit spreads can also be criticised. 
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Another point to explore further is the relation between the terin structure and changes 
in credit spreads is negative for investment grade companies, while is positive for the 
non-investment grade ones. This result is supported irrespective of the frequency of 
the data used or the methodology employed. This finding can have important 
implications in the contingent claims approach and the reduced forin approach for 
valuing risky debt. 
It is worth noting at this point, that results of BBB rated bonds, also support the 
negative relationship between the term structure of interest rates and the changes in 
credit spreads. Throughout this thesis it is evident that bonds belonging to this 
category tend to be very volatile, but most importantly they share some of the 
properties specific to high yield companies. Results provided not only from 
macroeconomic variables but also from equity and accounting variables, show that the 
inclusion of this category in the investment grade lowers significantly the explanatory 
power of the model. This is a point that should be further researched, since results 
from this study, even question the justification for BBB-rated bonds to be included in 
the investment grade category. 
Also it would be very interesting to explore further the properties of short term 
maturity indices, since results provided from the granger causality tests suggest that 
for the variables of CPL PPI and money supply we should reject the hypothesis that 
changes in credit indices don't granger cause the aforementioned macroeconomic 
variables. 
Another interesting result, which should be further explored is the high explanatory 
and predictive power of high yield credit spread changes for output forecasts. The 
strong explanatory ability of credit spreads, especially in the high yield sector, can 
help central bankers or other investors to improve several output forecasts. However, 
the high explanatory power of credit spreads in the high yield sector can be criticised, 
since results are based on a short time period of credit spreads. Hence the lack of 
historical data, limits the strength of our conclusion. Additionally, when financial 
markets are under stress the use of credit spreads may give the wrong signal. For 
example, the 1998 financial crisis, although led to a significant widening of credit 
spreads, was not reflected in a slowdown in economic growth in 1999. This crisis was 
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due in part to factors idiosyncratic to this market (i. e. the Russian bond default) and 
not symptomatic of a systematic deterioration of credit conditions of the magnitude 
and kind that occurred in the late 1980s. In the 1998 crisis, banks remained in 
relatively good financial health and they were in position to supply funds to offset the 
disruptions derived from the high yield market 73 
. 
Therefore, this result should be 
stress-tested on a longer sample, with more business cycles. Additionally, it may be 
beneficial to develop a general economic index of financial conditions that will 
include high yield corporate bond spread as one of its components. 
Part of the results reported from chgpter 5 support both theoretical and empirical 
evidence as to the importance for including on the one hand implied volatilities while 
excluding historical ones, as well as to the fact that the inclusion of equities add 
significant explanatory power to the modelling of credit spreads of non-investment 
grade companies. However, the analysis has pointed three points that should be 
further tested or considered: 
a. It would be interesting to elaborate further on bonds belonging to the B rating 
class as results provided, irrespective of time attributions (data frequencies 
checked) have been mostly significant compared to the other rating categories and 
by using the same explanatory variables. 
b. With respect to the time lag between changes in equities and the respective 
changes in credit spreads, results provided only by option adjusted spreads support 
the nine-month time lag. Further evidence should therefore be tested and 
evaluated accordingly. 
c. Lastly, with respect to the index maturities, it should be noted that based on the 
current set, short-term maturity bonds seemed to be better modelled by changes in 
equities than their longer-terrn counterparts. Although this argument verifies that 
bond market aren't that far behind from equity markets, we should expect this 
relation to hold also for longer term maturities and therefore should be further 
explored. 
13 For further comments on the substitution between bonds and bank credits over the 1998 crisis, refer 
to Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999. 
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With respect to chapter 6, and the use of financial ratios in predicting changes of 
credit spreads, it can be argued that their economical significance might not be that 
vast compared to theory. However, these ratios have been selected based on empirical 
evidence. Surely, they could be substituted by the other ratios and further elaboration 
on this issue would be important, since the biggest part of the literature in credit risk 
has used the accounting ratio approach in the modelling of corporate collapse. It is 
also very important to consider the broad argument of those criticising the use of 
accounting ratios as they reflect the book value of companies. If we consider that 
asset managers and credit analysts alike, always look at the financial reports of a 
company issuing a bond in order to reach a conclusion on whether to buy a corporate 
bond or not, implies that the use of accounting ratios, is still very widely used in the 
finance world. As such it should get more attention in terins of more research in the 
academic literature. Of course, it is up to the accounting profession to come up with a 
better way of reporting off balance sheet risks of the company, but until that happens, 
improvements can be made in the prediction of credit spread changes with the use of 
accounting ratios. 
Forecasts on credit spreads provided in chapter 7, should be further explored, if one 
can have access to the ML indices, in order to get more updated information and 
check for the predictive accuracy of the credit spreads for a longer time period. Also it 
is worth noting that despite the higher explanatory power for explaining changes in 
credit spreads in the high yield category, model's forecasts are more accurate for 
investment grade companies. But this can be explained by the higher volatility 
exhibited in non-investment grade companies. 
In addition to the limitations and points to research further that were derived from the 
current thesis, there are two areas in credit risk modelling which are of great interest: 
Estimating a credit risk model as the one described in this thesis but for emerging 
market countries. Although this is a very interesting area of research, the difficulty 
is focused on the lack of time series data available in these countries. Only 
recently, an effort to collect data in electronic form has begun and one of the main 
reasons for the more systematic effort is that it constitutes one of the Basel 11 
requirements. Also and more importantly, it would be very interesting to examine 
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how the amended Basel definition of default will affect the structural and reduced 
form approaches. 
(2) The next area of focus relates to the Basel's developments related to credit risk. 
Although we agree that the New Accord constitutes a framework which provides 
guidelines for properly measuring and managing credit risk, if it is followed on a 
consistent basis, the argument put forward for ultimate reductions in the minimum 
capital requirements is questionable. In particular, whether the proposed 
treatments related to the measurement and management of credit risk will actually 
lead to a decrease in the minimum capital that banks will be required to hold or 
the purpose is to force banks (especially in the non-developed countries) to have 
some more sophisticated credit risk systems in place in order to grant and/or 
follow credits. If one considers the money paid and the time consumed in every 
financial institution in order to resolve IT issues or other legal matters in order to 
comply to the new Accord, the line between the financial and human resources 
consumed, to the potential decrease in the minimum capital requirements that 
banks will ultimately hold (if they follow Internal Ratings Based Approach either 
Foundation or the Advanced), becomes very thin. Potentially, a closer look on the 
resources involved especially in European banks to accomplish all issues related 
to Basel 11, will confirm this. 
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LAPPENDIX 1- Credit Metrics 
Credit VaR for a bond or loan 
1. A transition matrix is created in order to specify a rating system, which will include the 
rating categories together with the probabilities of credit migration, within a given time 
frame. The main assumption made by CM is that all issuers are credit homogeneous 
within the same rating class with the same transition default probabilities. 
2. The risk horizon should be specified. This is usually one year or a longer time frame can 
be specified depending on whether a longer risk horizon is required. 
3. Then the forward discount curve at the pre-determined risk horizon should be specified 
for each credit category, and if default occurs the value of the instrument is named the 
recovery rate of face value of "par". 
4. The information provided from above is translated in the forward distribution of the 
changes in portfolio value according to credit migration. 
Credit VaR for a loan or bond portfolio 
Using a transition matrix (as provided by one of the large rating agencies), and assuming no 
correlation between changes in credit quality, joint migration probabilities are derived. Each 
entry in the transition matrix is simply the product of the transition probabilities for each 
obligor. 
These correlations depend upon: 
* The industry in which the firms are included 
The geographical region in which the firms are located, and 
The state of the economy in the business cycle, i. e. a slowdown or growth in economic 
indicators. Thus, default and migration probabilities cannot remain stationary over time. 
Effectively this means that there is need for a structural model which bridges the default 
probability changes and identifies some variables with stable correlations over a period of 
time. 
CM also uses the equity prices as a proxy for the firm's asset value, which in turn is derived 
as follows: 
CM estimates correlations between equity return of different obligors, and then the model 
deduces correlations between changes in credit quality directly from joint distribution of 
equity returns. The framework used for the valuation of corporate securities was initially 
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developed by Merton (1974), i. e. the option pricing model, according to which the firm's 
assets are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian 
motion, (eq. 1) i. e. 
U2 
Vt 
= 
Vo expl(p 
-2 )t + altz, 
where 
Vt : Firm's asset value and follows a Brownian motion 
Z, 
- 
N(O, 1), with mean pt and variance of cý of instantaneous rate of return of the 
firm's assets d V, / V, 
V, follows a log-normal distribution with an expected value at time t of E M) 
- 
V. exp 
40 
2. The firm has a very simple capital structure and is financed solely by equity and a zero 
coupon debt instrument maturing at time T, with a face value F, and a current market 
value of Bt. Default can only occur at maturity of the debt obligation if the value of the 
assets is less than F. 
3. Merton's model is also modified by CM to include changes in credit quality. This 
generalisation of Merton's model assumes : 
Normalised log-retums which are normally distributed over a period of time with o 
mean and variance equal to one. Same distribution is followed by all obligors within the 
same category. 
If PDEF is the probability of an obligor rated for example BB at present to default, then 
the critical asset value VDEF is given as follows: (Eq. 2) 
PDEF 
= 
Pr [V, 2ý VDEFI 
According to the aforementioned equation 
, 
default occurs when Zt satisfies the 
following relation: 
PDEF ý Pr f In* (VDEF L)ýJ_z: 11) 
_W - 
Lcýl 2t 2t Zt 
1A 
Pr[Zt: 9 [-ln(Vo/VDEF)+( ýt 
_ 
«: y2 /2) )t] 
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Where, r= In(V, / Vj +(U_ (CF2 / ))tl js the normalised return with N[O, lj 
Zcc is the threshold point in the standard normal distribution corresponding to a cumulative 
probability of PDEF. Then the critical asset value VDEF that can trigger default is Zcc = 
-d2 
. 
In 
tum, 
d2 
= In DEF) + (CY2 / 2) )t which is called the distance to default. LV-2-L-VD 
0-ýt 
only these levels are needed to derive the joint migration probabilities and can be calculated 
without the need to observe the asset value or the mean and variance values. In order to find 
out the critical asset value VDEF the asset volatility and the asset return should be estimated. it 
should also be noted that the normalised log-returris follow a joint non-nal distribution. 
We could also consider the case where we have two obligors BB and A rated, with 
probabilities of default of P, (PDEFI) and P2 (PDEF2), respectively and P(DEFI, DFIQ ) being the 
joint probability of default, and DEF, and DEF2 is the vent of default for the two obligors. 
From the above, the following default correlation can be derived: 
Corr (DEFI, DEF2) ý 
P( DEF DEF 2)-PI*P2 
-%ýrp I(IPI)*P2(I-P2) 
therefore the joint probability of default is: 
P(DEFI, DEF2)ý Pr [ V, '-5 VDEF 1, V2 ýý VDEF2) 
where, 
V 15 V2: asset values for both obligors at time t 
VDEF 1, VDEF 2,: critical values which trigger default. This can also be written as: 
I 
P(DEF 19 DEF2 )ý Pr [r, :! ý -d 21 , r2 -< -d 22 N2 (-d 21 -d 22, p 
where, 
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ri, r2 are normalised asset returns for obligors I and 2, 
d 2' d22 corresponding the distance to default 
N2 (x, y, p): denotes the cumulative standard bivariate normal distribution where p 
is the correlation coefficient between x and 
Credit VaR for large portfolios 
The procedure described in the previous section cannot be applied to very large portfolios. In 
order to derive a model for very large portfolios, CM implements a Monte Carlo simulation 
to generate full distribution of the portfolio values at I-year credit horizon. The model is 
derived as follows: 
1, Asset return thresholds are derived for each rating class, 
2. Obligors' correlation asset returns are calculated for each pair. 
3. Asset return scenarios are generated according to the normal probability distribution and 
the "Cholesky" decomposition method is used in order to generate correlated normal 
variables. Every scenario made is characterised by n standardised asset returns, one for 
each pair of obligors making up the portfolio. 
4. Asset returns are planned such as to correspond to the threshold levels derived in I" step. 
5. The portfolio is revalued given the spread curves are applying to each rating. 
6. The above procedure is repeated for a number of times until credit returns represent 
diagrammatically a fat 
-tailed and highly skewed graph. 
7. Then the percentiles of the distribution of the future values of the portfolio are then 
derived. 
Some other important element inherent in the CM model are: 
Credit VaR and calculation of the capital charge 
Economic capital stands as a cushion to any unexpected events which might lead to default 
or migration. CM has also found a way to derive the capital charge related to risk, which can 
be expressed as follows: 
Capital 
=EV- V(p) 
Where, 
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EV: the expected value of the portfolio 
V(p): value of the portfolio in the worst case scenario, at p% confidence level. 
FV: forward value of the portfolio = Vo(l+PR) 
Vo: current mark-to-market value of the portfolio 
PR: promised return of the portfolio 
ER: expected return of the portfolio 
EL: expected loss: FV- EV 
The expected loss goes into reserves and is imputed as a cost in the RAROC calculation, i. e. 
the capital charge comes only as a protection against unexpected losses. 
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I APPENDIX 2- Credit Risk +I 
Distribution of default losses for a portfolio 
In order to derive the loss distribution of a portfolio, the losses are divided into bands, with 
the exposures in each band being defined as a single number. Each band is then regards as 
being a single portfolio of loans and bonds, whereas we have: 
ei 
= Vi * Ili 
whereas, 
E; j is the expected loss in band j, in L units 
Vj is the common exposure in band j in L units 
ýtj : is the expected number of defaults in band 
therefore we have, 
4j 
= 
Ej / Vj 
and the expected loss of an obligor A in units of L is: 
6A =%A/ L 
then the expected loss for a 1-year period in band j, is the expected loss of all obligors 
belonging to the same band, i. e. 
EJ 
=I 6A 
A: VA=Vj 
Whereby, the expected number of defaults is given by 
Aý EJ I VJ ý- E FA/ Vj ýI EA/ VA 
A: VA=Vj A: VA=Vj 
In order to derive for the portfolio as a whole the distribution of losses, the following are 
considered: 
Probability generating function (" pgf ") for each band 
Each band is taken as a portfolio of exposures, whereby the pgf for the band is given by: 
00 Oo 
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(z) =S P(loss nL) Z= EP (n defautls )Z 
n=O n=O 
Since the number of defaults follows a Poisson distribution then: 
00 
Gi (z) =E : pj I*a, ýnL_ Z n, j - exp ýtj , pý *Z 
n=O n! 
2. The pgf for the entire portfolio is : 
00 mm 
G(z) = I-I exp jjj, pý *Z 'j J= exp Egj+Y, gj Z'ý) 
j=l j=l j=l 
m 
where ýi =E, ýij denotes the expected number of defaults for the entire portfolio. 
j=l 
3. The loss distribution of the whole portfolio 
Having pgf given, =: > P (loss of n L) = (I /n! ) * (d" G(z)/ d Z" )I z=o, for n= 1,2,... 
Where the probabilities can be expresses in a closed form and they are dependent on ej and Vj 
CR+ also proposed different extensions of the basic model which can be concluded to the 
following: 
" The model can be extended to a multi-period, 
" The variability of default rates can be assumed to result form a number of factors each of 
which represent an area of activity. Each factor K, is represented by a random Xk 
, 
which 
denotes the number of defaults in sector K, and which follow a gamma distribution. The 
mean default rate is also assumed to be a linear function of the Xk factors, which are also 
assumed to be independent. CR+ derives a closed form for the loss distribution of a bond 
or loan portfolio which is effective from a estimation point of view. 
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I APPENDIX 3- KMV Model 
KMV's model can be derived in three steps: 
1. Estimation of the market value and the volatility of the firm's assets 
2. Calculation of the distance to default 
- 
which is an index measure 
3. Scaling of the distance to default to actual probabilities. 
Each of these steps are analysed in turn as shown below: 
Lets assume that the market position of equity holders in a borrowing finn is equal to holding 
a call option on the assets of the firm 
-let call the firm A- which effectively means that 
the payoff to the equity holder has a limited downside and a long-tail upside. Then equity 
can be valued as follows: 
E=h (A, OA 
(a above the variables denotes that they are directly observable) 
in the above equation the market value of equity of the borrowing firm, depends on five 
variables, as did the BSM model for valuing a call option. However, still the values of A, (YA 
are not observable. In order to resolve the problem, KMV argued that there is another relation 
between the observable volatility of a firm's equity value (CYE) and the unobservable volatility 
of the firm's assets 
(CYA), i. e. 
CIE 9 (CIA) 
and then the values of A and (IA can be found, but still the formulas for the stock price 
-asset 
volatility have to be determined. 
KMV also allows for dividends in the BSM model. Lets assume that B is the default exercise 
price 
- 
including net short term liabilities and half the book value of long term liabilities 
outstanding- 
. 
Even then, the strike prices have varied among different versions of the model, 
and therefore it was argued that this is the result of the inclusion of net rather than total short 
term liabilities. The maturity variable can also vary, but is usually set to be one year. Based 
on all the above assumption the values of A and (YA can be specified for each obligor and 
generate EDF rates. 
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Furthermore, lets assume that the future asset values are normally distributed, then the 
distance to default can be calculated from t=O to the I year horizon as follows: 
Distance from Default =A-B/ CYA 
The normal distribution assumption is a very important element of the KMV methodology as 
it can allow for joint probability distributions to be calculated, but the accuracy of such a 
methodology is rather questionable. In order to overcome this problem, KMV develops 
empirical EDFs 
-instead of theoretical ones- as follows: 
Lets assume that a large database of companies having and not having defaulted in the past is 
available, and that the distance to default is calculated to be 2cr. Then we compare the 
percentage of the firms which had a distance to default of 2cr at time t=O and have actually 
defaulted in 1-year horizon to all the other firms which had 2cy distance to default at t=O, i. e. 
Empirical EDF = 
Number of firms that defaulted in I-year, with asset value of 
2a from B at time t=O 
Total population of firms with asset values of 2a from B at 
time t=O 
The empirical EDF can differ from the theoretical one. The EDF rates are rather sensitive due 
to their link to the stock market prices. However, empirical evidence shows that EDFs have 
been rather reliable indicators, i. e. the EDF for E13M started to rise significantly before its 
deterioration of the credit rating; and the EDF for Krung Thai Bank started to rise 
substantially before the Thai crisis in mid-1997. 
It should also be noted that since EDF rates reflect information of the equity markets-given 
their link with stock prices- it could be argued that EDFs would be more efficient in 
developed rather than in emerging markets. 
269 
I APPENDIX 4- ML Industry Classification per Credit Rating Category 
Indt-vil L Inc1LvI2L IndLvI3L IndLvI4L MIL Indat Total 
Corporate Financial Banking Banking II 
Banking Total 
- 
11 Mortgage Banks a Thrifts 1 
Mortgage Banks a Thrifts ToW 1 
Banking Tota l 12 
Finance & InI S222/C Financing 2 [ n ! !! !3 e 21 37 
ConsJC 
- - 1 1 . a s e 1-inancing Total 37 
Finance a In vestment T otal 37 
Insurance Life-Insur nce 7 jl-ifaý Insurance Tat 
_ 
e 7 ý5 K 
I 
JPSC Total 
Insurance To tal 
Financial Total 
-6-7 
Industrials Consumer od 
- 
Wholesale 2 
Food 
- 
Wholesale Total 2 
Food a Drug erl "rta:: 1 Food a Drug Rota iýrs Toted I Pharmaceuticals 
- 
12 Pharmaceuticals TR al 12 Consumer N on-Cyclical Total is 
Energy Ne ated Energy [I ' 3 
ld. g rerted Energy Total 3 
Energy Total 3 
Real Estate l !E :i S -2 
1 E T; Total 2 
Real Estate Total 2 
Services Cy Airlines 9 
Airlines Total 9 Transportation Excluding Akirkcad 3 [Transportation tXcluding AlrfiRall Total 3 
Services Cyc lical Total 12 
I/Services I 
IrServices Total 1 
_ Telecommunications Total 
Industrials To tal 33 
Utility lutilfty ti ctric-DistrfTrans I 
Electric-Distr. rrrains Otal I 1 E :!! ctEc- At re d : Eg 2d 4 
- 
, e a Zir z is i g a nt Total - 4 FLItility Toted 5 
Utility Total -5 
Corporate Total 95 
Quasi a Uuasi 6 Aw. ncy !A!! '2 L 2 y 849 7 genc y Total 849 
Agency Total 849 
Foreign oreign Sovereign Sovr 4 
Foreign Sovereign Total 4 
Foreign Sovereign Total 
- -- ----------- 
4 ýo Yernrnentj ! raryte G e! rEirn u ed ! 2YR
- -TA 
2 36 
Ye nýjerjt 0 'ZI 50 ý aranteed Total 36 
Government Guaranteed Total 36 
Supranationj Sup E!! n at; 2na: 81 
, ,,, ; raý ;t ii; T al 61 
Supranationa l Total 
81 
Quasi Foreign Government I otal 950 
Quasi Foreig n Government Total 950 
SecurrtizedPý01 ýOcurnlzwu -set Backe A13S Automobile 122 
ABS Automobile Total 
122 
ABS Credit Cards 
- - - 
75 
ABS Credit Cards fa agl 75 
ABS Home Equity ý2!! Ljj I- 128 
ABS Home Equity Loan. Total 
128 
ABS Manufactured Housing 
ý ManWaOlured Housing 1 otal 
126 
- Wbý 
Riceiianeous Abs 
126 
AUS Miscellaneous AtKS Total 
3 
ABS Utilities 3 
ABS Utilities Total 40 
Ts--satBacke d Total 
40. 
494 
Mortgage E38 1 Backed ,2 MO 
417 iZr1g ge Backea Total 417 
, 
Mortgage Backed Total 
417 
Securitized Total 911 
Securitized/Coll ateralized Tot 
- 
al 911 
Sovereign ýoverv4n 1 Sovereign S ,Z El aRl P2ý 112 I 
I 
v r g Total 
Sovereign Tate] 
112 
112 
- 
- 
Sovereign Total 
112 
ýF, 
--inin Total 112 
iffiriii Taltall 2.066- 
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I APPENDIX 4A 
- 
Calculation of weighted versions of pooled regressions I 
a. Cross Section Weights: It estimates a feasible GLS specification assuming the 
presence of cross section heteroscedasticity. GLS is performed by dividing the 
weight series by its mean then multiplying all of the data of each observation by 
the scaled weight series. The scaling of the weight series is a normalisation that 
has no effect on the parameter results, but makes the weighted residuals more 
comparable to the unweighted residuals. The White test of heteroscedasticity 
consistent covariance is accompanying the GLS results, which provides correct 
estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of 
unknown form. This method accounts for cross-equation heteroskedasticity by 
minimizing the weighted surn-of-squared residuals. The equation weights are the 
inverses of the estimated equation variances, and are derived from unweighted 
estimation of the parameters of the system. This method yields identical results to 
unweighted single-equation least squares if there are no cross-equation 
restrictions. 
b. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR): It estimates a feasible GLS 
specification correcting for both cross section heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation. It is also known as the multivariate regression, or 
Zellner's method. It estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across 
equations. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are based upon 
parameter estimates of the unweighted system. 
ý2ý101T ý 
(311 IT (712 IT 
GIN IT 
CF21 IT CF22 IT 
CF2N IT 
where Z is the symmeteric matrix of the contemporaneous correlations : 
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CTI 1 CY12 
....... 
GIN 
(721 C722 
....... 
CF2N 
with typical element crij 
=E (ejt eid, which is assumed constant across T. 
The SUR model is estimated by using aij estimated from a first stage pooled OLS 
regression : 
cy ij =It (y it 
- 
yit)(yjt-yjt)/ max(T, 
, 
Tj) 
The use of the max function in the denominator handles the case of unbalanced data 
by downweighting the covariance tenns. Provided that the number of missing values 
is asymptotically negligible, this approach yields a consistent estimator of Y- that is 
generally invertible. The parameter estimates and the covariance matrix of the 
parameters of the model are computed using the standard GLS formula. 
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IX 5a 
- 
RESULTS BASED ON MONTHLY DATA(GLS Method) 
Empirical results based on ML Indices (Monthly Data) 
Total Sa ple 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value 11-value 
onstant OMO 6.6 0.00 
JS Consumer Confidence 
-0.44 -16.3 0.00 
GPD 0.01 8.04 0.00 
Industrial Production 0.62 21.2 0.00 
CPl + 0.09 9.58 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.13 -9.09 0.00 
MS 
-0.01 -8.96 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
- 
White Heteroscedastica Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Adjusted R-squared 7 
Durbin Watson stat 2.2 
Unweighted Statistics 
Adjiisted R-squared 
- -2 Durbin Watson stat 
+ 
2.2 
Investment Grade Sample 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-Value 
Constant 0.018 12.8 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.33 -14.7 0.00 
GPD 0.02 16.6 0.00 
industrial Production 0.38 10.14 0.00 
CP1 + 0.08 6.45 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.19 -9.35 0.00 
MS 
-0.011 -4.56 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
- 
White Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors & Covarianc 
Adjusted R-squared 7 
Durbin Watson stat 2.1 
Unweighted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 2 
urbin Watson stat 1.9 
Non 
- 
Investment Grade Sample 
ariables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.04 2 3.4 2 0.00 
S Consumer Confidence 
-0.78 
_ 
-19.21 0.00 
GPD 0.03 18.15 0.00 
Industrial Production 0.7 15.58 0.00 
CPl + 
-0.08 -5.09 0.00 Term Structure 0.48 20.46 0.00 
NIS 
-0.01 F 
--6.45 0.00 
Weighted Statistics 
- 
ite t cedasticiýY! QLng istent Standaid rs & Covari I ance 
Adjusted R-squared 14 
Durbin Watson stat 2 
Unweighted Statistics ýdjusted R-s uared 2 
Purbin Watson stat 1.5 
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I APPENDIX 5b 
- 
RESULTS BASED ON MONTHLY DATA (SUR Method) 
AAA 
- 
Seemingi Unrelated gression 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficientl t-value P-value 
Constant 0.04 3.76 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.45 -2.93 0.02 
ridustrial Production (LAGS 3) 0.52 1.73 0.08 
PI (LAGS 3) + 0.2 1.98 0.00 
, 
DP (LAGS 3) 
-0.03 -1.02 0.09 S 
-0.44 -2.96 0.00 1, 
, i Ferm StrLICture 1 -0.43 -3.23 0.00 Unweighted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 
Durbin Watson stat 
AA 
- 
Seemingi Unrelated R gression 
Variables Expected Sign Coefflcient c l t-value P-value 
Constant 0.03 
fn 
3.10 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.35 
N 
-2.32 0.02 
Industrial Production (LAGS 3) 0.52 1.73 0.08 
CPI (LAGS 3) + O 8 2.35 0.00 
Tenn Structure 
-0.36 -3.45 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 
-0.01 -1.22 0.00 S 
-0.04 -2.77 0.00 
Unweighted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 2 
Durbin Watson stat 2 
A- Seemingly Unrelated Re gressi 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.01 - 3.14 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.42 -18.01 0.02 
Industrial Production (LAGS 3) 0.43 10.67 0.00 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.05 3.77 1 0.00 
Term Structure 
-0.06 -3.21 0.00 
ms 
-0.05 -3.48 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 
- -0.07 -1.07 0.09 
Unwelghted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 2 
Durbin Watson stat 2.1 
BBB 
-S emingly Unr lated Regressio 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.03 6.87 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.43 -15.15 0.00 GPD(LAGS 3) 
-0.01 -5.70 0.00 Industrial Production(LAGS 3) 0.4 7.86 0.00 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.21 14.5 0.00 
Tenn Structure 0.32 11.7 0.00 
ms 
-0.04 -10.5 0.00 Unwelghted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 
Durbin Watson stat 2 
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BB 
- 
Seemingly Unre lated Regression 
ariables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-vulue 
Cojistant 
4 ! 7ý 
(). () 1 14.2 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.25 -12.3 0.00 
Industrial Production (LAGS 3) 
- 
0.95 11.3 0.00 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.25 12.3 0.00 
Ten-n Structure 0.14 4.71 0.00 
NIS 
-0.14 -5.03 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.02 7.26 0.00 
Unweighted Statistics 
djusted R-squared 
__ _N4 urbin Watson stat _ 2 
B- Seemingly Unrel ted Regression 
ariables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
onstant 
-0.04 10.7 0.00 US Consumer Confidence 
-0.67 -11.25 0.00 GDP(LAGS 3) 0.02 7.22 0.00 
Industrial Production (LAGS 3) 1.13 10.44 0.00 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.10 2.73 0.00 
Term Structure 0.10 2.25 0.00 
Ms 
- -0.02 -3.23 0.00 
Unweighted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 13 ýurbin Watson stat 2 
C- Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value P-value 
Constant 0.04 10.7 0.00 
US Consumer Confidence 
-0.67 -11.2 0.00 
GDP(LAGS 3) 0.02 3.62 0.00 
Industrial Production (LAGS 3) 1.09 8.64 0.00 
CPI (LAGS 3) + 0.12 2.73 0.00 
Term Structure 0.11 2.25 0.02 
Ms 
- -0.01 -3.23 0.00 Unwelehted Statistics 
Adjusted R-squared 14 
Durbin Watson stat 
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I- APPENDIX 6- COR"LATIONS I 
5.14. Correlation Amoniz Dei)endent and IndeDendent Variables (Lon2 Term) 
LONG TERM CRED IT SPREAD I NDICES AND EQUITY VARI BLES (C ANGES) 
AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- I RUSSELL S&P VIX 
AAA 1.00 
AA 0.00 1.00 
, 
A+ 
-0.05 -0.07 1.00 
A 
-0.05 -0.05. 0.77 1.00. 
A- 0.01 
-0.021 0.73 0.82 1.00 
BBB+ 
-0.07 0.041 0.65 0.74 0.79 1.00 
BBB 0.06 0.02 0.60 0.61 0.67 0.78 1.00 
BBB- 
-0.03 -0.07 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.54 0.59 1.00 
RUSSELL 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 
-0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 is&p 1-0.07 
-0.12 
. 
ýO2 ý. 02 0.00 
-0.041 - -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 1 1.00 ivix 1 0.03 0.02 0.061 0.00 1 0.00 0.051 0.04 0.14 0.08 1 0.62 170: 0] 
.0 
5.15. Correlation Among Dependent and Independent Variables (MediumTerm) 
MEDIU M TER M CREDIT SPREAD INDICES AND EQUIT Y VAR ABLES (C HANGES) 
AAA AA A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- RUSSELL S&P VIX 
AAA 1.00 
AA 
-0.73 1.00 
A+ 
-0.30 0.37 1.00 
A. 
-0.22 0.33 
. 
0.76 1.00 
A- 1 
-0.15 0.37 1 0.35 0.19 1 1.00 
BBB+ 
-0.15 0.36 0.39 0.26 0.80 1.00 
BBB 
-0.18 0.40 0.42 0.28 6-6-8 -0.71 1.00 
BBB- 
-0.07 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.58 0.58 1 
0.65 1.00 
RUSSELL 0.03 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 1-0.13 -0.16 1.00 
. 
S&P 
. 
-0.07 0.07 
. 
0.01 0.02 _ 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.07 
-0.07 1.00 Ivix 10.03 1 
-0.02 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 1-0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.61 1.00 
5.16. Correlation Among Dmendent and IndeDendent Variables (Short Term) 
SHOR T TER M CREDIT SP READ I NDICES AND EQUITY VARI BLES (CHANG ES) 
AAA AA I A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- RUSSELL S&P I VIX 
AAA 1.00 
AA 0.14 1.00 
A+ 0.34 0.47 1.00 
A. 0.39 0.45 0.68 1.00 
A- 0.04 0.50. 0.49 0.65 1.00 
BBB+ 0.15 0.34 0.45 0.58 0.72 1.00 
BBB 0.02 0.34 0.43 0.57 0.68 0.69 1.001 
BBB- 0.13 0.37 0.41 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.66 1.00 
RUSSELL 0.07 
-0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.11, -0.06 -0.15 -0.21 1.00 
. 
S&P 1 
-0.10 -0.11 -0.14 1 -0.03 0.01 1 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -O. L7 1 00 Ivix 1 0.06 10.09 1 0.11 1 0.08 
-0.061 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.08 10.61 1.00 
281 
I APPENDIX 7A I 
Table 1 
Forec sting Ability in Percentage Terms under the GLS Method 
Investment Grade High Yiel d 
AAA AA A BBB BB B C 
I Quarter ahead 99% 102% 90% 88% 78% 87% 115%* 
2 Quarters Ahead 93% 88% 84% 90% 73% 92.3 30% 
1 Year Ahead 98% 100% 97% 99% 82% 97.8 78% 
2 Years Ahead 83% 81% 85% 85% 93% 89% 91% 
2 Year & 3/4 ahead 81. % 1 81% 87% 85% 93% 89% 96% 
Avergage Forecasting Ability in 
Percentage Terms for Investment 
Grade Sample 
Avergage Forecasting Ability 
in Percentage Terms for 
High Yield Sample 
1 Quarter ahead 92% 93% 
2 Quarters Ahead 90% 65% 
1 Year Ahead 99% 86% 
2 Years Ahead 84% 91% 
2 Year & 3/4 ahead 84% 93% 
Percentages above have been calculated as Mean Actual Spread Levels divided by Mean 
Forecasted Spread Levels 
* AA and C percentages imply that the forecasted spread is smaller than the actual one, hence 
the forecast is underestimating credit spread levels. 
Table 2 
Forecasting Ability in Percentage Terms under the GILS Method on the Three Random 
Samples 
A B C 
1 Quarter ahead 85% 94% 94% 
2 Quarters Ahead 84% 101%* 85% 
1 Year Ahead 103% 108% * 97% 
2 Years Ahead 91% 143%* 86% 
2 Year & 3/4 ahead 109%* 91% 90% 
Percentages above have been calculated as Mean Actual Spread Levels divided by Mean 
Forecasted Spread Levels. 
* Percentages imply that the forecasted spread is smaller than the actual one, hence the Iforecast 
is underestimating credit spread levels. 
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I APPENDIX 7B I 
Table 1 
Forec sting Ability in Percentage Terms und er the SUR Method 
Investment Grade igh Yield 
AAA AA A BBB BB B C 
1 Quarter ahead 94% 126% 98% 95% 74% 87% 61% 
2 Quarters Ahead 135%* 103%* 94% 94% 72% 91% 70% 
1 Year Ahead 78% 99% 94% 94% 87% 97% 83% 
2 Years Ahead 82% 85% 98% 98% 92% 88% 174%* 
2 Year & 3/4 ahead 81% 91% 98% 1 98% 91% 89% 113% 
Avergage Forecasting Ability in 
Percentage Terms for Investment 
Grade Sample 
Avergage Forecasting Ability 
in Percentage Terms for High 
Yield Sample 
1 Quarter ahead 90% 74% 
2 Quarters Ahead 87% 78% 
1 Year Ahead 91% 89% 
2 Years Ahead 91% 68% 
2 Year & 3/4 ahead 92% 89% 
Percentages above have been calculated as Mean Actual Spread Levels divided by Mean 
Forecasted Spread Levels. 
I 
* Percentages imply that the forecasted spread is smaller than the actual one, hence the forecast is underestimating credit spread levels. 
Table 2 
Forecasting Ability in Percentage Terms under the SUR Method on the Three Random 
Samples 
A B C 
1 Quarter ahead 86% 94% 100% 
2 Quarters Ahead 83% 100% 84% 
1 Year Ahead 103% 107% 88% 
2 Years Ahead 96% 84% 72% 
2 Year &% ahead 71% 77% 
Percentages above have been calculated as Mean Actual Spread Levels divided by Mean 
Forecasted Spread Levels. 
* Percentages imply that the forecasted spread is smaller than the actual one, hence the 
forecast is underestimating credit spread levels. 
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